N-liability bill expected in Parliament session!Let NOT U.S. corporations off the hook! Government of India Incs is churning out one Hazardous Bill after another. This time it is a Bill called the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage! It would Replicate Bhopal Tragedy without Compensation in an Age of Nuclear Energy Disinvestment!

Indian Holocaust My Father`s Life and Time-Three hundred SIX

Palash Biswas

http://indianholocaustmyfatherslifeandtime.blogspot.com/

"You've seen our two countries cooperate more and more, particularly since the horrific November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, which the Indians refer to as '26/11'," he said.

more by Robert Blake - Feb 19, 2010 - The Hindu (11 occurrences)

'Indo-US N-deal to boost economic ties'

Sunday, February 21, 2010,16:56 [IST]

New York, Feb 21: Meera Shankar, Indian Ambassador to US, has said that the Indo-US Civil nuclear deal will boost bilateral economic ties.

Buzz up!

Addressing a gathering, Shankar described the relations between New Delhi and Washington as attaining "unprecedented progress."

The envoy said the civil nuclear agreement is a "symbol of and instrument for the transformation in our relationship."

Shankar noted that the deal would "boost bilateral economic ties and also address our shared concerns on energy security and climate change."

She further said that India would increase nuclear energy generation from 4,000 MW at present to 20,000 MW by 2020.

"India is today the most competitive producer of small nuclear power plants," she said.

"As worldwide interest in nuclear energy revives, including in the US, India looks forward to building productive international partnerships in this field," she added.

OneIndia News

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BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

Eighteen years have gone by since the Bhopal Gas tragedy. The victims of the biggest industrial accident are yet to receive succour. "The Bhopal Gas Tragedy " has been lost in the collective consciousness of the nation. Yes, life has to go on - we must light candles and offer prayers for the victims of September, 11 2001 - but do spare a thought for those who lost their lives in their devotion to duty.

I am talking of the "unhonoured," "unwept" and "unsung" railwaymen who stood like "boys on the burning deck" and kept the wheels of Indian Railways turning.

Third of December 1984 dawned like any other day at Bhusaval Junction the heart of Central Railway operations. It was a pleasant bracing winter morning and it was "…business as usual…." The 00-00 hours to 08-00 hours shift in the Control Office was busy tying up the loose ends of the previous day's operations and gathering information to plan the day's work. The telephone lines were buzzing from different directions and all the 'control boards' were busy like the proverbial beehives. North bound trains towards Itarsi Junction, South bound trains towards Mumbai, West bound trains towards Surat and East bound trains towards Nagpur marked their progress on the control charts.

But wait! the Itarsi line was fading. Those were the days when railway communication was mainly through the overhead telegraph wires. Optic Fibre Cable was still in its infancy. It was the pre Sam-Pitroda days and telephone instruments were a luxury. There were no STD facilities and what was called a "lighting call" took a couple of hours to materialise!

At first the Bhusaval Control Office shrugged off the lack of communication with Itarsi as routine, but when the silence continued it was disquieting. The railways still had their more than 100 years old MORSE instruments functioning and there was a class of railwaymen which is extinct now called 'Signallers' who used the DOT-DASH-DOT method to raise Bhopal. Finally the headquarters control office at Mumbai confirmed that there was something seriously amiss at Bhopal which in those days was an area controlled from the Jhansi Railway Divisional Office. Communication to Bhopal was via Itarsi.

By about 6-00 a.m it was evident that a disaster had struck Bhopal. No trains were leaving Bhopal and those which entered just seemed to have disappeared into a 'black hole' till the yard was full and no more trains could be admitted.

The initial reports were almost flippant – "…. some evil fairy has struck and sleeping sickness has overtaken Bhopal…." Wild rumours started spreading. In the aftermath of the 1984 riots the militant Sikh organisations were blamed for everything.

Black 3^rd December brought the news that people had been dropping dead like flies in Bhopal and those who could manage were scrambling into trains which were running away from Bhopal. There was a mass exodus with the Government functionaries abandoning Bhopal and commandeering whatever vehicles were available.

As the next shift railway workers streamed in at Bhopal they saw the horrifying sight of their colleagues slumped over at the workspot. Signalmen and Stationmasters in the busy NISHATPURA yard which was the epicentre of the gas leak had collapsed with the signal levers still in their hands. Since the signals did not turn green the engine drivers, died in their cabs dutifully waiting for the signals. Clerks at the booking windows had keeled over with the ticket boxes and the cash safe wide open. The only redeeming feature was that the deadly gas had struck without fear or favour and even thieves dare not enter Bhopal!

Back at the Bhusaval Control Office the full impact of the happenings at Bhopal was still sinking in. Plans were made to send medical aid and manpower to Bhopal to restart the operations.

In the glorious tradition of Indian Railways not one employee questioned the decision to send people to Bhopal. Whenever there is a disaster, man made or natural, it is ingrained in railwaymen to rush to the scene of the disaster and none will quit his post till the job is done. The last civilian to leave Tezpur when the Chinese invaded India in 1962 was the Station Master!

Meanwhile, rumours had spread that a second wave of poisonous gas, even deadlier than the first one, had broken loose and the steady exodus further swelled due to the rush of the panic stricken residents.

While these streams of humanity were going out of Bhopal, there was one band of railwaymen going towards Bhopal. In retrospect one may say "Fools rushed where angels feared to tread," but at that point of time the Railwaymen and women of Itarsi, 90 kms. from Bhopal banded themselves together and set off in a caravan of road vehicles to the illfated city of Bhopal. Unmindful of the people exhorting them to go back, the unsung heroes armed with food and medicine, wended their way to Bhopal.

Nobody knew exactly what had happened except that some gas had engulfed Bhopal and as the sun rose the gas diffused and finally dispersed leaving in its wake thousands of humans choking, coughing and blinded. The "council of war" at the Bhusaval control office decided that a relief train should start immediately. On the presumption that only a nerve gas could disable people so rapidly, all the stocks of ATROPINE were commandeered along with hundreds of vials of eye drops.

The Special Train carrying a multidisciplinary team of railway employees including doctors and para-medics, covered the distance of 302 kms. from Bhusaval to Itarsi in 3 hours flat. When we reached Bhopal we were informed that the Government Administration had finally got their act together - probably shamed into action by the railwaymen who had proceeded from Itarsi.

We were told to organise relief operations in the Itarsi civil hospital. We found that the ATROPINE vials and "Visine" eye drops were useless. I still do not know whether there is an antidote to METHYL ISOCYANATE - the poisonous substance which had annihilated everyone near the Union Carbide Factory in Bhopal.

The sight at Itarsi was something straight out of Dante's 'Inferno.' Dozens of men, women and children were writhing in agony and we watched them in horrified helplessness. Death was a welcome relief to the victims, their eyeballs swollen red and bursting, every breath bringing agony to their burning lungs. The screams of the tortured bodies were in different languages. As train after train went past Itarsi discharging the bodies of the victims of the monstrous gas, the famous cliché that "from Kashmir to Kanniyakumari Indian Railways is one" was poignantly apparent as we tried our best to soothe the victims in whatever language we could speak. Faced with their end these poor souls uncomplainingly requested that their next of kin should be informed and their belongings taken care of. I still cannot forget the poor blinded Malayalee boy holding my hands imploring me to convey some important news to his mother in Kerala.

The dying wish of a TTE (Travelling Ticket Examiner ) was that his settlement dues should be expedited and his family cared for. In his delirious death he kept apologising for abandoning his train and pressed the reservation chart into the hands of another railwayman. His sightless eyes failed to reveal that it was a doctor.

There was no way for postmortem to be performed and all the death certificates were signed with the words "Cardiac arrest due to unknown causes".

The railways raced back to normality within 24 hours of the accident. Hundreds of railwaymen still bear the physical and mental scars of that black day.

When I joined the Railways I was asked to make a daily prayer that there should be no fatal railway accidents in my career and I do not have to remove mangled bodies from a train wreck. I never expected that I would live to see so many dead and dying humans around.

While we continue to pray for their souls, let us salute the railwaymen who tenaciously clung to their workspots and rushed to the scene of disaster.

V. Anand,

Ex-ADRM/BSL/CR,

Now GM/SR
http://www.irastimes.org/bhopal_gas_tragedy.htm

N-liability bill expected in Parliament session!A bill that limits the liability of a nuclear plant operator at Rs300 crore in case of an accident and provides for appointing claims commissioner with powers of a civil court to arbitrate such cases is likely to be introduced in the ongoing budget session of parliament.

Let NOT U.S. corporations off the hook!Meanwhile,Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill ignores objections!A bill that limits the liability of a nuclear plant operator at Rs300 crore in the eventuality of an accident and provides for appointing claims commissioner with powers of a civil court to arbitrate such cases is likely to be introduced in the ongoing Budget Session of Parliament.

Government of India Incs is churning out one Hazardous Bill after another. The Union Cabinet overrode strong objections from both the Finance and Environment Ministries in approving the controversial Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill November last, The Hindu has learned. These objections related to the impact of the law on safety standards and on providing adequate compensation in the event of a nuclear accident.It is generally known that the Prime Minister takes the nuclear deal and the setting up of nuclear power plants as an issue of personal prestige. Hence one is not surprised at the government's decision to ignore genuine concerns expressed by various ministries and to go ahead with the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill.

This time it is a Bill called the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage!Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill pegs the maximum amount of liability in case of each nuclear accident at Rs300 crore to be paid by the operator of the nuclear plant.The passage of a civil nuclear liability bill is one of key steps in implementation of the India-US civil nuclear agreement. The bill was approved by the Union Cabinet on November 20 last and it is expected to be tabled in Parliament in the ongoing session.

The Bill, which the government is to introduce in Parliament this session, channels all liability stemming from a nuclear accident to the operator of the plant. The maximum liability for an incident has been fixed at 300 million SDRs (approximately Rs. 2,385 crore), but the liability of the operator, whether public or private, is capped at Rs. 500 crore. The draft law will enable the country to accede to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), without which the United States says its companies will not be able to sell nuclear equipment to India.

It would Replicate Bhopal Tragedy without Compensation in an Age of Nuclear Energy Disinvestment!t is understood that the Union Cabinet has overridden strong objections from both the Finance and Environment Ministries in approving the controversial Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill last November. These objections related to the impact of the law on safety standards and on providing adequate compensation in the event of a nuclear accident.

Notwithstanding objections from opposition parties and some elements within itself, the government is preparing to push through the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, which seeks to define the financial liabilities of the operator of a nuclear reactor in case of an accident, in the current session of Parliament.

As it finalises the arguments to counter the criticism, the government has received support from some top scientists, including former chairman of Atomic Energy Commission Anil Kakodkar. "The liability of Rs 500 crore on the operator is an optimum amount. It was important that this amount was not kept too low. I think this is the appropriate and reasonable level," said Kakodkar. He said the legislation was extremely important for the country as it would enable it to join the "international support system" in case of a nuclear accident. "The provisions of the Bill have been finalised after detailed studies by experts and all concerns have been taken into account. I think it is quite balanced and needs to be passed in its present form," he said.

However, the draft bill also has provisions that would enable the Central government to either increase or decrease the amount of liability of any operator.The passage of a civil nuclear liability bill is one of key steps in implementation of the India-US civil nuclear agreement. The bill was approved by the Union Cabinet on November 20 last and it is expected to be tabled in Parliament in the ongoing session.

The operator would not be liable for any nuclear damage if the incident was caused by "grave national disaster of exceptional character", armed conflict or act of terrorism and suffered by person on account of his own negligence.

The bill also provides for establishment of Nuclear Damage Claims Commission which will have one or more claims commissioners for a specified area.

It proposes that the claims commissioner shall have all powers of a civil court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath, enforcing attendance of witnesses, compelling the discovery and production of documents and other material objects.

The bill has already run into opposition from the CPI(M) that has reservations on nuclear plant operators being made to pay compensation instead of the suppliers.

Environment activists have described as a violation of fundamental rights the proposed attempt to cap the level of compensation of victims of a nuclear accident.

After award of compensation, the operator has the right to appeal in three cases, one of which is when the operator argues that the incident resulted from the "wilful act or gross negligence" of a supplier of material, equipment or services.

The right to claim compensation has a limit of 10 years from the date of incident. The exception is of stolen, lost, jettisoned or abandoned nuclear material, where the period is increased to 20 years.

Currently, the Atomic Energy Act 1962 allows the state-run Nuclear Power Corporation of India to operate nuclear power plants in the country.

India has entered into civil nuclear cooperation agreements with eight countries including France, Russia, the US and Kazakhstan. An agreement has also been finalised with Canada and is expected to be signed soon.

In its comments, the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) drew attention to the law's failure to specify the amount of compensation for death or damage due to an accident. It said nuclear damage to human and animal life and the environment were long-term and needed a thorough understanding of the subject, "especially as the Act is for final compensation and not for interim relief."

The MoEF pointed out that the law did not specify which agency or entity was eligible to file a claim for compensation for damage to the environment. Finally, in the absence of the Health Ministry batting for its concerns, it said the 10-year limit for filing of claims was too low "since the nuclear damages involves changes in DNAs resulting in mutagenic and teratogenic changes, which take a long time to manifest." It observed that more scientific guidelines were needed to ensure the competent claims authority was able to review these kinds of damage and award compensation "which is just."

The Finance Ministry focussed its criticism on the central tenet of the law — the need to limit the liability of private companies involved in the nuclear business to Rs. 500 crore. Noting that the difference between that figure and the maximum liability of Rs. 2,385 crore would have to be made good by the government, the Ministry questioned the Department of Atomic Energy's rationale that the risk of accidents was low and that unlimited liability would hinder the growth of the nuclear industry in the country.

Limiting the liability in an arbitrary way could "expose the government to substantial liabilities for the failings of the private sector management in such installations," it said in its submissions to the Cabinet.

In the end, however, the objections were rejected and the draft law approved as it stood.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: <spiderharikannan@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Mar 10, 2010 at 9:27 AM
Subject: Stop a nuclear disaster
To: palashbiswaskl@gmail.com

Hi ,
Our government is churning out one hazardous bill after another. This time it is a bill called the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and it's coming up for a vote in a couple of days.

The bill lets U.S. corporations off the hook for any nuclear accidents they cause on Indian soil. They'd only have to pay a meagre amount, and Indian taxpayers would be stuck paying crores for the nuclear clean up and to compensate the victims.

Without any public debate, the Prime Minister is appeasing American interests and ignoring our safety.

Greenpeace is launching a petition asking the PM to hold a public consultation before introducing the bill.

I have already signed this petition. Can you join me?

http://www.greenpeace.org/india/stop-the-vote

Thanks!

spiderharikannan@gmail.com

Greenpeace

Don't let U.S. corporations off the hook

Our government is churning out one hazardous bill after another. This time it is a bill called the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and it's coming up for a vote in a couple of days.

The bill lets U.S. corporations off the hook for any nuclear accidents they cause on Indian soil. They'd only have to pay a meagre amount, and Indian taxpayers would be stuck paying crores for the nuclear clean up and to compensate the victims.

Without any public debate, the Prime Minister is appeasing American interests and ignoring our safety. Sign this petition to ask the PM to hold a public consultation before the vote on this bill.

The petition says: "India must hold a public consultation before changing the liability rules for any nuclear accidents caused by U.S. corporations."

Garbage Civilization

http://toxicswatch.blogspot.com/2009/11/civil-liability-for-nuclear-damage-bill.html

LS-564E

Bill C-5: An Act respecting civil liability and compensation

for damage in case of a nuclear incident*

(This bill did not become law before the 39^th Parliament ended on 7 September 2008.)

Prepared by:
Robert Dufresne
Law and Government Division
17 October 2007

PDF (87.95 Kb, 12 pages)

Disclaimer

Status of the Bill

Background
Description and Analysis
A. Definitions and Designation of Minister (clauses 2 and 3)
B. Application (clauses 4 and 5)
C. Designation of Nuclear Installations (clause 6)
D. Liability for Nuclear Incidents
1. Liability of Operator (clauses 7 to 12, 18 and 64)
2. Compensable Damage (clauses 13 to 20)
3. Financial Provisions (clauses 21 to 27 and 62)
4. Preservation of Certain Rights and Obligations (clause 28)
5. Judicial Proceedings (clauses 29 and 30)
E. Nuclear Claims Tribunal (clauses 31 to 63)
1. Establishment and Operation of Tribunal (clauses 31 to 33 and 36 to 37)
2. Interim Financial Assistance and Compensation (clauses 34 to 35 and 53 to 54)
3. Membership and Operation of Tribunal (clauses 38 to 43)
4. Powers and Duties of Tribunal (clauses 44 to 49)
5. Claims (clauses 50 to 52)
6. Re-hearing and Appeal (clauses 55 to 57)
7. Financial Provisions (clauses 58 to 63)
F. Reciprocating Agreements (clause 64)
G. Offence and Punishment (clause 65)
H. Regulations (clauses 66 to 68)
I. Consequential Amendments and Repeal (clauses 69 to 73)
J. Coming into Force (clause 74)
Commentary

Background

Bill C-5, An Act respecting civil liability and compensation for damage in case of a nuclear incident, was introduced in the House of Commons by the Honourable Gary Lunn, PC, MP, Minister of Natural Resources. It received first reading in the House on 26 October 2007. Bill C-5 is in substance identical to Bill C-63, which was introduced during the 1st Session of the 39th Parliament and died on the Order Paper with the prorogation of Parliament.

Bill C-5 establishes a specific civil liability regime with respect to nuclear incidents and repeals the Nuclear Liability Act, which previously provided for such a regime. Like that Act, it makes the operators of nuclear installations exclusively liable, but increases significantly (from $75 million to $650 million) the extent of their liability and the financial security that they are required to maintain. It also provides for the establishment of a special Tribunal to hear and decide claims.

The establishment of a form of civil liability and of a requirement to pay compensation in respect of damage caused by a nuclear incident is in line with efforts to manage and minimize the risks involved in the use of nuclear material. These efforts include measures for mitigation, preparation, response and reparation. The bill is chiefly concerned with the last of these measures.

The idea of a specific regime governing civil liability and compensation in case of a nuclear incident is based on the observation that private insurers have systematically and consistently refused to provide coverage for damage resulting from nuclear incidents. The establishment of such a regime makes it possible to fill this gap and provide coverage for such risks.

Description and Analysis

The bill establishes a specific civil liability regime applicable in case of a nuclear incident. It sets out terms and conditions respecting the civil liability and the compensation to be paid for any damage caused in such circumstances. It also provides for the establishment of a Tribunal to administer claims arising from a nuclear incident.

A. Definitions and Designa-tion of Minister (clauses 2 and 3)

Clause 2 sets out definitions that establish some of the main parameters of the bill. Three are worth noting: a "nuclear incident" (the concept that gives the bill its title) is defined as "an occurrence or a series of occurrences having the same origin that causes damage for which an operator is liable under this Act"; an "operator" is the holder of a licence issued under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and designated as such under clause 6 of the bill; and the "Tribunal" is a nuclear claims tribunal established under the bill.

The "Minister," within the meaning of the bill, is the minister designated by order of the Governor in Council.

B. Application (clauses 4 and 5)

The bill is binding on the federal government and on the provinces.

The bill excludes two types of circumstances from its application: first, incidents resulting from an act of war, hostilities, a civil war or an insurrection – but not a terrorist activity as defined in subsection 83.01(1) of the Criminal Code; and, second, damage to the nuclear installation, or to any property located at the installation and used in connection with it, if the operator of the installation is responsible for the damage.

C. Designation of Nuclear Installations (clause 6)

Clause 6 deals with the designation of nuclear installations. The Governor in Council designates the installations by regulation on the recommendation of the Minister after consultation with the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. The sites that can be designated are those containing facilities authorized to contain nuclear material under a licence issued in accordance with the Nuclear Safety and Control Act. The bill designates the holder of the licence as the operator of the nuclear installation.

The same designation process applies to means of transport equipped with a nuclear reactor.

D. Liability for Nuclear Incidents

1. Liability of Operator (clauses 7 to 12, 18 and 64)

The bill provides that the only legal liability regime to which the operator of a nuclear installation is subject is the regime established in the bill.

The operator's liability covers damage caused within Canada and within Canada's exclusive economic zone (an area of the sea off Canada's shores) by ionizing radiation emitted from a source of radiation within the operator's nuclear installation or emitted from nuclear material being transported to or from the installation. The operator is also liable for similar damage caused by a combination of the radioactive properties and the toxic, explosive or otherwise dangerous properties of such sources.

Similarly, the operator is liable for certain damage associated with preventive measures taken under an emergency scheme, including economic losses, lost wages, and costs arising from the loss of use of property by the persons affected.

Lastly, if an agreement is concluded with a reciprocating country and the regulations to implement the agreement so provide, the operator's liability can extend to damage that occurs in that country or in that country's exclusive economic zone. The liability covers damage resulting from the production, processing, transport, storage, use or disposition of the nuclear material.

The bill sets certain parameters with respect to the liability regime. First, the operator's liability is absolute: that is, it does not require proof of tort or of fault (clause 9). Further, if more than one operator is liable, each is jointly and severally, or solidarily, liable (clause 10). However, the bill provides, in certain cases, for a narrow exception to the principle of operator liability. Specifically, it excludes damage suffered by an individual in cases where the incident that caused the damage was wholly or partly the result of an act or omission committed by the individual with intent to cause injury or damage, or recklessly and with the knowledge that injury or damage would result. The bill preserves the operator's right of recourse against such an individual, but eliminates the right of recourse against any other person in case of a nuclear incident.

2. Compensable Damage (clauses 13 to 20)

Compensable damage in case of a nuclear incident includes bodily injury, damage to property, and psychological trauma resulting from such injury or damage. Economic losses incurred by a person as a result of bodily injury, damage to property or psychological trauma are also compensable, as are the costs incurred through loss of the use of property and any resulting wage loss. However, if the nuclear installation generates electricity, the costs resulting from the failure to provide electricity are not compensable.

The injury and damage described above are also compensable if they result from preventive measures taken under an emergency scheme.

The bill also provides that the reasonable cost of measures taken to repair, reduce or mitigate the environmental damage caused by an incident can be compensated if the measures were ordered by a government agency responsible for environmental protection.

In the case of a nuclear incident and a concomitant non-nuclear incident, the damage is deemed to have been caused by the nuclear incident, unless it can be identified as having been caused only by the non-nuclear incident.

Lastly, if a nuclear incident occurs during a transport operation, damage to the means of transport, or to the structure or site where the nuclear material is stored, is not compensable under the bill.

3. Financial Provisions (clauses 21 to 27 and 62)

The bill limits the financial liability of an operator to $650 million, but this amount can be increased by regulation and must be reviewed every five years by the Minister. A nuclear claims tribunal cannot award, in respect of a given incident, an amount that exceeds that limit or, if compensation was paid before the Tribunal was established, an amount that exceeds the difference between the compensation paid and the limit of the liability. However, if Parliament appropriates additional funds, the Tribunal can award those additional funds as compensation (clause 62).

Operators are required to maintain, for each of their installations, financial security in an amount equal to the financial liability required under subclause 21(1) of the bill (currently $650 million). Federal departments, however, are exempt from this requirement. The security is in the form of insurance with an approved insurer, but an operator can, by concluding a special agreement with the Minister, obtain a portion of the security in an alternative form. The agreement can be revoked by the Minister.

The risk insured by an approved insurer can be reinsured by the federal government through an agreement with the Minister. A copy of the reinsurance agreement must be tabled in each house of Parliament within the first 30 sitting days of that house after the agreement is concluded. A special account of the federal government – the Nuclear Liability Reinsurance Account – is continued under the agreement. Any deficit in the Account will be paid from the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

4. Preservation of Certain Rights and Obligations (clause 28)

The bill does not have the effect of limiting or restricting any rights or obligations arising from a contract of insurance, from a scheme or system of health insurance, employee compensation or occupational disease compensation, or from a survivor or disability provision of a pension plan.

5. Judicial Proceedings (clauses 29 and 30)

The bill provides that an action involving damage is to be brought before the court that has jurisdiction in the place where the nuclear incident occurs, but that the Federal Court of Canada has jurisdiction in respect of any action arising from a nuclear incident that occurs in more than one province or outside any province. However, the bill provides that a specific administrative tribunal can be established to deal with a nuclear incident and the claims resulting from it, and in that case the courts lose their jurisdiction.

Any claims for damage suffered must be brought within three years after the day on which the claimant had knowledge of the damage or – in the case of a death – of the death. Absolutely no action or claim can be brought after 10 years from the day of the incident or, in the case of bodily injury, after 30 years from that day.

E. Nuclear Claims Tribunal (clauses 31 to 63)

1. Establishment and Operation of Tribunal (clauses 31 to 33 and 36 to 37)

The Governor in Council can have the claims arising from a nuclear incident dealt with by a Tribunal "if the Governor in Council believes that it is in the public interest to do so, having regard to the extent and the estimated cost of the damage, and the advantages of having the claims dealt with by an administrative Tribunal" (subclause 31(1)). This is done by means of a declaration, and the Minister must then submit a report to Parliament estimating the cost of the damage arising from the nuclear incident. As mentioned above, the Tribunal then has exclusive jurisdiction and any other proceedings are discontinued.

As soon as possible after a declaration is made, the Governor in Council establishes the Tribunal and designates the location of its head office in Canada. The purpose of the Tribunal is "to examine and adjudicate claims for damage arising from the nuclear incident as expeditiously as the circumstances and considerations of fairness permit" (subclause 36(2)). The Tribunal must then notify the public of the manner in which to bring a claim, and publish the notice without delay in the Canada Gazette.

2. Interim Financial Assistance and Compensation (clauses 34 to 35 and 53 to 54)

After the Governor in Council makes the declaration and before the notice to the public is published, the Minister can provide interim financial assistance to persons who, in the Minister's opinion, have suffered damage as a result of the nuclear incident. This assistance cannot exceed 20% of the maximum financial liability provided for in subclause 34(2) of the bill. The Minister's functions in relation to the interim financial assistance can be delegated to any person, association of insurers or province, if the Minister enters into an agreement to that effect.

The Tribunal can also award interim compensation, and must in that case notify the Minister and the claimant. If the Tribunal decides not to award interim compensation, it notifies the claimant only.

3. Membership and Operation of Tribunal (clauses 38 to 43)

The Tribunal is composed of a minimum of five members, including a chairperson, appointed by the Governor in Council to hold office during good behaviour for an appropriate term and who can be removed for cause. The bill grants the members immunity from civil liability "for anything done or said in good faith in the exercise or purported exercise of a power or in the performance or purported performance of a duty or function of the Tribunal" (clause 40). It also grants the Tribunal the power to hire and manage the staff it considers necessary for the conduct of its activities (clause 41).

4. Powers and Duties of Tribunal (clauses 44 to 49)

The bill sets out the powers and duties of the Tribunal. With respect to the attendance, swearing and examination of witnesses, the production and inspection of documents, the enforcement of its orders and other matters necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction, the Tribunal has the powers, rights and privileges of a superior court. The Tribunal is not bound by the legal rules of evidence, but cannot receive as evidence anything that would be inadmissible in a court. It can issue commissions to take evidence outside Canada. It can require persons claiming compensation to undergo physical or other examinations, and can refuse to hear any claim that it considers frivolous or vexatious. The Tribunal can make any rules that are necessary for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its duties and functions, and must submit to the Minister any report of its activities that the Minister requests.

5. Claims (clauses 50 to 52)

The Tribunal can establish internal panels to hear claims, and establish classes of claims to be determined by a claims officer without a hearing. If necessary, the Minister assigns the claims to the panels and claims officers. Hearings are to be held in public, but can be held wholly or partly in private to protect a person's privacy.

6. Re-hearing and Appeal (clauses 55 to 57)

The bill also establishes a process for the re-hearing and appeal of the Tribunal's decisions. A claimant or an operator can request a re-hearing within 30 days after receiving notification of a decision. The claimant or operator can also appeal a decision if the claim has been heard by a panel consisting of less than three members. An application to appeal must be made in writing to the chairperson of the Tribunal, who has the appeal heard by a panel consisting of three other members.

The decisions of the Tribunal are otherwise final and conclusive. They can be reviewed in a court only on the grounds referred to in subsection 18.1(4) of the Federal Courts Act, that is, if the Tribunal failed to observe a principle of natural justice or procedural fairness or any other required procedure, or the decision was founded on fraud or perjured evidence.

7. Financial Provisions (clauses 58 to 63)

Under clauses 58 to 63 of the bill, the payment of claims involves two transfers of funds. On the one hand, once the period for making an appeal or applying for a re-hearing has ended, the Minister pays to the claimants, out of the Nuclear Liability Reinsurance Account (or out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund in case of insufficient funds), the amounts owed to them as a result of the Tribunal's decision. On the other hand, the operator liable for the damage pays the Government of Canada the lesser of the following amounts:

the amount of the maximum financial liability provided for in the bill (currently $650 million) less the total amount paid by the operator before the establishment of the Tribunal as compensation for damage arising from the incident; or
the total of all amounts paid by the Minister under the bill as compensation for damage.

If the operator fails to pay any amount due, the Government of Canada is paid by the approved insurer or by the issuer of the financial instrument serving as alternative financial security.

The Governor in Council can use the regulation-making power to establish classes of damage and set terms and conditions concerning the payment of compensation (awarding the maximum amount or a percentage of that amount). Clause 63 sets out a procedure for dealing with changes to the payment structure for certain classes of damage. If the changes are to the claimant's advantage, the claimant will receive the additional amount payable under the new structure.

F. Reciprocating Agreements (clause 64)

The bill provides that the Governor in Council can declare a country to be a reciprocating country for the purposes of the Act if the Governor in Council is of the opinion that satisfactory arrangements exist for "compensation in that country and in Canada for damage resulting from the production, processing, transport, storage, use or disposition of nuclear material." The Governor in Council has the regulation-making powers to implement any agreement between Canada and such a country in relation to such damage. If an agreement exists between Canada and a reciprocating country, no Canadian court has jurisdiction to determine a claim in respect of such damage unless the regulations to implement the agreement provide otherwise.

G. Offence and Punishment (clause 65)

An operator who does not hold the financial securities required by the bill commits an offence punishable on summary conviction. The punishment is a fine not exceeding $300,000 for each day on which the offence is committed or continued. However, the operator cannot be found guilty of such an offence if it is established that the operator "exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence" (subclause 65(2)).

H. Regulations (clauses 66 to 68)

Clauses 66 to 68 of the bill set out a series of measures in respect of which the Governor in Council can make regulations under the Act. Clause 66 sets out, among others, regulation-making powers relating to insurance and reinsurance and to the establishment of classes of nuclear establishments. Clause 67 deals with regulations respecting the Tribunal and its members. Clause 68 provides that the Governor in Council can make regulations to establish priorities for certain classes of damage, to fix maximum awards or reduce them on a pro rata basis for certain classes of damage, to establish classes of damage for which compensation is not to be paid, and to extend the time limit for certain classes of damage.

I. Consequential Amendments and Repeal (clauses 69 to 73)

The bill affects three Acts. First, it repeals the Nuclear Liability Act. Second, it amends certain provisions of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992 to replace, in those provisions, the title of the repealed Act with the title of the future Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act (Bill C-5). The provisions amended state that nothing in the referenced sections restricts the liability of an operator under the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act, the rights and obligations arising from that Act, or the jurisdiction of a Tribunal established under that Act.

J. Coming into Force (clause 74)

The bill, once passed, will come into force on a day fixed by order of the Governor in Council.

Commentary

Bill C-5 has not attracted much media attention or been the subject of any real public debate outside Parliament.

* Notice: For clarity of exposition, the legislative proposals set out in the bill described in this Legislative Summary are stated as if they had already been adopted or were in force. It is important to note, however, that bills may be amended during their consideration by the House of Commons and Senate, and have no force or effect unless and until they are passed by both houses of Parliament, receive Royal Assent, and come into force.

http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Sites/LOP/LegislativeSummaries/Bills_ls.asp?lang=E&ls=c5&source=library_prb&Parl=39&Ses=2

Bhopal disaster

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The Bhopal disaster was an industrial catastrophe that took place at a pesticide plant owned and operated by Union Carbide (UCIL) in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India. Around midnight on December 3-4, 1984, the plant released methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and other toxins, resulting in the exposure of over 500,000 people. Estimates vary on the death toll. The official immediate death toll was 2,259 and the government of Madhya Pradesh has confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths related to the gas release.^[1] Other government agencies estimate 15,000 deaths.^[2] Others estimate that 8,000 died within the first weeks and that another 8,000 have since died from gas-related diseases.^[3]^[4]

Some 25 years after the gas leak, 390 tonnes of toxic chemicals abandoned at the UCIL plant continue to leak and pollute the groundwater in the region and affect thousands of Bhopal residents who depend on it,^[5]^[6]^[7] though there is some dispute as to whether the chemicals still stored at the site pose any continuing health hazard.^[2] There are currently civil and criminal cases related to the disaster ongoing in the United States District Court, Manhattan and the District Court of Bhopal, India against Union Carbide,^[8] now owned by Dow Chemical Company, with an Indian arrest warrant pending against Warren Anderson, CEO of Union Carbide at the time of the disaster.^[9]^[10] No one has yet been prosecuted.

[hide]

1 Summary of background and causes

1.1 Public information

2 Contributing factors

4.1 Timeline, summary

5 Health effects

6 Aftermath of the leakage

7 Union Carbide's defense

8 Long-term fallout

8.1 Legal action against Union Carbide

9 Changes in corporate identity

10 Ongoing contamination

10.1 Criticisms of clean-up operations

15 Further reading

[edit] Summary of background and causes

The UCIL factory was established in 1969 near Bhopal. 50.9 % was owned by Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) and 49.1 % by various Indian investors, including public sector financial institutions.^[3]^[4] It produced the pesticide carbaryl (trademark Sevin). In 1979 a methyl isocyanate (MIC) production plant was added to the site. MIC, an intermediate in carbaryl manufacture, was used instead of less hazardous but more expensive materials. UCC understood the properties of MIC and its handling requirements.^[11]^[12]^[13]

During the night of December 2–3, 1984, large amounts of water entered tank 610, containing 42 tonnes of methyl isocyanate. The resulting exothermic reaction increased the temperature inside the tank to over 200 °C (392 °F), raising the pressure to a level the tank was not designed to withstand. This forced the emergency venting of pressure from the MIC holding tank, releasing a large volume of toxic gases into the atmosphere. The reaction sped up because of the presence of iron in corroding non-stainless steel pipelines. A mixture of poisonous gases flooded the city of Bhopal, causing great panic as people woke up with a burning sensation in their lungs. Thousands died immediately from the effects of the gas and many were trampled in the panic.

Theories of how the water entered the tank differ. At the time, workers were cleaning out pipes with water, and some claim that owing to bad maintenance and leaking valves, it was possible for the water to leak into tank 610.^[14] In December 1985 The New York Times reported that according to UCIL plant managers the hypothesis of this route of entry of water was tested in the presence of the Central Bureau Investigators and was found to be negative.^[15] UCC also maintains that this route was not possible, and that it was an act of sabotage by a "disgruntled worker" who introduced water directly into the tank.^[16] However, the company's investigation team found no evidence of the necessary connection.^[17]

The 1985 reports^[17]^[18]^[19] give a picture of what led to the disaster and how it developed, although they differ in details.

Factors leading to this huge gas leak include:

The use of hazardous chemicals (MIC) instead of less dangerous ones
Storing these chemicals in large tanks instead of over 200 steel drums.
Possible corroding material in pipelines
Poor maintenance after the plant ceased production in the early 1980s
Failure of several safety systems (due to poor maintenance and regulations).
Safety systems being switched off to save money - including the MIC tank refrigeration system which alone would have prevented the disaster.

Plant design modified by Indian engineers to abide by government regulations and economic pressures to reduce expenses contributed most to the actual leak^{[citation needed]}. The problem was then made worse by the plant's location near a densely populated area, non-existent catastrophe plans and shortcomings in health care and socio-economic rehabilitation. Analysis shows that the parties responsible for the magnitude of the disaster are the two owners, Union Carbide Corporation and the Government of India, and to some extent, the Government of Madhya Pradesh.^[3]^[4]^[20]

[edit] Public information

Much speculation arose in the aftermath. The closing of the plant to outsiders (including UCC) by the Indian government, and the failure to make data public contributed to the confusion. The CSIR report^[19] was formally released 15 years after the disaster. The authors of the ICMR studies^[21] on health effects were forbidden to publish their data until after 1994. UCC has still not released their research about the disaster or the effects of the gas on human health. Soon after the disaster UCC was not allowed to take part in the investigation by the government. The initial investigation was conducted entirely by the government agencies - Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) under the directorship of Dr. Varadajan and Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

UCC and the Government of India maintained until 1994, when the International Medical Commission on Bhopal met, that MIC had no longterm health effects.^[4]

[edit] Contributing factors

The deficiencies in the Bhopal plant design can be summarised as: choosing a dangerous method of manufacturing pesticides; large-scale storage of MIC before processing; location close to a densely populated area; under-dimensioning of the safety features; dependence on manual operations.^[4]
Deficiencies in the management of UCIL can be summarised: lack of skilled operators due to the staffing policy; reduction of safety management due to reducing the staff; insufficient maintenance of the plant; lack of emergency response plans.^[4]^[22]

[edit] Plant production process

Union Carbide produced the pesticide, Sevin (a trademarked brand name for carbaryl), using MIC as an intermediate. Until 1979, MIC was imported from the USA.^[4] Other manufacturers, such as Bayer, made carbaryl without MIC, though at greater manufacturing costs.^[23]

The chemical process, or "route", used in the Bhopal plant reacted methylamine with phosgene to form MIC (methyl isocyanate), which was then reacted with 1-naphthol to form the final product, carbaryl. This route differed from MIC-free routes used elsewhere, in which the same raw materials are combined in a different manufacturing order, with phosgene first reacted with the naphthol to form a chloroformate ester, which is then reacted with methyl amine. In the early 1980s, the demand for pesticides had fallen though production continued, leading to buildup of stores of unused MIC.^[4]^[23]

[edit] Work conditions

Attempts to reduce expenses affected the factory's employees and their conditions.

Kurzman argues that "cuts ... meant less stringent quality control and thus looser safety rules. A pipe leaked? Don't replace it, employees said they were told ... MIC workers needed more training? They could do with less. Promotions were halted, seriously affecting employee morale and driving some of the most skilled ... elsewhere".^[24]
Workers were forced to use English manuals, even though only a few had a grasp of the language.^[14]^[25]
By 1984, only six of the original twelve operators were still working with MIC and the number of supervisory personnel was also cut in half. No maintenance supervisor was placed on the night shift and instrument readings were taken every two hours, rather than the previous and required one-hour readings.^[14]^[24]
Workers made complaints about the cuts through their union but were ignored. One employee was fired after going on a 15-day hunger strike. 70% of the plant's employees were fined before the disaster for refusing to deviate from the proper safety regulations under pressure from management.^[14]^[24]
In addition, some observers, such as those writing in the Trade Environmental Database (TED) Case Studies as part of the Mandala Project from American University, have pointed to "serious communication problems and management gaps between Union Carbide and its Indian operation", characterised by "the parent companies [sic] hands-off approach to its overseas operation" and "cross-cultural barriers".^[26]
The personnel management policy led to an exodus of skilled personnel to better and safer jobs.^[14]^[22]

[edit] Equipment and safety regulations

Union Carbide MIC plant

It emerged in 1998, during civil action suits in India, that, unlike Union Carbide plants in the USA, its Indian subsidiary plants were not prepared for problems. No action plans had been established to cope with incidents of this magnitude. This included not informing local authorities of the quantities or dangers of chemicals used and manufactured at Bhopal.^[3]^[4]^[14]^[23]
The MIC tank alarms had not worked for 4 years.^[3]^[4]^[14]^[27]
There was only one manual back-up system, not the four-stage system used in the USA.^[3]^[4]^[14]^[27]
The flare tower and the vent gas scrubber had been out of service for 5 months before the disaster. The gas scrubber therefore did not treat escaping gases with sodium hydroxide (caustic soda), which might have brought the concentration down to a safe level.^[27] Even if the scrubber had been working, according to Weir, investigations in the aftermath of the disaster discovered that the maximum pressure it could handle was only one-quarter of that which was present in the accident. Furthermore, the flare tower itself was improperly designed and could only hold one-quarter of the volume of gas that was leaked in 1984.^[3]^[4]^[14]^[28]
To reduce energy costs, the refrigeration system, designed to inhibit the volatilization of MIC, had been left idle — the MIC was kept at 20 degrees Celsius (room temperature), not the 4.5 degrees advised by the manual, and some of the coolant was being used elsewhere.^[3]^[4]^[14]^[27]
The steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes, was out of action for unknown reasons.^[3]^[4]^[14]^[27]
Slip-blind plates that would have prevented water from pipes being cleaned from leaking into the MIC tanks through faulty valves were not installed. Their installation had been omitted from the cleaning checklist.^[3]^[4]^[14]
Water sprays designed to "knock down" gas leaks were poorly designed — set to 13 metres and below, they could not spray high enough to reduce the concentration of escaping gas.^[3]^[4]^[14]^[27]
The MIC tank had been malfunctioning for roughly a week. Other tanks had been used for that week, rather than repairing the broken one, which was left to "stew". The build-up in temperature and pressure is believed to have affected the magnitude of the gas release.^[3]^[4]^[14]^[27]
Carbon steel valves were used at the factory, even though they corrode when exposed to acid.^[23] On the night of the disaster, a leaking carbon steel valve was found, allowing water to enter the MIC tanks. The pipe was not repaired because it was believed it would take too much time and be too expensive.^[3]^[4]^[14]^[27]
UCC admitted in their own investigation report that most of the safety systems were not functioning on the night of December 3, 1984.^[18]
Themistocles D'Silva contends in the latest book - The Black Box of Bhopal - that the design of the MIC plant, following government guidelines, was "Indianized" by UCIL engineers to maximize the use of indigenous materials and products. It also dispensed with the use of sophisticated instrumentation as not appropriate for the Indian plant. Because of the unavailability of electronic parts in India, the Indian engineers preferred pneumatic instrumentation. It also discredits the unproven allegations in the CSIR Report.^[29]

[edit] Previous warnings and accidents

A series of prior warnings and MIC-related accidents had occurred:

In 1976, the two trade unions reacted because of pollution within the plant.^[4]^[22]
In 1981, a worker was splashed with phosgene. In panic he ripped off his mask, thus inhaling a large amount of phosgene gas; he died 72 hours later.^[4]^[22]
In January 1982, there was a phosgene leak, when 24 workers were exposed and had to be admitted to hospital. None of the workers had been ordered to wear protective masks.
In February 1982, an MIC leak affected 18 workers.^[4]^[22]
In August 1982, a chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over 30 percent of his body.^[4]^[22]
In October 1982, there was a leak of MIC, methylcarbaryl chloride, chloroform and hydrochloric acid. In attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered intensive chemical burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases.^[4]^[22]
During 1983 and 1984, leaks of the following substances regularly took place in the MIC plant: MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine, phosgene, and carbon tetrachloride, sometimes in combination.^[4]^[22]
Reports issued months before the incident by scientists within the Union Carbide corporation warned of the possibility of an accident almost identical to that which occurred in Bhopal. The reports were ignored and never reached senior staff.^[4]^[23]
Union Carbide was warned by American experts who visited the plant after 1981 of the potential of a "runaway reaction" in the MIC storage tank; local Indian authorities warned the company of problems on several occasions from 1979 onwards. Again, these warnings were not heeded.^[4]^[23]

[edit] The leakage

In November 1984, most of the safety systems were not functioning. Many valves and lines were in poor condition. Tank 610 contained 42 tonnes MIC, much more than safety rules allowed.^[4]
During the nights of 2–3 December, a large amount of water entered tank 610. A runaway reaction started, which was accelerated by contaminants, high temperatures and other factors. The reaction generated a major increase in the temperature inside the tank to over 200°C (400°F). This forced the emergency venting of pressure from the MIC holding tank, releasing a large volume of toxic gases. The reaction was sped up by the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines.^[4]
It is known that workers cleaned pipelines with water. They were not told by the supervisor to add a slip-blind water isolation plate. Because of this, and of the bad maintenance, the workers consider it possible for water to have accidentally entered the MIC tank.^[4]^[14]
UCC maintains that a "disgruntled worker" deliberately connected a hose to a pressure gauge.^[4]^[16]
UCC's investigation team found no evidence of the suggested connection.^[17]

[edit] Timeline, summary

At the plant^[4]

21.00 Water cleaning of pipes starts.
22.00 Water enters tank 610, reaction starts.
22.30 Gases are emitted from the vent gas scrubber tower.
00.30 The large siren sounds and is turned off.
00.50 The siren is heard within the plant area. The workers escape.

Outside^[4]

22.30 First sensations due to the gases are felt — suffocation, cough, burning eyes and vomiting.
1.00 Police are alerted. Residents of the area evacuate. Union Carbide director denies any leak.
2.00 The first people reached Hamidia hospital. Symptoms include visual impairment and blindness, respiratory difficulties, frothing at the mouth, and vomiting.
2.10 The alarm is heard outside the plant.
4.00 The gases are brought under control.
6.00 A police loudspeaker broadcasts: "Everything is normal".

[edit] Health effects

[edit] Short term health effects

Apart from MIC, the gas cloud may have contained phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, carbon monoxide, hydrogen chloride, oxides of nitrogen, monomethyl amine (MMA) and carbon dioxide, either produced in the storage tank or in the atmosphere.^[4]

The gas cloud composed mainly of materials denser than the surrounding air, stayed close to the ground and spread outwards through the surrounding community. The initial effects of exposure were coughing, vomiting, severe eye irritation and a feeling of suffocation. People awakened by these symptoms fled away from the plant. Those who ran inhaled more than those who had a vehicle to ride. Owing to their height, children and other people of shorter stature inhaled higher concentrations. Many people were trampled trying to escape.^[4]

Thousands of people had succumbed by the morning hours. There were mass funerals and mass cremations as well as disposal of bodies in the Narmada river. 170,000 people were treated at hospitals and temporary dispensaries. 2,000 buffalo, goats, and other animals were collected and buried. Within a few days, leaves on trees yellowed and fell off. Supplies, including food, became scarce owing to suppliers' safety fears. Fishing was prohibited as well, which caused further supply shortages.^[4]

A total of 36 wards were marked by the authorities as being "gas affected", affecting a population of 520,000. Of these, 200,000 were below 15 years of age, and 3,000 were pregnant women. In 1991, 3,928 deaths had been certified. Independent organizations recorded 8,000 dead in the first days. Other estimations vary between 10,000 and 30,000. Another 100,000 to 200,000 people are estimated to have permanent injuries of different degrees.^[4]

The acute symptoms were burning in the respiratory tract and eyes, blepharospasm, breathlessness, stomach pains and vomiting. The causes of deaths were choking, reflexogenic circulatory collapse and pulmonary oedema. Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only in the lungs but also cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty degeneration of the liver and necrotising enteritis.^[30] The stillbirth rate increased by up to 300% and neonatal mortality rate by 200 %.^[4]

[edit] Hydrogen cyanide or not?

Whether hydrogen cyanide was present in the gas mixture is still a controversy.^[30]^[31]
Exposed at higher temperatures, MIC breaks down to hydrogen cyanide (HCN). According to Kulling & Lorin, at +200°C, 3 % of the gas is HCN.^[32] However, according to another scientific publication,^[33] MIC when heated in the gas-phase starts breaks down to hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and other products above 400°C. Concentrations of 300 ppm can lead to immediate collapse.
Laboratory replication studies by CSIR and UCC scientists failed to detect any HCN or HCN- derived side products. Chemically, HCN is known to be very reactive with MIC.^[34] HCN is also known to react with hydrochloric acid, ammonia, and methylamine (also produced in tank 610 during the vigorous reaction with water and choloroform) and also with itself under acidic conditions to form trimers of HCN called triazenes. None of the HCN-derived side products were detected in the tank residue.^[35]
The non-toxic antidote sodium thiosulfate (Na₂S₂O₃) in intravenous injections increases the rate of conversion from cyanide to non-toxic thiocyanate. Treatment was suggested early, but because of confusion within the medical establishments, it was not used on larger scale until June 1985.^[4]

[edit] Long term health effects

It is estimated that 20,000 have died since the accident from gas-related diseases. Another 100,000 to 200,000 people are estimated to have permanent injuries.^[4]

The quality of the epidemiological and clinical research varies. Reported and studied symptoms are eye problems, respiratory difficulties, immune and neurological disorders, cardiac failure secondary to lung injury, female reproductive difficulties and birth defects among children born to affected women. Other symptoms and diseases are often ascribed to the gas exposure, but there is no good research supporting this.^[4]

There is a clinic established by a group of survivors and activists known as Sambhavna. Sambhavna is the only clinic that will treat anybody affected by the gas, or the subsequent water poisoning, and treats the condition with a combination of Western and traditional Indian medicines, and has performed extensive research.^[36]

Union Carbide as well as the Indian Government long denied permanent injuries by MIC and the other gases. In January, 1994, the International Medical Commission on Bhopal (IMCB) visited Bhopal to investigate the health status among the survivors as well as the health care system and the socio-economic rehabilitation.

The reports from Indian Council of Medical Research^[21] were not completely released until around 2003.

For a review of the research on the health effects of the Bhopal disaster, see Dhara & Dhara (2002).^[37]

[edit] Aftermath of the leakage

Medical staff were unprepared for the thousands of casualties.^[4]
Doctors and hospitals were not informed of proper treatment methods for MIC gas inhalation. They were told to simply give cough medicine and eye drops to their patients.^[4]
The gases immediately caused visible damage to the trees. Within a few days, all the leaves fell off.^[4]
2,000 bloated animal carcasses had to be disposed.^[4]
"Operation Faith": On December 16, the tanks 611 and 619 were emptied of the remaining MIC. This led to a second mass evacuation from Bhopal.^[4]
Complaints of a lack of information or misinformation were widespread. The Bhopal plant medical doctor did not have proper information about the properties of the gases. An Indian Government spokesman said that "Carbide is more interested in getting information from us than in helping our relief work."^[4]
As of 2008, UCC had not released information about the possible composition of the cloud.^[4]
Formal statements were issued that air, water, vegetation and foodstuffs were safe within the city. At the same time, people were informed that poultry was unaffected, but were warned not to consume fish.^[4]

[edit] Compensation from Union Carbide

The Government of India passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act that gave the government rights to represent all victims in or outside India.^[4]
UCC offered US$ 350 million, the insurance sum.^[4] The Government of India claimed US$ 3.3 billion from UCC.^[4] In 1999, a settlement was reached under which UCC agreed to pay US$470 million (the insurance sum, plus interest) in a full and final settlement of its civil and criminal liability.^[4]
When UCC wanted to sell its shares in UCIL, it was directed by the Supreme Court to finance a 500-bed hospital for the medical care of the survivors. Bhopal Memorial Hospital and Research Centre (BMHRC) was inaugurated in 1998. It was obliged to give free care for survivors for eight years.^[4]

[edit] Economic rehabilitation

After the accident, no one under the age of 18 was registered. The number of children exposed to the gases was at least 200,000.^[4]
Immediate relief was decided two days after the tragedy.^[4]
Relief measures commenced in 1985 when food was distributed for a short period and ration cards were distributed.^[4]
Widow pension of the rate of Rs 200/per month (later Rs 750) was provided.^[4]
One-time ex-gratia payment of Rs 1,500 to families with monthly income Rs 500 or less was decided.^[4]
Each claimant was to be categorised by a doctor. In court, the claimants were expected to prove "beyond reasonable doubt" that death or injury in each case was attributable to exposure. In 1992, 44 percent of the claimants still had to be medically examined.^[4]
From 1990 interim relief of Rs 200 was paid to everyone in the family who was born before the disaster.^[4]
The final compensation (including interim relief) for personal injury was for the majority Rs 25,000 (US$ 830). For death claim, the average sum paid out was Rs 62,000.^[4]
Effects of interim relief were more children sent to school, more money spent on treatment, more money spent on food, improvement of housing conditions.^[4]
The management of registration and distribution of relief showed many shortcomings.^[38]
In 2007, 1,029,517 cases were registered and decided. Number of awarded cases were 574,304 and number of rejected cases 455,213. Total compensation awarded was Rs.1,546.47 crores.^[39]
Because of the smallness of the sums paid and the denial of interest to the claimants, a sum as large as Rs 10 billion is expected to be left over after all claims have been settled.^[4]

[edit] Occupational rehabilitation

33 of the 50 planned worksheds for gas victims started. All except one was closed down by 1992.^[4]
1986, the MP government invested in the Special Industrial Area Bhopal. 152 of the planned 200 worksheds were built. In 2000, 16 were partially functioning.^[4]
It is estimated that 50,000 persons need alternative jobs, and that less than 100 gas victims have found regular employment under the government's scheme.^[4]

[edit] Habitation rehabilitation

2,486 flats in two- and four-story buildings were constructed in the "Widows colony" outside Bhopal. The water did not reach the upper floors. It was not possible to keep cattle. Infrastructure like buses, schools, etc. were missing for at least a decade.^[4]

[edit] Health care

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the health care system became tremendously overloaded. Within weeks, the State Government established a number of hospitals, clinics and mobile units in the gas-affected area.^[4]
Radical health groups set up JSK (the People's Health Centre) that was working a few years from 1985.^[4]
Since the leak, a very large number of private practitioners have opened in Bhopal. In the severely affected areas, nearly 70 percent do not appear to be professionally qualified.^[4]
The Government of India has focused primarily on increasing the hospital-based services for gas victims. Several hospitals have been built after the disaster. In 1994, there were approximately 1.25 beds per 1,000, compared to the recommendation from the World bank of 1.0 beds per 1,000 in developing countries.^[4]
The Bhopal Memorial Hospital and Research Centre (BMHRC) is a 350-bedded super speciality hospital. Heart surgery and hemodialysis are done. Major specialities missing are gynaecology, obstetrics and paediatrics. Eight mini-units (outreach health centres) were started. Free health care for gas victims should be offered until 2006.^[4] The management has faced problems with strikes, and the quality of the health care is disputed.^[40]^[41]^[42]
Sambhavna Trust is a charitable trust that registered in 1995. The clinic gives modern and Ayurvedic treatments to gas victims, free of charge.^[4]^[43]

[edit] Environmental rehabilitation

When the factory was closed in 1985–1986, pipes, drums and tanks were cleaned and sold. The MIC and the Sevin plants are still there, as are storages of different residues. Isolation material is falling down and spreading.^[4]

The area around the plant was used as a dumping area for hazardous chemicals. In 1982 tubewells in the vicinity of the UCC factory had to be abandoned.^[4] UCC's laboratory tests in 1989 revealed that soil and water samples collected from near the factory and inside the plant were toxic to fish.^[44] Several other studies has shown polluted soil and groundwater in the area.^[4].

Reported polluting compounds are, among others, naphthol, naphthalene, Sevin, tarry residue, mercury, toxic organochlorines, volatile organochlorine compounds, chromium, copper, nickel, lead, hexachloroethane, hexachlorobutadiene, pesticide HCH and halo-organics^{[clarification needed]}. It is plausible that these chemicals have some negative health effects on those exposed, but there is no scientific evidence.^[4]

In order to provide safe drinking water to the population around the UCC factory, there is a scheme for improvement of water supply.^[39]
In December 2008, the Madhya Pradesh High Court decided that the toxic waste should be incinerated at Ankleshwar in Gujarat.^[45]

[edit] Union Carbide's defense

Now owned by Dow Chemical Company, Union Carbide denies allegations against it on its website dedicated to the tragedy. The corporation believes that the accident was the result of sabotage, stating that safety systems were in place and operative. It also stresses that it did all it could to alleviate human suffering following the disaster.^[46]

[edit] Investigation into possible sabotage

Theories of how the water entered the tank differ. At the time, workers were cleaning out pipes with water. The workers maintain that entry of water through the plant's piping system during the washing of lines was possible because a slip-bind was not used, the downstream bleeder lines were partially clogged, many valves were leaking, and the tank was not pressurised. The water, which was not draining properly through the bleeder valves, may have built up in the pipe, rising high enough to pour back down through another series of lines in the MIC storage tank. Once water had accumulated to a height of 6 meters (20 feet), it could drain by gravity flow back into the system. Alternatively, the water may have been routed through another standby "jumper line" that had only recently been connected to the system. Indian scientists suggested that additional water might have been introduced as a "back-flow" from the defectively designed vent-gas scrubber.^[4]^[14] However, none of these possible routes of entry could be duplicated when tested.^{[by whom?]}

The company cites an investigation conducted by the engineering consulting firm Arthur D. Little, which concluded that a single employee secretly and deliberately introduced a large amount of water into the MIC tank by removing a meter and connecting a water hose directly to the tank through the metering port.^[16] Carbide claims such a large amount of water could not have found its way into the tank by accident, and safety systems were not designed to deal with intentional sabotage. Documents cited in the Arthur D. Little Report as well as in the recent book The Black Box of Bhopal state that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) along with UCIL engineers tried to simulate the water-washing hypothesis as a route of the entry of water into the tank. This all-important test failed to support this as a route of water entry. UCC claims the plant staff falsified numerous records to distance themselves from the incident, and that the Indian Government impeded its investigation and declined to prosecute the employee responsible, presumably because that would weaken its allegations of negligence by Union Carbide.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Safety and equipment issues

The corporation denies the claim that the valves on the tank were malfunctioning, claiming that "documented evidence gathered after the incident showed that the valve close to the plant's water-washing operation was closed and leak-tight. Furthermore, process safety systems — in place and operational — would have prevented water from entering the tank by accident". Carbide states that the safety concerns identified in 1982 were all allayed before 1984 and "none of them had anything to do with the incident".^[47]

The company admits that "the safety systems in place could not have prevented a chemical reaction of this magnitude from causing a leak". According to Carbide, "in designing the plant's safety systems, a chemical reaction of this magnitude was not factored in" because "the tank's gas storage system was designed to automatically prevent such a large amount of water from being inadvertently introduced into the system" and "process safety systems — in place and operational — would have prevented water from entering the tank by accident". Instead, they claim that "employee sabotage — not faulty design or operation — was the cause of the tragedy".^[47]

[edit] Response

The company stresses the "immediate action" taken after the disaster and their continued commitment to helping the victims. On December 4, the day following the leak, Union Carbide sent material aid and several international medical experts to assist the medical facilities in Bhopal.^[47]

Carbide put $2 million into the Indian Prime Minister's immediate disaster relief fund on 11 December 1984.^[47] The corporation established the Employees' Bhopal Relief Fund in February 1985, which raised more than $5 million for immediate relief.^[48]

In August 1987, Carbide made an additional $4.6 million in humanitarian interim relief available.^[48]

Union Carbide also undertook several steps to provide continuing aid to the victims of the Bhopal disaster after the court ruling, including:

The sale of its 50.9 percent interest in UCIL in April 1992 and establishment of a charitable trust to contribute to the building of a local hospital. The sale was finalized in November 1994. The hospital was begun in October 1995 and was opened in 2001. The company provided a fund with around $90 million from sale of its UCIL stock. In 1991, the trust had amounted approximately $100 million. The hospital caters for the treatment of heart, lung and eye problems.^[46]
Providing "a $2.2 million grant to Arizona State University to establish a vocational-technical center in Bhopal, which was constructed and opened, but was later closed and leveled by the government".^[49]
Donating $5 million to the Indian Red Cross.^[49]
Developing the Responsible Care system with other members of the chemical industry as a response to the Bhopal crisis, which is designed "to help prevent such an event in the future by improving community awareness, emergency preparedness and process safety standards".^[48]

[edit] Long-term fallout

Legal action against Union Carbide has dominated the aftermath of the disaster. However, other issues have also continued to develop. These include the problems of ongoing contamination, criticisms of the clean-up operation undertaken by Union Carbide, and a 2004 hoax.

Time-line 1984–2004: See "Bhopal Gas Tragedy: Fact Sheet", Hindustan Times, Dec 3, 2004^[50]

[edit] Legal action against Union Carbide

Legal issues began affecting Union Carbide, the US and Indian governments, the local authorities in Bhopal and the victims of the disaster immediately after the catastrophe.

[edit] Legal proceedings leading to the settlement

On 14 December 1984, the Chairman and CEO of Union Carbide, Warren Anderson, addressed the US Congress, stressing the company's "commitment to safety" and promising to ensure that a similar accident "cannot happen again". However, the Indian Government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Act in March 1985, allowing the Government of India to act as the legal representative for victims of the disaster,^[48] leading to the beginning of legal wrangling.

March 1986 saw Union Carbide propose a settlement figure, endorsed by plaintiffs' US attorneys, of $350 million that would, according to the company, "generate a fund for Bhopal victims of between $500–600 million over 20 years". In May, litigation was transferred from the US to Indian courts by US District Court Judge. Following an appeal of this decision, the US Court of Appeals affirmed the transfer, judging, in January 1987, that UCIL was a "separate entity, owned, managed and operated exclusively by Indian citizens in India".^[48] The judge in the US granted Carbide's forum request, thus moving the case to India. This meant that, under US federal law, the company had to submit to Indian jurisdiction.

Litigation continued in India during 1988. The Government of India claimed US$ 350 billion from UCC.^[4] The Indian Supreme Court told both sides to come to an agreement and "start with a clean slate" in November 1988.^[48] Eventually, in an out-of-court settlement reached in 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay US$ 470 million for damages caused in the Bhopal disaster, 15% of the original $3 billion claimed in the lawsuit.^[4] By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200.^[51]

Throughout 1990, the Indian Supreme Court heard appeals against the settlement from "activist petitions". Nonetheless, in October 1991, the Supreme Court upheld the original $470 million, dismissing any other outstanding petitions that challenged the original decision. The decision set aside a "portion of settlement that quashed criminal prosecutions that were pending at the time of settlement". The Court ordered the Indian government "to purchase, out of settlement fund, a group medical insurance policy to cover 100,000 persons who may later develop symptoms" and cover any shortfall in the settlement fund. It also "requests" that Carbide and its subsidiary "voluntarily" fund a hospital in Bhopal, at an estimated $17 million, to specifically treat victims of the Bhopal disaster. The company agreed to this.^[48] However, the International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal notes that the Court also reinstated criminal charges.

[edit] Charges against Warren Anderson and others

The Chairman and CEO of Union Carbide, Warren Anderson, had been arrested and released on bail by the Madhya Pradesh Police in Bhopal on December 7, 1984. This caused controversy as his trip to Bhopal was conditional on an initial promise by Indian authorities not to arrest him. Anderson has since refused to return to India.

In 1987, the Indian government summoned Warren Anderson, eight other executives and two company affiliates with homicide charges to appear in Indian court.^[52] Union Carbide balked, saying the company is not under Indian jurisdiction.^[52]

Beginning in 1991, the local authorities from Bhopal charged Warren Anderson, who had retired in 1986, with manslaughter, a crime that carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. Anderson has so far avoided an international arrest warrant and a US court summons. He was declared a fugitive from justice by the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bhopal on February 1, 1992 for failing to appear at the court hearings in a culpable homicide case in which he was named the chief defendant. Orders were passed to the Government of India to press for an extradition from the United States, with whom India had an extradition treaty in place. The Bhopal Medical Appeal believe that "neither the American nor the Indian government seem interested in disturbing him with an extradition". A seemingly apathetic attitude from the US government, which has failed to pursue the case, has also led to strong protests in the past, most notably by Greenpeace. A plea by India's Central Bureau of Investigation to dilute the charges from culpable homicide to criminal negligence has since been dismissed by the Indian courts.

The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of the decision of the lower federal courts in October 1993, meaning that victims of the Bhopal disaster could not seek damages in a US court.^[48] The Rajiv Gandhi government reached an out of court settlement for compensation for the victims which was too meagre and considered a sellout of their interests.

Meanwhile, very little of the money from the settlement reached with Union Carbide went to the survivors, and people in the area feel betrayed not only by Union Carbide (and chairman Warren Anderson), but also by their own politicians.^[4] On the anniversary of the tragedy, effigies of Anderson and politicians are burnt.

In July 2004, the Indian Supreme Court ordered the Indian government to release any remaining settlement funds to victims. The deadline for this release was extended by the Indian Supreme Court In April 2005, giving the Indian government until 30 April 2006 after a request from the Welfare Commission for Bhopal Gas Victims. The fund is believed to amount to $500 million after earning interest "from money remaining after all claims had been paid".^[48]

August 2006 saw the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York City uphold the dismissal of remaining claims in the case of Bano v. Union Carbide Corporation. This move blocked plaintiffs' motions for class certification and claims for property damages and remediation. In the view of Carbide, "the ruling reaffirms UCC's long-held positions and finally puts to rest — both procedurally and substantively — the issues raised in the class action complaint first filed against Union Carbide in 1999 by Haseena Bi and several organizations representing the residents of Bhopal". In September 2006, the Welfare Commission for Bhopal Gas Victims announced that all original compensation claims and revised petitions had been "cleared".^[48]

Criminal charges are proceeding against former Union Carbide India Limited employees including: Former UCIL Chairman Shri Keshub Mahindra; presently Chairman-cum-managing Director Vijay Gokhale; former Vice-President Functioning In charge, Kishor Kamdar; former works manager J. Mukund; and former Production manager A.P. Division, S.P. Choudhury.

Federal class action litigation, Sahu v. Union Carbide et al. is presently pending on appeal before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York.^[53] The litigation seeks damages for personal injury, medical monitoring^[54] and injunctive relief in the form of cleanup^[55] of the drinking water supplies^[56] for residential areas near the Bhopal plant^[57] A related complaint seeking similar relief for property damage claimants is stayed pending the outcome of the Sahu appeal before the federal district court in the Southern District of New York.

[edit] Changes in corporate identity

[edit] Sale of Union Carbide India Limited

Union Carbide sold its Indian subsidiary, which had operated the Bhopal plant, to Eveready Industries India Limited, in 1994.

[edit] Acquisition of Union Carbide by Dow Chemical Company

The Dow Chemical Company purchased Union Carbide in 2001 for $10.3 billion in stock and debt. Dow has publicly stated several times that the Union Carbide settlement payments have already fulfilled Dow's financial responsibility for the disaster. Dow did not purchase, however, the Indian Union Carbide. That was split up, renamed, and bought by the Indian government after the tragedy took place.

Some Dow stockholders filed suits to stop the acquisition, noting the outstanding liabilities for the Bhopal disaster.^[58] The acquisition has gained criticism from the International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal, as it is apparently "contrary to established merger law" in that "Dow denies any responsibility for Carbide's Bhopal liabilities". According to the Bhopal Medical Appeal, Carbide "remains liable for the environmental devastation" as environmental damage was not included in the 1989 settlement, despite ongoing contamination issues.^[58]

[edit] Ongoing contamination

The contamination in the site itself and the surrounding areas did not arise directly from the Bhopal disaster, but rather from the materials processed at the plant and the conditions under which those materials were processed. The area around the plant was used as a dumping ground area for hazardous chemicals. Between 1969 and 1977, all effluents were dumped in an open pit. From then on, neutralisation with hydrochloric acid was undertaken. The effluents went to two evaporation ponds. In the rainy seasons, the effluents used to overflow. It is also said that lots of chemicals are buried in the ground.^[4]

By 1982 tubewells in the vicinity of the UCC factory had to be abandoned. In 1991 the municipal authorities declared water from over 100 tubewells to be unfit for drinking.^[4]

Carbide's laboratory tests in 1989 revealed that soil and water samples collected from near the factory were toxic to fish. Twenty-one areas inside the plant were reported to be highly polluted. In 1994 it was reported that 21% of the factory premises were seriously contaminated with chemicals.^[44]^[59]^[60]

Studies made by Greenpeace and others from soil, groundwater, wellwater and vegetables from the residential areas around UCIL and from the UCIL factory area show contamination with a range of toxic heavy metals and chemical compounds.^[59]^[60]^[61]^[62]^[63]

Substances found, according to the reports, are naphthol, naphthalene, Sevin, tarry residues, alpha napthol, mercury, organochlorines, chromium, copper, nickel, lead, hexachlorethane, hexachlorobuta-diene, pesticide HCH (BHC), volatile organic compounds and halo-organics. Many of these contaminants were also found in breast milk.

In 2002, an inquiry found a number of toxins, including mercury, lead, 1,3,5 trichlorobenzene, dichloromethane and chloroform, in nursing women's breast milk. Well water and groundwater tests conducted in the surrounding areas in 1999 showed mercury levels to be at "20,000 and 6 million times" higher than expected levels; heavy metals and organochlorines were present in the soil. Chemicals that have been linked to various forms of cancer were also discovered, as well as trichloroethene, known to impair fetal development, at 50 times above safety limits specified by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).^[58]

In an investigation broadcast on BBC Radio 5 on November 14, 2004,^[64] it was reported that the site is still contaminated with 'thousands' of metric tons of toxic chemicals, including benzene hexachloride and mercury, held in open containers or loose on the ground. A sample of drinking water from a well near the site had levels of contamination 500 times higher than the maximum limits recommended by the World Health Organization.^[65]

In 2009, a day before the 25th anniversary of the disaster, Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), a Delhi based pollution monitoring lab, released latest tests from a study showing that groundwater in areas even three km from the factory up to 38.6 times more pesticides than Indian standards. ^[66]

The BBC took a water sample from a frequently used hand pump, located just north of the plant. The sample, tested in UK, was found to contain 1000 times the World Health Organization's recommended maximum amount of carbon tetrachloride, a carcinogenic toxin.^[67] This shows that the ground water has been contaminated due to toxins leaking from the factory site.

[edit] Criticisms of clean-up operations

Lack of political willpower has led to a stalemate on the issue of cleaning up the plant and its environs of hundreds of tonnes of toxic waste, which has been left untouched. Environmentalists have warned that the waste is a potential minefield in the heart of the city, and the resulting contamination may lead to decades of slow poisoning, and diseases affecting the nervous system, liver and kidneys in humans. According to activists, there are studies showing that the rates of cancer and other ailments are high in the region.^[68] Activists have demanded that Dow clean up this toxic waste, and have pressed the government of India to demand more money from Dow.

Carbide states that "after the incident, UCIL began clean-up work at the site under the direction of Indian central and state government authorities", which was continued after 1994 by the successor to UCIL, Eveready Industries, until 1998, when it was placed under the authority of the Madhya Pradesh Government.^[48] Critics of the clean-up undertaken by Carbide, such as the International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal, claim that "several internal studies" by the corporation, which evidenced "severe contamination", were not made public; the Indian authorities were also refused access. They believe that Union Carbide "continued directing operations" in Bhopal until "at least 1995" through Hayaran, the U.S.-trained site manager, even after the sale of its UCIL stock. The successor, Eveready Industries, abruptly relinquished the site lease to one department of the State Government while being supervised by another department on an extensive clean up programme. The Madhya Pradesh authorities have announced that they will "pursue both Dow and Eveready" to conduct the clean-up as joint tortfeasors.^{[citation needed]}

The International Campaign view Carbide's sale of UCIL in 1994 as a strategy "to escape the Indian courts, who threatened Carbide's assets due to their non-appearance in the criminal case". The successor, Eveready Industries India, Limited (EIIL), ended its 99-year lease in 1998 and turned over control of the site to the state government of Madhya Pradesh.^[46] Currently, the Madhya Pradesh Government is trying to legally force Dow and EIIL to finance clean-up operations.

On 7 March 2009, Indian scientists of the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) have decided to investigate the longterm health effects of the disaster. Studies will also be conducted to see if the toxic gases caused genetic disorders, low birth weight, growth and development disorders, congenital malformation and biological markers of MIC/toxic gas exposure.^[69]

[edit] Settlement fund hoax

Bichlbaum as Finisterra on BBC World News

On December 3, 2004, the twentieth anniversary of the disaster, a man claiming to be a Dow representative named Jude Finisterra was interviewed on BBC World News. He claimed that the company had agreed to clean up the site and compensate those harmed in the incident, by liquidating Union Carbide for $12 billion USD.^[70]

Immediately afterward, Dow's share price fell 4.2% in 23 minutes, for a loss of $2 billion in market value. Dow quickly issued a statement saying that they had no employee by that name — that he was an impostor, not affiliated with Dow, and that his claims were a hoax. The BBC broadcast a correction and an apology. The statement was widely carried.^[71]

"Jude Finisterra" was actually Andy Bichlbaum, a member of the activist prankster group The Yes Men. In 2002, The Yes Men issued a fake press release explaining why Dow refused to take responsibility for the disaster and started up a website, at "DowEthics.com", designed to look like the real Dow website but with what they felt was a more accurate cast on the events. In 2004, a producer for the BBC emailed them through the website requesting an interview, which they gladly obliged.^[72]

Taking credit for the prank in an interview on Democracy Now!, Bichlbaum explains how his fake name was derived: "Jude is the patron saint of impossible causes and Finisterra means the end of the Earth". He explained that he settled on this approach (taking responsibility) because it would show people precisely how Dow could help the situation as well as likely garnering major media attention in the US, which had largely ignored the disaster's anniversaries, when Dow attempted to correct the statement.^[73]

After the original interview was revealed as a hoax, Bichlbaum appeared in a follow-up interview on the United Kingdom's Channel 4 News.^[74] During the interview he was repeatedly asked if he had considered the emotions and reaction of the people of Bhopal when producing the hoax. According to the interviewer, "there were many people in tears" upon having learned of the hoax. Each time, Bichlbaum said that, in comparison, what distress he had caused the people was minimal to that for which Dow was responsible. In the 2009 film The Yes Men Fix the World, the Yes Men travel to Bhopal to assess public opinion on their prank, and are surprised to find that the residents laud their efforts to bring responsibility to the corporate world.

[edit] See also

[edit] Notes

^ http://www.mp.gov.in/bgtrrdmp/relief.htm
^ ^a ^b "Industrial Disaster Still Haunts India - South and Central Asia - msnbc.com". http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34247132/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/page/2/. Retrieved December 3, 2009.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k ^l ^m Eckerman (2001).
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k ^l ^m ⁿ ^o ^p ^q ^r ^s ^t ^u ^v ^w ^x ^y ^z ^aa ^ab ^ac ^ad ^ae ^af ^ag ^ah ^ai ^aj ^ak ^al ^am ^an ^ao ^ap ^aq ^ar ^as ^at ^au ^av ^aw ^ax ^ay ^az ^ba ^bb ^bc ^bd ^be ^bf ^bg ^bh ^bi ^bj ^bk ^bl ^bm ^bn ^bo ^bp ^bq ^br ^bs ^bt ^bu ^bv ^bw ^bx ^by ^bz ^ca ^cb ^cc ^cd ^ce Eckerman (2004).
^ "No takers for Bhopal toxic waste". BBC. 2008-09-30. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7569891.stm. Retrieved 2010-01-01.
^ Broughton, Edward (2005). "The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review". Environmental Health 4 (6): 6. doi:10.1186/1476-069X-4-6. http://www.ehjournal.net/content/4/1/6.
^ Chander, J. (2001). "Water contamination: a legacy of the union carbide disaster in Bhopal, India". Int J Occup Environ Health 7 (1): 72–3. PMID 11210017. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11210017.
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^ ^a ^b ^c "Statement of Union Carbide Corporation Regarding the Bhopal Tragedy". Bhopal Information Center, UCC. http://www.bhopal.com/ucs.htm.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d "Frequently Asked Questions". Bhopal Information Center, UCC. http://www.bhopal.com/faq.htm.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k "Chronology". Bhopal Information Center, UCC. November 2006. http://www.bhopal.com/chrono.htm.
^ ^a ^b "Incident Response and Settlement". Bhopal Information Center,UCC. http://www.bhopal.com/irs.htm.
^ "Bhopal Gas Tragedy: Fact Sheet". Hindustan Times. Dec 3, 2004.
^ Broughton (2005).
^ ^a ^b "India Acts in Carbide Case". The New York Times. May 17, 1988. p. D15. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE0D71F3CF934A25756C0A96E948260.
^ http://www.bhopal.net/pdfs/Sahu%20Opinion%2011.3.08.pdf
^ The Truth About Dow : Govt handling of Bhopal: Blot on Indian Democracy, 224 Indian groups tell PM.
^ The Truth About Dow : 25 years on, Govt wakes up to Bhopal waste but can't find any one to clean it up.
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^ Oops! You have reached Bhopal.con.
^ ^a ^b ^c "What Happened in Bhopal?". The Bhopal Medical Appeal. http://www.bhopal.org/whathappened.html.
^ ^a ^b Labunska et al. (2003).
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^ Stringer et al. (2002).
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^ Peoples' Science Institute (2001).
^ "Bhopal faces risk of 'poisoning'". BBC Radio 5. 2004-11-14. http://search.bbc.co.uk/cgi-bin/search/results.pl?scope=all&tab=av&recipe=all&q=bhopal+faces+risk+of+%27poisoning%27&x=0&y=0.
^ "Bhopal 'faces risk of poisoning'". BBC Radio 5 website. 2004-11-14. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4010511.stm. Retrieved 2010-01-01.
^ "Bhopal gas leak survivors still being poisoned: Study". Bhopal. 1 December 2009. http://www.cseindia.org/AboutUs/press_releases/press-20091201.htm.
^ "Bhopal marks 25 years since gas leak devastation". BBC News. December 3, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8392206.stm. Retrieved 2010-01-01.
^ India's betrayal of Bhopal - PAMELA TIMMS AND PRABAL KR DAS, The Scotsman, November 22, 2007.
^ 25 years on, study on Bhopal gas leak effects.
^ video.
^ Z-net
^ The Yes Men
^ Democracy Now!
^ video

[edit] References

[edit] Books and reports

Preview of several more books at Google books. http://books.google.com/books?q=bhopal&btnG=Search+Books.
[2]Alfred de Grazia: A Cloud over Bhopal, Popular Prakashan, Bombay (1985)
Browning, Jackson (1993). Jack A. Gottschalk. ed (PDF). Union Carbide: Disaster at Bhopal. Crisis Response: Inside Stories on Managing Image Under Siege. Detroit. http://www.bhopal.com/pdfs/browning.pdf. "Union Carbide's former vice-president of health, safety and environmental programs tells how he dealt with the catastrophe from a PR point of view."
Cassels, J. (1993). The Uncertain Promise Of Law: Lessons From Bhopal. University Of Toronto Press.
ChouhanTR and others (1994, 2004). Bhopal: the Inside Story — Carbide Workers Speak Out on the World's Worst Industrial Disaster. USA: The Apex Press. ISBN 1-891843-30-3. India: Other India Press ISBN 81-85569-65-7 Main author Chouhan was an operator at the plant. Contains many technical details.
Dhara VR (2000). The Bhopal Gas Leak: Lessons from studying the impact of a disaster in a developing nation.. USA: Univ. of Massachusetts Lowell. http://webdrive.service.emory.edu/users/vdhara/www.BhopalPublications/Health%20Effects%20&%20Epidemiology/Dhara%20Disseration%20Bhopal%20Disaster.pdf. Doctoral thesis.
Doyle, Jack (2004). Trespass Against Us. Dow Chemical & The Toxic Century. USA: Common Courage Press. ISBN 1-56751-268-2. http://www.trespassagainstus.com/index.php. A story of how one company's chemical prducts and byproducts have damaged public health and the environment. 466 pages.
D'Silva, Themistocles (2006). The Black Box of Bhopal: A Closer Look at the World's Deadliest Industrial Disaster. Victoria, B.C.: Trafford. ISBN 1-4120-8412-1. Review Written by a retired former employee of UCC who was a member of the investigation committee that reproduced the tank residue and determined the true cause of the incident. Includes several original documents including correspondence between UCIL and the Ministries of the Government of India.
Eckerman, Ingrid (2001) (PDF). Chemical Industry and Public Health — Bhopal as an example. http://www.dnsy.se/_upload/lfm/2006/bhopal%20gas%20disaster.pdf. Essay for MPH. A short overview, 57 pages, 82 references.
Eckerman, Ingrid (2004). The Bhopal Saga — Causes and Consequences of the World's Largest Industrial Disaster. India: Universities Press. ISBN 81-7371-515-7. http://www.eckerman.nu/default.cfm?page=The%20Bhopal%20Saga. Preview Google books All known facts 1960s – 2003, systematized and analysed. 283 pages, over 200 references.
Fortun, Kim (2001). Advocacy after Bhopal. Environmentalism, Disaster, New Global Orders. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-25720-7. Preview Google books
de Grazia, Alfred (1985). A Cloud over Bhopal — Causes, Consequences and Constructive Solutions. ISBN 0-940268-09-9. http://www.grazian-archive.com/governing/bhopal/Publishers%20Note.html. "The first book on the Bhopal disaster, written on-site a few weeks after the accident."
Hanna B, Morehouse W, Sarangi S (2005). The Bhopal Reader. Remembering Twenty Years of the World's Worst Industrial Disaster. USA: The Apex Press. ISBN 1-891843-32-X USA, 81-85569-70-3 India. Reprinting and annotating landmark writing from across the years.
Jasanoff, Sheila ed. (1994). Learning from Disaster. Risk Management After Bhopal. University of Pennsylvania Press. ISBN 081221532X, 9780812215328. 291 pages. Preview Google books
Johnson S, Sahu R, Jadon N, Duca C (2009). Contamination of soil and water inside and outside the Union Carbide India Limited, Bhopal. New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment. In Down to Earth
Kalelkar AS, Little AD. (1998) (PDF). Investigation of Large-magnitude incidents: Bhopal as a Case Study.. http://bhopal.bard.edu/resources/documents/1988ArthurD.Littlereport.pdf. London: The Institution of Chemical Engineers Conference on Preventing Major Chemical Accidents
Kulling P, Lorin H (1987). The Toxic Gas Disaster in Bhopal December 2–3, 1984. Stockholm: National Defence Research Institute. [In Swedish]
Kurzman, D. (1987). A Killing Wind: Inside Union Carbide and the Bhopal Catastrophe. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Kovel, J (2002). The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism or the End of the World?. London: Zed Books.
Labunska I, Stephenson A, Brigden K, Stringer R, Santillo D, Johnston P.A. (1999) (PDF). The Bhopal Legacy. Toxic contaminants at the former Union Carbide factory site,Bhopal, India: 15 years after the Bhopal accident. http://webdrive.service.emory.edu/users/vdhara/www.BhopalPublications/Environmental%20Health/Greenpeace%20Bhopal%20Report.pdf. Greenpeace Research Laboratories, Department of Biological Sciences, University of Exeter, Exeter UK
Lapierre, Dominique; Moro, Javier (2001). Five Minutes Past Midnight in Bhopal. New York, NY: Warner Books. ISBN 0-446-53088-3. A novel, based on facts, that describes the development from the 1960s to the disaster itself. Very thrilling.
Mitchel, James (1996). The long road to recovery: Community responses to industrial disaster. Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press. ISBN 92-808-0926-1. http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu21le/uu21le00.htm#Contents.
Singh, Moti (2008). Unfolding the Betrayal of Bhopal Gas Tragedy. Delhi, India: B.R. Publishing Corporation. ISBN 8176466220. The chief coordinator of rescue operations at the district level writes rather critically on how the administration and bureaucracy functioned after the disaster.
Shrishti (2002). Toxic present — toxic future. A report on Human and Environmental Chemical Contamination around the Bhopal disaster site. Delhi: The Other Media.
Stringer R, Labunska I, Brigden K, Santillo D. (2002) (PDF). Chemical Stockpiles at Union Carbide India Limited in Bhopal: An investigation. Greenpeace Research Laboratories. http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/chemical-stockpiles-at-union-c.pdf.
The Trade Union Report on Bhopal. Geneva, Switzerland: ICFTU-ICEF. 1985. http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/unionreport1985.html.
Varadarajan S et al. (1985). Report on Scientific Studies on the Factors Related to Bhopal Toxic Gas Leakage. New Delhi: Indian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.
Weir D (1987). The Bhopal Syndrome: Pesticides, Environment and Health. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.

[edit] Articles and papers

See also "International Medical Commission on Bhopal". http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Medical_Commission_on_Bhopal.
"Health and Epidemiology Papers About the Bhopal Disaster". http://webdrive.service.emory.edu/users/vdhara/www.BhopalPublications.
Broughton E (2005). "The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: A review". Environmental Health 4 (1): 6 pages. doi:10.1186/1476-069X-4-6. PMID 15882472.& PMC 1142333. http://www.ehjournal.net/content/4/1/6. 10 May 2005
Dhara, V. Ramana; Dhara, Rosaline (Sept/October 2002). "The Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal: A review of health effects" (reprint). Archives of Environmental Health. pp. 391–404. http://webdrive.service.emory.edu/users/vdhara/www.BhopalPublications/Health%20Effects%20&%20Epidemiology/Health%20Effects%20Review%20articles/Health%20Effects%20Review%20AEH.pdf.
Dhara VR, Gassert TH (September 2005). "The Bhopal gas tragedy: Evidence for cyanide poisoning not convincing". Current Science 89 (6): 923–5. http://webdrive.service.emory.edu/users/vdhara/www.BhopalPublications/Toxicology/Current%20Science%20article%20&%20critique/Current%20Science%20critique%20Gassert%20Dhara%20&%20Sriramachari%20response.pdf.
D'Silva TDJ, Lopes A, Jones RL, Singhawangcha S, Chan JK (1986). "Studies of methyl isocyanate chemistry in the Bhopal incident". J. Org. Chem. 51 (20): 3781–3788. doi:10.1021/jo00370a007.
Eckerman, Ingrid (2005). "The Bhopal gas leak: Analyses of causes and consequences by three different models.". Journal of Loss Prevention in the process industry. pp. 2005:18;213–217. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6TGH-4GWC0T0-7&_user=99318&_coverDate=11%2F30%2F2005&_alid=1193044136&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_cdi=5255&_sort=r&_docanchor=&view=c&_ct=1&_acct=C000007678&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=99318&md5=34c0e3b6b93cd1ef9dd2d5f0f6e11788.
Eckerman, Ingrid (2006). "The Bhopal Disaster 1984 - working conditions and the role of the trade unions." (PDF). Asian Pacific Newsletter on occupational health and safety. http://www.ttl.fi/NR/rdonlyres/AF130282-A0AB-4439-8E3C-AFF55CDEF59F/0/AsianPacific_Nwesletter22006.pdf. Vol 13, No 2;48–49
Gassert TH, Dhara VR, (Sep 2005.). "Debate on cyanide poisoning in Bhopal victims." (PDF). Current Science. http://webdrive.service.emory.edu/users/vdhara/www.BhopalPublications/Toxicology/Current%20Science%20article%20&%20critique/Current%20Science%20critique%20Gassert%20Dhara%20&%20Sriramachari%20response.pdf. (Response) Vol 89, nr 6
Jayaraman N. "Bhopal: Generations of Poison". http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15485. CorpWatch, December 2, 2009
Jasanoff, Sheila (2007). "Bhopal's Trials of Knowledge and Ignorance". Isis 98: 344–350. doi:10.1086/518194. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/518194.
Khurrum MA, S Hafeez Ahmad S (1987). "Long term follow up of ocular lesion of methyl-isocyanate gas disaster in Bhopal". Indian Journal of Ophthalmology 35 (3): 136–137. PMID 3507407. http://www.ijo.in/article.asp?issn=0301-4738;year=1987;volume=35;issue=3;spage=136;epage=137;aulast=Khurrum.
Lakhani N. Bhopal: The victims are still being born. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/bhopal-the-victims-are-still-being-born-1830516.html. The Independent, 29 November 2009
Lepowski, W. "Ten Years Later: Bhopal". Chemical and Engineering News, 19 December 1994.
McTaggart U. "Dioxin, Bhopal and Dow Chemical". http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/555. Solidarity ATC 106, September-October 2003
Mishra PK, Dabadghao S, Modi1 GK, Desikan P, Jain A, Mittra I, Gupta D, Chauhan C, Jain SK, Maudar KK (2009). "In utero exposure to methyl isocyanate in the Bhopal gas disaster: evidence of persisting hyperactivation of immune system two decades later". Occupational and Environmental Medicine 66 (4): 279. doi:10.1136/oem.2008.041517. PMID 19295137. http://oem.bmj.com/content/66/4/279.extract.
Naik SR, Acharya VN, Bhalerao RA, Kowli SS, Nazareth HH, Mahashur AA, Shah SS, Potnis AV, Mehta AC (1986). "Medical survey of methyl isocyanate gas affected population of Bhopal. Part I. General medical observations 15 weeks following exposure". Journal of Post-Graduate Medicine 32 (4): 175–84. PMID 0003585790. http://www.jpgmonline.com/article.asp?issn=0022-3859;year=1986;volume=32;issue=4;spage=175;epage=84;aulast=Naik.
Naik SR, Acharya VN, Bhalerao RA, Kowli SS, Nazareth HH, Mahashur AA, Shah SS, Potnis AV, Mehta AC (1986). "Medical survey of methyl isocyanate gas affected population of Bhopal. Part II. Pulmonary effects in Bhopal victims as seen 15 weeks after M.I.C. exposure.". Journal of Post-Graduate Medicine 32 (4): 185–91. PMID 0003585791. http://www.jpgmonline.com/article.asp?issn=0022-3859;year=1986;volume=32;issue=4;spage=185;epage=91;aulast=Naik.
Peterson M.J. "Case study: Bhopal Plant Disaster". http://www.umass.edu/sts/ethics/bhopal.html. Science, Technology & Society Initiative, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Ranjan N, Sarangi S, Padmanabhan VT, Holleran S, Ramakrishnan R, Varma DR (2003). Methyl Isocyanate Exposure and Growth Patterns of Adolescents in Bhopal "Methyl Isocyanate Exposure and Growth Patterns of Adolescents in Bhopal Methyl Isocyanate Exposure and Growth Patterns of Adolescents in Bhopal". JAMA (14). http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/290/14/1856 Methyl Isocyanate Exposure and Growth Patterns of Adolescents in Bhopal.
Rice, Annie; ILO (2006). "Bhopal Revisited — the tragedy of lessons ignored" (PDF). Asian Pacific Newsletter on occupational health and safety. http://www.ttl.fi/NR/rdonlyres/AF130282-A0AB-4439-8E3C-AFF55CDEF59F/0/AsianPacific_Nwesletter22006.pdf. Vol 13, No 2;46–47
Sriramachari S (2004). "The Bhopal gas tragedy: An environmental disaster" (PDF). Current Science 86: 905–920. http://webdrive.service.emory.edu/users/vdhara/www.BhopalPublications/Toxicology/Current%20Science%20article%20&%20critique/Curr%20Science%20Bhopal%20article%20Sriramachari.pdf.

[edit] Reports from governmental institutions, UCC and DOW

[edit] Governmental institutions

Health Effects of the Toxic Gas Leak from the Union Carbide Methyl Isocyanate Plant in Bhopal. Technical report on Population Based Long Term, Epidemiological Studies (1985–1994). Bhopal Gas Disaster Research Centre, Gandhi Medical College, Bhopal (2003?) Contains the studies performed by the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR)
An Epidemiological Study of Symptomatic Morbidities in Communities Living Around Solar Evaporation Ponds And Behind Union Carbide Factory, Bhopal. Department of Community Medicine, Gandhi Medical College, Bhopal (2009)
At A Glance. Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief & Rehabilitation 1985 – 2009. Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief & Rehabilitation Department, Bhopal (2009)

[edit] Union Carbide Corporation

Methyl Isocyanate. Union Carbide F-41443A - 7/76. Union Carbide Corporation, New York (1976)
Carbon monoxide, Phosgene and Methyl isocyanate. Unit Safety Procedures Manual. Union Carbide India Limited, Agricultural Products Division: Bhopal (1978)
Operating Manual Part II. Methyl Isocyanate Unit. Union Carbide India Limited, Agricultural Products Division (1979).
Bhopal Methyl Isocyanate Incident. Investigation Team Report. Union Carbide Corporation, Danbury, CT (1985).
Presence of Toxic Ingredients in Soil/Water Samples Inside Plant Premises. Union Carbide Corporation, USA (1989)

[edit] Dow Chemicals publications

Stockholder Proposal on Bhopal 2006. http://www.dow.com/financial/2006prox/161-00639.pdf. In Notice of the Annual Meeting of Stockholders to be held on Thursday, May 11, 2006 (Agenda item 3, pp 11–13)
Stockholder Proposal on Bhopal 2007. http://www.dow.com/financial/2007prox/161-00662.pdf. In Notice of the Annual Meeting of Stockholders to be held on Thursday, May 10, 2007 (Agenda item 4, pp 39–41)
Annual Meeting Final Voting Results. http://www.dow.com/corpgov/pdf/20070510_voting.pdf. May 10, 2007

[edit] Mixed

"Bhopal Disaster". Trade Environmental Database. TED case studies no. 233, American University, Washington (1 Nov 1997). http://www.american.edu/ted/bhopal.htm.
"Bhopal Papers. Conference Announcement and Call for Papers". http://webdrive.service.emory.edu/users/vdhara/papers.htm. A collection of different articles and papers concerning the Bhopal disaster.
Three part series on Horrors of Bhopal Gas Tragedy
"Bibliography on Bhopal disaster". http://www.alyssaalappen.org/2002/12/04/bibliography-on-bhopal-disaster/. A condensed list of books, reports, and articles on the Bhopal disaster and related issues.
"Chemical Terrorism Fact Sheet: Methyl Isocyanate." (PDF). http://bioterrorism.slu.edu/pulmonary/quick/methyliso.pdf. CSB&EI, Saint Louis University School of Public Health, USA
"Unproven technology". Bhopal.net (14 Nov 2002). http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/unproventechnology.html.
"Clouds of injustice. Bhopal disaster 20 years". http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA20/015/2004/en. Amnesty International, London (2004) Report (pdf).
"Summary of "Clouds of injustice - Bhopal disaster 20 years on"". http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA20/104/2004/en. Amnesty International 29 Nov 2004.
"No more Bhopals". http://old.studentsforbhopal.org/Resources.htm. Contains original documents. This page does helpfully categorize information resources by subject. Some material seem to have disappeared.
Sharma H. Rajan. "Catastrophe and the Dilemma of law" (PDF). http://www.icjb.org/legal/catastrope-dilemma.pdf. (2004) A chapter from The Bhopal Reader by Hanna B et al.
The Bhopal Memory Project Material from UCC, the trade union and other original material has been scanned and can be found here. Some seem to have disappeared.
"Subterranean Leak". http://www.downtoearth.org.in/webexclusives/story1.htm. Down to Earth Dec 1, 2009.

[edit] Contamination of site

A Report on Mercury Contamination of Groundwater near the Union Carbide Factory at Bhopal. Peoples' Science Institute, Dehra Doon (2001)
Foul Debris. The UCIL plant is still a health hazard. Down to Earth, Dec 15 (2003).

[edit] Presentations

Eckerman, Ingrid. "The Bhopal Gas Disaster 1984 – Children's Acute and Chronic Exposure to Toxic Substances" (PDF). http://www.lakareformiljon.org/images/stories/LfM_blandat/Bhopal_Bangalore_2010.pdf. Power point presentation (2010)
Eckerman, Ingrid. "The Bhopal Saga — Causes and Consequences of the World's Largest Industrial Disaster." (PDF). http://www.lakareformiljon.org/images/stories/dokument/2009/bhopal_gas_tragedy_march_2008.pdf. Power point presentation in easy English (2008)
Eckerman, Ingrid. "The Bhopal Gas Leak — too late for good epidemiology." (PDF). http://www.lakareformiljon.org/images/stories/dokument/2009/epidemiology_lkarstmman_2007_engelska.pdf. Poster presentation (2007)

[edit] Further reading

[edit] Websites

The Bhopal Europe Bus Tour, October - November 2009
End 25 years of injustice, Amnesty International, 16 October 2009
The Bhopal Library, The Apex Press, New York
International Campaign For Justice in Bhopal
Bhopal Medical Appeal and Sambhavna Trust Clinic
Students for Bhopal
Bhopal Information Center, Union Carbide
Statement of The Dow Chemical Company Regarding the Bhopal Tragedy 2005
Toxic Hotspots Greenpeace, 2003
Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief & Rehabilitation Department,The official website of the Government of Madhya Pradesh
Dow Ethics, parody website by The Yes Men
Bhopal: 25 years on BBC News' website on the Bhopal disaster

[edit] News

Bhopal's health effects probed, BBC News 26 March 2009
"Bhopal faces risk of 'poisoning'", BBC News, 14 Nov 2004
25 years on, Bhopal gas victims still suffering, DNA India newspaper
25 years after Bhopal gas tragedy, plant to be open to public, Indian-Express newspaper

[edit] Films

Twenty Years Without Justice: The Bhopal Chemical Disaster International Campaign for Justice for Bhopal video
Bhopal.fm Arts website with broadcasting, photos, music and videos
"One Night in Bhopal". BBC News. 2009-12-02. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/bhopal/default.stm. Retrieved 2010-01-01.
It Happened in Bhopal, 27 Aug 2007
Shrouds of Silence, August 2008
Bhopal: Prayer for Rain, upcoming film based on the Bhopal disaster.
The Yes Men Fix the World, documentary film being released on October 23, 2009 which includes discussion of the disaster and shows

[edit] Photos

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Bhopal disaster

No More Bhopals, Micha Patault
Raghu Rai, 1984
Pablo Bartholomew, 1984
The Ghosts of Bhopal, Common Language Project
Child killed by the poisonous gas leak in the Union Carbide chemical plant disaster, World Press Photo of the Year, 1984
Poison in Bhopal, ReMedAct, 2008
BHOPAL XXV, Stephane Bouillet
Bhopal Gas Tragedy - 25 Years On | 26 Photos, Reuters India
25th anniversary of the Bhopal disaster, The Boston Globe

[edit] Texts

Animal's People A fictionalized story of a Bhopal survivors that recreates present day Bhopal for the reader
Bhopal Gas Tragedy A railway officer describes how he received victims coming by train, 2002

[edit] Music

The Bhopal disaster is referenced in the song R.S.V.P. by B Dolan in which he decries Warren Anderson's involvement and gives out his home address.

[hide] v • d • e Dow Chemical Co.

Corporate Directors:	Arnold A. Allemang · Andrew Liveris · Jacqueline K. Barton · Geoffery E. Merszei · James A. Bell · Dennis H. Reilley · Jeff M. Fettig · James M. Ringler · Barbara Hackman Franklin · Ruth G. Shaw · John B. Hess · Paul G. Stern

Assets & Products:	Lorsban · Polystyrene (Styrofoam) · Saran Wrap · Union Carbide · Windsor Salt

Annual Revenue: $40.2 billion USD (▲23% FY 2004) · Employees: 43,203 · Stock Symbols: NYSE: DOW · Website: www.dow.com

Coordinates: 23°16′51″N 77°24′38″E / 23.28083°N 77.41056°E / 23.28083; 77.41056

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhopal_disaster"

Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement

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U.S. President George W. Bush and India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh exchange handshakes in New Delhi on March 2, 2006.

The Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement, known also as the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, refers to a bilateral accord on civil nuclear cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of India. The framework for this agreement was a July 18, 2005 joint statement by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then U.S. President George W. Bush, under which India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and place all its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and, in exchange, the United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India.^[1] This U.S.-India deal took more than three years to come to fruition as it had to go through several complex stages, including amendment of U.S. domestic law, a civil-military nuclear Separation Plan in India, an India-IAEA safeguards (inspections) agreement and the grant of an exemption for India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an export-control cartel that had been formed mainly in response to India's first nuclear test in 1974. In its final shape, the deal places under permanent safeguards those nuclear facilities that India has identified as "civil" and permits broad civil nuclear cooperation, while excluding the transfer of "sensitive" equipment and technologies, including civil enrichment and reprocessing items even under IAEA safeguards. On August 18, 2008 the IAEA Board of Governors approved,^[2] and on February 2, 2009, India signed an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA.^[3] Once India brings this agreement into force, inspections will begin in a phased manner on the 35 civilian nuclear installations India has identified in its Separation Plan.^[4]

The nuclear deal was widely seen^{[by whom?]} as a legacy-building effort by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh.^{[citation needed]} But while the deal had to pass muster with the U.S. Congress twice (once when the Hyde Act was passed in late 2006 to amend U.S. domestic law and then when the final deal-related package was approved in October 2008), Singh blocked the Indian Parliament from scrutinizing the deal. The deal proved very contentious in India and threatened at one time to topple Singh's government, which survived a confidence vote in Parliament in July 2008 by roping in a regional party as a coalition partner in place of the leftist bloc that had bolted.

On August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with India,^[5] after which the United States approached the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to grant a waiver to India to commence civilian nuclear trade.^[6] The 45-nation NSG granted the waiver to India on September 6, 2008 allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries.^[7] The implementation of this waiver makes India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.^[8]

The US House of Representatives passed the bill on 28 September 2008.^[9] Two days later, India and France inked a similar nuclear pact making France the first country to have such an agreement with India.^[10] On October 1, 2008 the US Senate also approved the civilian nuclear agreement allowing India to purchase nuclear fuel and technology from the United States.^[11]^[12] U.S. President, George W. Bush, signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal, approved by the U.S. Congress, into law, now called the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, on October 8, 2008.^[13] The agreement was signed by Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his counterpart Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on 10 October.^[14]^[15]

[edit] Overview

The Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, also known as the Hyde Act, is the U.S. domestic law that modifies the requirements of Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act to permit nuclear cooperation with India^[16] and in particular to negotiate a 123 Agreement to operationalize the 2005 Joint Statement. As a domestic U.S. law, the Hyde Act is binding on the United States. The Hyde Act cannot be binding on India's sovereign decisions although it can be construed as prescriptive for future U.S. reactions. As per the Vienna convention, an international treaty such as the 123 agreement cannot be superseded by an internal law such as the Hyde Act.^[17]^[18]^[19]

The 123 agreement defines the terms and conditions for bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation, and requires separate approvals by the U.S. Congress and by Indian cabinet ministers. According to the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, the agreement will help India meet its goal of adding 25,000 MW of nuclear power capacity through imports of nuclear reactors and fuel by 2020.^[20]

After the terms of the 123 agreement were concluded on July 27, 2007,^[21] it ran into trouble because of stiff opposition in India from the communist allies of the ruling United Progressive Alliance.^[22] The government survived a confidence vote in the parliament on July 22, 2008 by 275–256 votes in the backdrop of defections from both camps to the opposite camps.^[23] The deal also had faced opposition from non-proliferation activists, anti-nuclear organisations, and some states within the Nuclear Suppliers Group.^[24]^[25] A deal which is inconsistent with the Hyde Act and does not place restrictions on India has also faced opposition in the U.S. House.^[26]^[27] In February 2008 U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that any agreement would be "consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act".^[28] The bill was signed on October 8, 2008

[edit] Background

Parties to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have a recognized right of access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and an obligation to cooperate on civilian nuclear technology. Separately, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has agreed on guidelines for nuclear exports, including reactors and fuel. Those guidelines condition such exports on comprehensive safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which are designed to verify that nuclear energy is not diverted from peaceful use to weapons programs. Though neither India, Israel, nor Pakistan have signed the NPT, India argues that instead of addressing the central objective of universal and comprehensive non-proliferation, the treaty creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967, who alone are free to possess and multiply their nuclear stockpiles. ^[29] India insists on a comprehensive action plan for a nuclear-free world within a specific time-frame and has also adopted a voluntary "no first use policy".

In response to a growing Chinese nuclear arsenal, India conducted a nuclear test in 1974 (called "peaceful nuclear explosion" and explicitly not for "offensive" first strike military purposes but which could be used for "peaceful deterrence").^{[citation needed]} Led by the U.S., other states have set up an informal group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology.^[30] Consequently, India was left outside the international nuclear order, which forced India to develop its own resources for each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle and power generation, including next generation reactors such as fast breeder reactors and a thorium breeder reactor^[31]^[32] known as the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor. In addition to impelling India to achieve success in developing these new reactor technologies, the sanctions also provided India with the impetus to continue developing its own nuclear weapons technology with a specific goal of achieving self-sufficiency for all key components for weapons design, testing and production.

Given that India is estimated to possess reserves of about 80,000-112,369 tons of uranium,^[33] India has more than enough fissile material to supply its nuclear weapons program, even if it restricted Plutonium production to only 8 of the country's 17 current reactors, and then further restricted Plutonium production to only 1/4 of the fuel core of these reactors.^[34] According to the calculations of one of the key advisers to the US Nuclear deal negotiating team, Ashley Tellis:^[34]

Operating India's eight unsafeguarded PHWRs in such a [conservative] regime would bequeath New Delhi with some 12,135–13,370 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, which is sufficient to produce between 2,023–2,228 nuclear weapons over and above those already existing in the Indian arsenal. Although no Indian analyst, let alone a policy maker, has ever advocated any nuclear inventory that even remotely approximates such numbers, this heuristic exercise confirms that New Delhi has the capability to produce a gigantic nuclear arsenal while subsisting well within the lowest estimates of its known uranium reserves.

However, because the amount of nuclear fuel required for the electricity generation sector is far greater than that required to maintain a nuclear weapons program, and since India's estimated reserve of uranium represents only 1% of the world's known uranium reserves, the NSG's uranium export restrictions mainly affected Indian nuclear power generation capacity. Specifically, the NSG sanctions challenge India's long term plans to expand and fuel its civilian nuclear power generation capacity from its current output of about 4GWe (GigaWatt electricity) to a power output of 20GWe by 2020; assuming the planned expansion used conventional Uranium/Plutonium fueled heavy water and light water nuclear power plants.

Consequently, India's nuclear isolation constrained expansion of its civil nuclear program, but left India relatively immune to foreign reactions to a prospective nuclear test. Partly for this reason, but mainly due to continued unchecked covert nuclear and missile proliferation activities between Pakistan, China ^[35]^[36] and North Korea,^[37]^[38] India conducted five more nuclear tests in May, 1998 at Pokhran.

India was subject to international sanctions after its May 1998 nuclear tests. However, due to the size of the Indian economy and its relatively large domestic sector, these sanctions had little impact on India, with Indian GDP growth increasing from 4.8% in 1997–1998 (prior to sanctions) to 6.6% (during sanctions) in 1998–1999.^[39] Consequently, at the end of 2001, the Bush Administration decided to drop all sanctions on India.^[40] Although India achieved its strategic objectives from the Pokhran nuclear weapons tests in 1998,^[41]^{[verification needed]} it continued to find its civil nuclear program isolated internationally.

[edit] Rationale behind the agreement

[edit] Nuclear non-proliferation

The proposed civil nuclear agreement implicitly recognizes India's "de facto" status even without signing the NPT. The Bush administration justifies a nuclear pact with India because it is important in helping to advance the non-proliferation framework ^[42] by formally recognizing India's strong non-proliferation record even though it has not signed the NPT. The former Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, one of the architects of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal said "India's trust, its credibility, the fact that it has promised to create a state-of-the-art facility, monitored by the IAEA, to begin a new export control regime in place, because it has not proliferated the nuclear technology, we can't say that about Pakistan." when asked whether the U.S. would offer a nuclear deal with Pakistan on the lines of the Indo-U.S. deal.^[43]^[44]^[45] Mohammed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would be in charge of inspecting India's civilian reactors has praised the deal as "it would also bring India closer as an important partner in the nonproliferation regime".^[46] However, members of the IAEA safeguards staff have made it clear that Indian demands that New Delhi be allowed to determine when Indian reactors might be inspected could undermine the IAEA safeguards system.^{[citation needed]} The reason for this is to restrict development of nuclear weapons and to negotiate with India indirectly to ratify the NPT using another mechanism.^{[citation needed]} Likewise, the reaction in the Western academic community was mixed. While some authors praised the agreement as bringing India closer to the NPT regime, others argued that it gave India too much leeway in determining which facilities were to be safeguarded and that it effectively rewarded India for continuously defying the Non-Proliferation Treaty by not acceding to it.^[47]

[edit] Economic considerations

Financially, the U.S. also expects that such a deal could spur India's economic growth and bring in $150 billion in the next decade for nuclear power plants, of which the U.S. wants a share.^[48] It is India's stated objective to increase the production of nuclear power generation from its present capacity of 4,000 MWe to 20,000 MWe in the next decade. However, the developmental economic advising firm Dalberg, which advises the IMF and the World Bank, moreover, has done its own analysis of the economic value of investing in nuclear power development in India. Their conclusion is that for the next 20 years such investments are likely to be far less valuable economically or environmentally than a variety of other measures to increase electricity production in India. They have noted that U.S. nuclear vendors cannot sell any reactors to India unless and until India caps third party liabilities or establishes a credible liability pool to protect U.S. firms from being sued in the case of an accident or a terrorist act of sabotage against nuclear plants.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Strategic

Since the end of the Cold War, The Pentagon, along with certain U.S. ambassadors such as Robert Blackwill, has requested increased strategic ties with India and a de-hyphenization of Pakistan with India, i.e. having separate policies toward India and Pakistan rather than just an "India-Pakistan" policy. The United States also sees India as a viable counter-weight to the growing influence of China,^{[citation needed]} and a potential client for which it must compete with Russia.^{[citation needed]}

While India is self-sufficient in thorium, possessing 25% of the world's known and economically viable thorium,^[49] it possesses a meager 1% of the similarly calculated global uranium reserves.^[50] Indian support for cooperation with the U.S. centers on the issue of obtaining a steady supply of sufficient energy for the economy to grow. Indian opposition to the pact centers on the concessions that would need to be made, as well as the likely de-prioritization of research into a thorium fuel cycle if uranium becomes highly available given the well understood utilization of uranium in a nuclear fuel cycle.

[edit] Agreement

On March 2, 2006 in New Delhi, George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, following an initiation during the July 2005 summit in Washington between the two leaders over civilian nuclear cooperation.^[51]

Heavily endorsed by the White House, the agreement is thought to be a major victory to George W. Bush's foreign policy initiative and was described by many lawmakers as a cornerstone of the new strategic partnership between the two countries.^[52] The agreement is widely considered to help India fulfill its soaring energy demands and boost U.S. and India into a strategic partnership. The Pentagon speculates this will help ease global demand for crude oil and natural gas.

On August 3, 2007, both the countries released the full text of the 123 agreement.^[53] Nicholas Burns, the chief negotiator of the India-United States nuclear deal, said the U.S. has the right to terminate the deal if India tests a nuclear weapon and that no part of the agreement recognizes India as a nuclear weapons state.^[54]

[edit] Hyde Act Passage in the U.S.

On December 18, 2006 President George W. Bush signed the Hyde Act into law. The Act was passed by an overwhelming 359–68 in the United States House of Representatives on July 26 and by 85–12 in the United States Senate on November 16 in a strong show of bipartisan support.^[55]^[56]^[57]

The House version (H.R. 5682) and Senate version (S. 3709) of the bill differed due to amendments each had added before approving, but the versions were reconciled with a House vote of 330–59 on December 8 and a Senate voice-vote on December 9 before being passed on to President G.W. Bush for final approval.^[58]^[59] The White House had urged Congress to expedite the reconciliation process during the end-2006 lame duck session, and recommended removing certain amendments which would be deemed deal-killers by India.^[60] Nonetheless, while softened, several clauses restricting India's strategic nuclear program and conditions on having India align with U.S. views over Iran were incorporated in the Hyde Act.

In response to the language Congress used in the Act to define U.S. policy toward India, President Bush, stated "Given the Constitution's commitment to the authority of the presidency to conduct the nation's foreign affairs, the executive branch shall construe such policy statements as advisory," going on to cite sections 103 and 104 (d) (2) of the bill. To assure Congress that its work would not be totally discarded, Bush continued by saying that the executive would give "the due weight that comity between the legislative and executive branches should require, to the extent consistent with U.S. foreign policy."^[61]

[edit] Political opposition in India

Main article: Opposition to the Indo-US civilian agreement in India

The Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement was met with stiff opposition by some political parties and activists in India. Although many mainstream political parties including the Congress(I) supported the deal along with regional parties like Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and Rashtriya Janata Dal its realization ran into difficulties in the face of stiff political opposition in India. Also, in November 2007, former Indian Military chiefs, bureaucrats and scientists drafted a letter to Members of Parliament expressing their support for the deal.^[62] However, opposition and criticism continued at political levels. The Samajwadi Party (SP) which was with the Left Front in opposing the deal changed its stand after discussing with ex-president of India and scientist Dr A P J Abdul Kalam. The SP then supported the government and the deal. The Indian Government survived a vote of confidence by 275-256 after the Left Front withdrew their support to the government over this dispute.^[63]. Incidentally, results showed ten MP's belonging to the opposing BJP party cross-voting in the favor of the government.

As details were revealed about serious inconsistencies between what the Indian parliament was told about the deal, and the actual facts about the agreement that were presented by the Bush administration to the US Congress, opposition grew in India against the deal. In particular, portions of the agreement dealing with guaranteeing India a fuel supply or allowing India to maintain a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel appear to be diametrically opposed to what the Indian parliament was led to expect from the agreement:

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's statement in parliament is totally at variance with the Bush Administration's communication to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which says India will not be allowed to stockpile such nuclear fuel stocks as to undercut American leverage to re-impose sanctions. To drive home this point, it says the 123 Agreement is not inconsistent with the Hyde Act's stipulation—the little-known 'Barack Obama Amendment' -- that the supply of nuclear fuel should be "commensurate with reasonable operating requirements". The 'strategic reserve' that is crucial to India's nuclear program is, therefore, a non-starter.^[64] Furthermore, the agreement, as a result of its compliance with the Hyde Act, contained a direct linkage between shutting down US nuclear trade with India and any potential future Indian nuclear weapons test, a point that was factually inconsistent with explicit reassurances made on this subject by Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, during final parliamentary debate on the nuclear deal. As professor Brahma Chellaney, an expert in strategic affairs and one of the authors of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine ^[65], explained:

While the Hyde Act's bar on Indian testing is explicit, the one in the NSG waiver is implicit, yet unmistakable. The NSG waiver is overtly anchored in NSG Guidelines Paragraph 16, which deals with the consequence of "an explosion of a nuclear device". The waiver's Section 3(e) refers to this key paragraph, which allows a supplier to call for a special NSG meeting, and seek termination of cooperation, in the event of a test or any other "violation of a supplier-recipient understanding". The recently leaked Bush administration letter to Congress has cited how this Paragraph 16 rule will effectively bind India to the Hyde Act's conditions on the pain of a U.S.-sponsored cut-off of all multilateral cooperation. India will not be able to escape from the U.S.-set conditions by turning to other suppliers.^[66]

[edit] Indian parliament vote

Further information: 2008 Lok Sabha Vote of Confidence and Notes-for-Vote scandal

On July 9, 2008, India formally submitted the safeguards agreement to the IAEA.^[67] This development came after the Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh returned from the 34th G8 summit meeting in Hokkaido, Japan, where he met with U.S. President George W. Bush.^[68] On June 19, 2008, news media reported that Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh threatened to resign his position if the Left Front, whose support was crucial for the ruling United Progressive Alliance to prove its majority in the Indian parliament, continued to oppose the nuclear deal and he described their stance as irrational and reactionary.^[69] According to the Hindu, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee's earlier statement said "I cannot bind the government if we lose our majority," ^[70] implying that United Progressive Alliance government would not put its signature on any deal with IAEA if it lost the majority in either a 'opposition-initiated no-confidence motion' or if failing to muster a vote of confidence in Indian parliament after being told to prove its majority by the president. On July 8, 2008, Prakash Karat announced that the Left Front is withdrawing its support to the government over the decision by the government to go ahead on the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. The left front had been a staunch advocate of not proceeding with this deal citing national interests.^[71]

On 22 July 2008 the UPA faced its first confidence vote in the Lok Sabha after the Communist Party of India (Marxist) led Left Front withdrew support over India approaching the IAEA for Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. The UPA won the confidence vote with 275 votes to the opposition's 256, (10 members abstained from the vote) to record a 19-vote victory.^[72]^[73]^[74]^[75]

[edit] IAEA approval

The IAEA Board of Governors approved the safeguards agreement on August 1, 2008, and the 45-state Nuclear Suppliers Group next had to approve a policy allowing nuclear cooperation with India. U.S. President Bush can then make the necessary certifications and seek final approval by the U.S. Congress.^[76] There were objections from Pakistan, Iran, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland and Austria at the IAEA meeting.^[77]

[edit] NSG waiver

On September 6, 2008 India was granted the waiver at the NSG meeting held in Vienna, Austria. The consensus was arrived at after overcoming misgivings expressed by Austria, Ireland and New Zealand and is an unprecedented step in giving exemption to a country which has not signed the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)^[78]^[79] The Indian team who worked on the deal includes Manmohan Singh, Pranab Mukherjee, Shiv Shankar Menon, Shyam Saran, MK Narayanan, Anil Kakodkar, Ravi Grover, and DB Venkatesh Varma.^[78]

[edit] Versions of U.S. draft exemption

On August 2008 U.S. draft exemption would have granted India a waiver based on the "steps that India has taken voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime".^[80] Based on these steps, and without further conditions, the draft waiver would have allowed for the transfer to India of both trigger list and dual-use items (including technology), waiving the full-scope safeguards requirements of the NSG guidelines.^[81]

A September 2008 waiver would have recognized additional "steps that India has voluntarily taken."^[82] The waiver called for notifying the NSG of bilateral agreements and for regular consultations; however, it also would have waived the full-scope safeguards requirements of the NSG guidelines without further conditions.^[81]

The U.S. draft underwent further changes in an effort to make the language more acceptable to the NSG.^[83]

[edit] Initial support and opposition

The deal had initial support from the United States, the United Kingdom,^[84] France,^[85] Japan,^[86] Russia,^[87] and Germany.^[88]^[89] After some initial opposition, there were reports of Australia,^[90] Switzerland,^[91] and Canada^[92]^[93] expressing their support for the deal. Selig S. Harrison, a former South Asia bureau chief of The Washington Post, has said the deal may represent a tacit recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state,^[94] while former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph says the U.S. State Department made it "very clear that we will not recognize India as a nuclear-weapon state".^[95]

Norway, Austria, Brazil, and Japan all warned that their support for India at the IAEA did not mean that they would not express reservations at the NSG. New Zealand, which is a member of the NSG but not of the IAEA Board of Governors, cautioned that its support should not be taken for granted.^[25] Ireland, which launched the non-proliferation treaty process in 1958 and signed it first in 1968, doubted India's nuclear trade agreement with the U.S.^[96] Russia, a potentially large nuclear supplier to India, expressed reservations about transferring enrichment and reprocessing technology to India.^[97] China argued the agreement constituted "a major blow to the international non-proliferation regime".^[98] New Zealand said it would like to see a few conditions written in to the waiver: the exemption ceasing if India conducts nuclear tests, India signing the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) additional protocol, and placing limits on the scope of the technology that can be given to India and which could relate to nuclear weapons.^[99] Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Scandinavian countries proposed similar amendments.^[100]The nuclear deal was opposed by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, who opined that the U.S. would be making "a dangerous deal with India"^[101]

After the first NSG meeting in August 2008, diplomats noted that up to 20 of the 45 NSG states tabled conditions similar to the Hyde Act for India's waiver to do business with the NSG.^[102] "There were proposals on practically every paragraph," a European diplomat said.^[102] A group of seven NSG members suggested including some of the provisions of the U.S. Hyde Act in the final waiver.^[103] Daryll Kimball, executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association, said the NSG should at a minimum "make clear that nuclear trade with India shall be terminated if it resumes testing for any reason. If India cannot agree to such terms, it suggests that India is not serious about its nuclear test moratorium pledge."^[104]

[edit] Reactions following the waiver

After India was granted the waiver on September 6, the United Kingdom said that the NSG's decision would make a "significant contribution" to global energy and climate security.^[105] U.S. National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said, "this is a historic achievement that strengthens global non-proliferation principles while assisting India to meet its energy requirements in an environmentally friendly manner. The United States thanks the participating governments in the NSG for their outstanding efforts and cooperation to welcome India into the global non-proliferation community. We especially appreciate the role Germany played as chair to move this process forward."^[106] New Zealand praised the NSG consensus and said that it got the best possible deal with India.^[107] One of India's strongest allies Russia said in a statement, "We are convinced that the exemption made for India reflects Delhi's impeccable record in the non-proliferation sphere and will guarantee the peaceful uses of nuclear exports to India."^[108] Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith said that the NSG granted waiver because of "India's rise as a global power" and added, "If such a request was made for another country, I don't think it would have been cleared by the NSG members."^[109] During his visit to India in September 2008, Smith said that Australia "understood and respected India's decision not to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty".^[110] German Foreign Ministry spokesman Jens Ploetner called India a "special case" and added, "Does this agreement send an approving message to Iran? No, it absolutely does not."^[111]

Initially, there were reports of People's Republic of China analyzing the extent of the opposition against the waiver at the NSG and then revealing its position over the issue.^[112] On September 1, 2008, prominent Chinese newspaper People's Daily expressed its strong disapproval of the civilian agreement with India.^[113] India's National Security Advisor remarked that one of the major opponents of the waiver was China and said that he would express Indian government's displeasure over the issue.^[114] It was also revealed that China had abstained during the final voting process, indicating its non-approval of the nuclear agreement.^[115] In a statement, Chinese delegation to the NSG said the group should address the aspirations of other countries too, an implicit reference to Pakistan.^[116] There were also unconfirmed reports of India considering the cancellation of a state visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi.^[117] However, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said the Chinese Foreign Minister will be welcomed "as an honored guest".^[118] The Times of India noted that China's stance could have a long-term implication on Sino-Indian relations.^[119]

There were some other conflicting reports on China's stance, however. The Hindu reported that though China had expressed its desire to include more stern language in the final draft, they had informed India about their intention to back the agreement.^[120] In an interview to the Hindustan Times, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue said that "China understands India's needs for civil nuclear energy and related international cooperation."^[121] Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told India's CNN-IBN, "We didn't do anything to block it [the deal]. We played a constructive role. We also adopted a positive and responsible attitude and a safeguards agreement was reached, so facts speak louder ... than some reports".^[122] During a press conference in New Delhi, Yang added, "The policy was set much before that. When consensus was reached, China had already made it clear in a certain way that we have no problem with the [NSG] statement."^[123] Highlighting the importance of Sino-Indian relations, Yang remarked, "let us [India and China] work together to move beyond doubts to build a stronger relationship between us."^[124]

[edit] Indian reactions

Indian PM Manmohan Singh visited Washington D.C. on September 26, 2008 to celebrate the conclusion of the agreement with U.S. President George W. Bush.^[125] He also visited France to convey his appreciation for the country's stance.^[126] India's External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee expressed his deep appreciation for India's allies in the NSG, especially the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, South Africa and Brazil for helping India achieve NSG's consensus on the nuclear deal.^[127]

Bhartiya Janata Party's Yashwant Sinha, who also formerly held the post of India's External Affairs Minister, criticized the Indian government's decision to seek NSG's consensus and remarked that "India has walked into the non-proliferation trap set by the U.S., we have given up our right to test nuclear weapons forever, it has been surrendered by the government".^[128] However, another prominent member of the same party and India's former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra supported the development at the NSG and said that the waiver granted made "no prohibition" on India to conduct nuclear tests in the future.^[129]

A leading advocate of the agreement was India's most eminent strategic affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyam, also known for his long and controversial championing of an Indian nuclear deterrent.^[130]. He argued that the convergence of strategic interests between the two nations forced such a remarkable gesture from the US, overturning its decades-long stand on non-proliferation, and that it would be unwise on India's part to spurn such an overture.^[131]. He also argued that not recognizing new geo-political realities would be even more foolhardy on the part of the Indian elite.^[132]^[133]

Former President of India and noted Indian scientist, APJ Abdul Kalam, also supported the agreement and remarked that New Delhi may break its "voluntary moratorium" on further nuclear tests in "supreme national interest".^[134] However, analyst M K Bhadrakumar demurred. He said that the consensus at NSG was achieved on the "basis" of Pranab Mukherjee's commitment to India's voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and by doing so, India has entered into a "multilateral commitment" bringing it within "the ambit of the CTBT and NPT".^[135]

The NSG consensus was welcomed by several major Indian companies. Major Indian corporations like Videocon Group, Tata Power and Jindal Power saw a $40 billion (U.S.) nuclear energy market in India in the next 10–15 years.^[136] On a more optimistic note, some of India's largest and most well-respected corporations like Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, National Thermal Power Corporation and Larsen & Toubro were eyeing a $100 billion (U.S.) business in this sector over the same time period.^[136] According to Hindustan Times, nuclear energy will produce 52,000 MW of electricity in India by 2020.^[137]

[edit] Other reactions over the issue

More than 150 non-proliferation activists and anti-nuclear organizations called for tightening the initial NSG agreement to prevent harming the current global non-proliferation regime.^[138] Among the steps called for were:^[24]

ceasing cooperation if India conducts nuclear tests or withdraws from safeguards
supplying only an amount of fuel which is commensurate with ordinary reactor operating requirements
expressly prohibiting the transfer of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production items to India
opposing any special safeguards exemptions for India
conditioning the waiver on India stopping fissile production and legally binding itself not to conduct nuclear tests
not allowing India to reprocess nuclear fuel supplied by a member state in a facility that is not under permanent and unconditional IAEA safeguards
agreeing that all bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between an NSG member-state and India explicitly prohibit the replication or use of such technology in any unsafeguarded Indian facilities

The call said that the draft Indian nuclear "deal would be a nonproliferation disaster and a serious setback to the prospects of global nuclear disarmament" and also pushed for all world leaders who are serious about ending the arms race to "to stand up and be counted."^[24]

Dr. Kaveh L Afrasiabi, who has taught political science at Tehran University, has argued the agreement will set a new precedent for other states, adding that the agreement represents a diplomatic boon for Tehran.^[139] Ali Ashgar Soltanieh, the Iranian Deputy Director General for International and Political Affairs,^[140] has complained the agreement may undermine the credibility, integrity and universality of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Pakistan argues the safeguards agreement "threatens to increase the chances of a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent."^[141] Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi has suggested his country should be considered for such an accord,^[142] and Pakistan has also said the same process "should be available as a model for other non-NPT states".^[143] Israel is citing the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal as a precedent to alter Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rules to construct its first nuclear power plant in the Negev desert, and is also pushing for its own trade exemptions.^[144]

Brahma Chellaney, a Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research, argued that the wording of the U.S. exemption sought to irrevocably tether New Delhi to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. He argued India would be brought under a wider non-proliferation net, with India being tied to compliance with the entire set of NSG rules. India would acquiesce to its unilateral test moratorium being turned into a multilateral legality. He concluded that instead of the "full" civil nuclear cooperation that the original July 18, 2005, deal promised, India's access to civil nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technologies would be restricted through the initial NSG waiver.^[145]

[edit] Consideration by U.S. Congress

The Bush Administration told Congress in January 2008 that the United States may cease all cooperation with India if India detonates a nuclear explosive device. The Administration further said it was not its intention to assist India in the design, construction or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-use items.^[146] The statements were considered sensitive in India because debate over the agreement in India could have toppled the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The State Department had requested they remain secret even though they were not classified.^[147] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also previously told the House Foreign Affairs Panel in public testimony that any agreement would "have to be completely consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act".^[28] Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and the Former Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Jeffrey Bergner also said the agreement would be in conformity with the Hyde Act.^[148]

Howard Berman, chair of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, in a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned that an NSG waiver "inconsistent" with the 2006 Hyde Act would "jeopardise" the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in the U.S. Congress.^[149] Edward J. Markey, co-chairman of the House Bipartisan Task Force on Non-proliferation, said there needed to be clear consequences if India broke its commitments or resumed nuclear testing.^[150]

[edit] Passage in Congress

On September 28, 2008 the US House of Representatives voted 298-117 to approve the Indo-US nuclear deal.^[151] On October 1, 2008 the US Senate voted 86-13 to approve the Indo-US nuclear deal.^[152] The Arms Control Association said the agreement fails to make clear that an Indian nuclear test would prompt the U.S. to cease nuclear trade;^[152] however, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that any nuclear test by India would result in the "most serious consequences," including automatic cut-off of U.S. cooperation as well as a number of other sanctions.^[153]

After Senate approval, US President George W. Bush said the deal would "strengthen our global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, protect the environment, create jobs, and assist India in meeting its growing energy needs in a responsible manner."^[154] Then-US presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain, as well as then-Vice Presidential candidate Joe Biden, voted in support of the bill.^[155]

[edit] Formal signing of the deal

There was speculation the Indo-US deal would be signed on October 4, 2008 when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was in India. The deal was to be inked by Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The two leaders were to sign the deal at 2 pm at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi.^[156] But Mr. Mukherjee announced that India would wait for the US President to sign the 123 agreement legislation first into law and address India's concerns on fuel supply guarantees and the legal standing of the 123 agreement in the accompanying signing statement.^[157]

Ms Rice was aware of the Indian decision before she left Washington. But she was very hopeful that the deal would be signed as the US state department had said that the President's signature was not prerequisite for Rice to ink the deal.^[158] Rice had earlier said that there were still a number of administrative details to be worked out even as she insisted that the US would abide by the Hyde Act on the testing issue:

Secretary Rice and Indian Minister for External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee after signing the 123 agreement in Washington on October 10, 2008.

"There are a lot of administrative details that have to be worked out. This (the deal) was only passed in our Congress two days ago. The President is looking forward to signing the bill, sometime, I hope, very soon, because we'll want to use it as an opportunity to thank all of the people who have been involved in this," said Rice.^[159]

In Washington, a Senate Democratic aide said such a delay was not that unusual because legislation needed to be carefully reviewed before being sent to the White House.^[160]

US President George W Bush signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into law on October 8.^[13] The new law, called the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, was signed by President Bush at a brief White House function in the presence of the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman, Vice-President Dick Cheney and the Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Ronen Sen besides a large gathering of other dignitaries. ^[161] The final administrative aspect of the deal was completed after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed the bilateral instruments of the 123 Agreement in Washington on October 10 paving the way for operationalization of the deal between the two countries.^[162] ^[163]

[edit] Chronology of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

July 18, 2005: President Bush and Prime Minister Singh first announce their intention to enter into a nuclear agreement in Washington.

March 1, 2006: Bush visits India for the first time.

March 3, 2006: Bush and Singh issue a joint statement on their growing strategic partnership, emphasising their agreement on civil nuclear cooperation.

July 26, 2006: The US House of Representatives passes the 'Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006,' which stipulates that Washington will cooperate with New Delhi on nuclear issues and exempt it from signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

July 28, 2006: In India, the Left parties demand threadbare discussion on the issue in Parliament.

November 16, 2006: The US Senate passes the 'United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and US Additional Protocol Implementation Act' to "exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 United States exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to India."

December 18, 2006: President Bush signs into law congressional legislation on Indian atomic energy.

July 27, 2007: Negotiations on a bilateral agreement between the United States and India conclude.

Aug 3, 2007: The text of the 'Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy' (123 Agreement) is released by both governments.

Aug 13, 2007: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh makes a suo motu statement on the deal in Parliament.

Aug 17, 2007: The CPI(M) General Secretary Prakash Karat says the 'honeymoon (with government) may be over but the marriage can go on'.

Sept 4, 2007: In India, the UPA-Left committee to discuss nuclear deal set up.

Feb 25, 2008: Left parties in India say the ruling party would have to choose between the deal and its government's stability.

March 3–6, 2008: Left parties warn of 'serious consequences' if the nuclear deal is operationalised and set a deadline asking the government to make it clear by March 15 whether it intended to proceed with the nuclear deal or drop it.

March 7–14, 2008: The CPI writes to the Prime Minister Singh, warns of withdrawal of support if government goes ahead with the deal and puts political pressure on the Manmohan Singh government not to go with the deal.

April 23, 2008: The Indian Government says it will seek the sense of the House on the 123 Agreement before it is taken up for ratification by the American Congress.

June 17, 2008: External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee meets Prakash Karat, asks the Left to allow the government to go ahead with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement.

June 30, 2008: The Indian Prime Minister says his government prepared to face Parliament before operationalising the deal.

July 8, 2008: Left parties in India withdraw support to government.

July 9, 2008: The draft India-specific safeguards accord with the IAEA circulated to IAEA's Board of Governors for approval.

July 10, 2008: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh calls for a vote of confidence in Parliament.

July 14, 2008: The IAEA says it will meet on August 1 to consider the India-specific safeguards agreement.

July 18, 2008: Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon briefs the IAEA Board of Governors and some NSG countries in Vienna on the safeguards agreement.

July 22, 2008: Government is willing to look at "possible amendments" to the Atomic Energy Act to ensure that the country's strategic autonomy will never be compromised, says Prime Minister Singh.

July 22, 2008: The UPA government lead by Manmohan Singh wins trust vote in the Lok Sabha in India.

July 24, 2008: India dismisses warning by Pakistan that the deal will accelerate an atomic arms race in the sub-continent.

July 24, 2008: India launches full blast lobbying among the 45-nation NSG for an exemption for nuclear commerce.

July 25, 2008: IAEA secretariat briefs member states on India-specific safeguards agreement.

Aug 1, 2008: IAEA Board of Governors adopts India- specific safeguards agreement unanimously.

Aug 21-22, 2008: The NSG meet to consider an India waiver ends inconclusively amid reservations by some countries.

Sep 4-6, 2008: The NSG meets for the second time on the issue after the US comes up with a revised draft and grants waiver to India after marathon parleys.

Sept 11, 2008: President Bush sends the text of the 123 Agreement to the US Congress for final approval.

Sept 12, 2008: US remains silent over the controversy in India triggered by President Bush's assertions that nuclear fuel supply assurances to New Delhi under the deal were only political commitments and not legally binding.

Sept 13, 2008: The State Department issues a fact sheet on the nuclear deal saying the initiative will help meet India's growing energy requirements and strengthen the non- proliferation regime by welcoming New Delhi into globally accepted nonproliferation standards and practices.

Sept 18, 2008: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee kicks off a crucial hearing on the Indo-US nuclear deal.

Sept 19, 2008: America's nuclear fuel supply assurances to India are a "political commitment" and the government cannot "legally compel" US firms to sell a "given product" to New Delhi, top officials tells Congressional panel.

Sept 21, 2008: US financial crisis diverts attention from N-deal as both the Bush Administration and the Congress are bogged down over efforts to rescue bankrupt American banks. financial crisis in the country.

Sept 26, 2008: PM Singh meets President Bush at the White House, but were not able to sign the nuclear deal as the Congress did not approve it.

Sept 27, 2008: House of Representatives approves the Indo-US nuclear deal. 298 members voted for the Bill while 117 voted against.

Oct 1, 2008: Senate approves the Indo-US civil nuclear deal with 86 votes for and 13 against.

Oct 4, 2008: Secretary of State Rice visits Delhi. India and the US unable to ink the nuclear agreement with New Delhi insisting that it would do so only after President Bush signs it into a law, an occasion when it expects certain misgivings to be cleared.

Oct 4, 2008: White House announces that President Bush will sign the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into a law on October 8.

Oct 8, 2008: President Bush signs legislation to enact the landmark US-India civilian nuclear agreement.

Oct 10, 2008: The 123 Agreement between India and US is finally operationalized between the two countries after the deal is signed by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his counterpart Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Washington D C.

[edit] See also

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		Energy portal

[edit] References

^ Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
^ IAEA Board Approves India-Safeguards Agreement
^ India Safeguards Agreement Signed
^ INFCIRC/731
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^ ^a ^b "India Inc sets eyes on $40 bn nuclear energy market- Indicators-Economy-News-The Economic Times". Economictimes.indiatimes.com. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/India_Inc_eyes_on_40_bn_nuclear_energy_mkt/articleshow/3460143.cms. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
^ "N-trade: It's a $40 billion opportunity-India-The Times of India". Timesofindia.indiatimes.com. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/N-trade_Its_a_40_billion_opportunity/articleshow/3469511.cms. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
^ The Hindu: Tighten draft waiver for India
^ Afrasiabi: Iran heartened by India's nuclear vote
^ Second Meeting of Experts of The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (July 2004): Statement By His Excellency Dr. Ali-Asghar Soltanieh
^ Forbes: India moves a step closer to U.S. nuclear pact
^ ISIS (July 2008): "Press Trust of India - India dismisses Pak talk of arms race due to N-deal"
^ Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the International Organizations (July 2008): Letter from Pakistan to the IAEA Board of Governors and Nuclear Suppliers Group
^ Hindustan Times: Now, Israel wants NSG rules changed
^ "Serious implications for India in NSG draft". In.rediff.com. http://in.rediff.com/news/2008/aug/15brahma.htm. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
^ Indian Express: Was India misled by America on nuclear deal?
^ Washington Post: In Secret Letter, Tough U.S. Line on India Nuclear Deal
^ Department of State: Answers to questions about Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement
^ The Hindu News Update Service
^ Economic Times of India: Congressional approval may not be automatic; dissenters speak out
^ Times of India: US House approves Indo-US nuke deal
^ ^a ^b Bloomberg: Bush Wins Approval in Congress for Priority India Atomic Accord
^ The Hindu: Nuclear test will have serious consequences
^ "Bush hails Senate passage of Indo-US nuclear deal-USA-World-The Times of India". Timesofindia.indiatimes.com. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Bush_hails_senate_passage_of_Indo-US_nuclear_deal/articleshow/3551793.cms. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
^ Rice hails approval of India nuclear deal
^ "N-deal faces last-minute glitch". Deccan Harald. http://www.deccanherald.com/Content/Oct42008/scroll2008100493498.asp?section=frontpagenews.
^ "Condoleezza Rice leaves without inking deal". Economic Times. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/PoliticsNation/Condoleezza_Rice_leaves_without_inking_deal/articleshow/3561357.cms.
^ Sunday Times (October 5, 2008), Rice is here but deal still not on table, Times of India
^ "Rice arrives, nuclear deal not to be signed today". NDTV.com. http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20080067616&ch=10/4/2008%2012:00:00%20PM.
^ "Rice in India, may not sign nuclear deal". Reuters.com. http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE4930E420081004.
^ "Bush signs India-U.S. nuclear bill into law". The Hindu. 2008-10-10. http://www.hindu.com/2008/10/10/stories/2008101060940100.htm. Retrieved 2008-10-13.
^ Gollust, David (2008-10-10). "US, India Sign Civilian Nuclear Accord". Voice Of America. http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-10/2008-10-10-voa66.cfm. Retrieved 2008-12-24.
^ Times of India (October 11, 2008), India, US seal 123 Agreement, Times of India

[edit] External links

[edit] U.S. Government links

[edit] India Government links

Indian Ministry of External Affairs (August 2007): Text of the preliminary Indo-U nuclear agreement (meaindia.nic.in)

[edit] Nuclear Suppliers Group links

[edit] Other links

Argument Map (October 2008)

[show] v • d • e Nuclear power in India

Operational plants	Kaiga · Kakrapar · Koodankulam · Kalpakkam · Kota · Tarapur · Narora

Research and testing	CIRUS reactor · Dhruva reactor · Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR) · Institute for Plasma Research (IPR) · Heavy Water Board · Pokhran · Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre (VECC) · Smiling Buddha · Pokhran-II ·

Organizations	Atomic Energy Commission · Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) · Department of Atomic Energy · Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL)

Projects and Nuclear Testing	Smiling Buddha · Pokhran-II

Other topics	Energy policy of India · Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement

Electricity in India · Wind power in India · Solar power in India

[show] v • d • e Foreign relations of India

Africa	Algeria · Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) · Egypt · Liberia · Nigeria · South Africa

Americas	Argentina · Brazil · Canada · Colombia · Guyana · United States

Asia	Afghanistan · Bahrain · Bangladesh · Bhutan · Burma (Myanmar) · People's Republic of China · Indonesia · Iran · Iraq · Israel · Japan · Kazakhstan · Maldives · Mongolia · Nepal · Pakistan · Palestine · Saudi Arabia · Singapore · South Korea · Sri Lanka · Republic of China (Taiwan) · Tajikistan · Thailand · Turkey · Uzbekistan · Vietnam

Europe	Bulgaria · Estonia · Finland · France · Germany · Greece · Iceland · Ireland · Italy · Poland · Romania · Russia · Ukraine · United Kingdom

Oceania	Australia · Fiji · New Zealand

International organizations	United Nations · India and the United Nations · East Asian Summit · G4 · G8+5 · G20 · BRIC · IBSA · IAEA · IMF · ISO · Commonwealth of Nations · NAM · SAARC · UNESCO · WHO · WTO · SAEU · BIMSTEC · India - European Union relations

Related topics	Ministry of External Affairs · Diplomatic missions of India · Diplomatic missions in India · Minister of External Affairs · Indian Foreign Secretary · Kashmir dispute · Look East policy · Indo-Pakistani wars · Sino-Indian War · Greater India

Ministry of External Affairs, Official website

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-U.S._civilian_nuclear_agreement"

MAJORITY PROBLEMS Parties unlikely to back the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Bill
BJP:	116
Left:	24
BSP:	21
JD (U):	20
Shiv Sena:	11
AIDMK:	9
Rashtriya Lok Dal:	5
Telugu Desam Party:	6
Akali Dal:	4
Janata Dal S:	3
Telengana Rashtriya Samiti:	2
total:	221
UPA allies likely to back the bill:	271
'WILD CARD': Trinamool with 19 seats
The Bill needs 272 votes to pass in the 543-member House
Figures indicate number of seats

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Thursday, March 11, 2010