| Siliguri finger at adamant Mamata | ||
| BARUN GHOSH | ||
Calcutta, Oct. 2: Mamata Banerjee's intransigence, more than Deepa Das Munshi's manoeuvres, ruptured the alliance in Siliguri, senior Trinamul leaders said today. They felt that the party could have accepted the Congress's offer of a last-minute compromise to avert the spat over the mayor's post in the Siliguri Municipal Corporation. The Congress confirmed that such an offer was made. Darjeeling district Congress president Shankar Malakar revealed that he had rushed to local Trinamul leader Gautam Deb's residence hours before the election yesterday with a two-pronged formula. First, the Congress was ready to part with the posts of deputy mayor and the chairperson, five mayor-in-council portfolios and two borough chiefs, provided the demand for the mayor's post was dropped. Second, both Trinamul and the Congress could share power for two-and-a-half years each during the five-year tenure of the Siliguri civic board along the lines of the Jammu and Kashmir formula fashioned in 2002. According to this formula, Trinamul would have had its mayor for two-and-a-half years, while the Congress's mayor would have been at the helm for the remaining period. "But Trinamul refused everything proposed by us and remained firm on its demand for the mayor's post. Against this backdrop, we were left with no option but to sound out the Left for support to form a stable civic board," said Raiganj MP Deepa, who has been associated with the political events in Siliguri since September 15 when the civic poll results were announced. It was Deepa who had persuaded Bengal Congress president Pranab Mukherjee and AICC general secretary K. Keshava Rao, in charge of Bengal affairs, to accept the deal in which "we were forced to approach the Left councillors". "It would have been suicidal had we meekly surrendered the mayor's post to buy peace with Trinamul. Unlike in south Bengal, we deserve to be recognised as a force more formidable than Trinamul in the north because our traditional strong base is there," said a PCC functionary in Calcutta. The Congress leaders' observations found an echo in a section of the Trinamul leadership as well. These leaders felt that the acceptance of the Congress's offer would have sent a positive message about Mamata to the people of Siliguri who voted for the alliance. "Today, we are pointing fingers at the Congress for seeking the Left's support. But as the principal Opposition, we should not have shunned our responsibility to keep the alliance intact by accommodating the Congress's last-minute formula. A gesture to honour an alliance partner could have improved our image at a time we are getting ready to tie up with the Congress in the approaching elections," a Trinamul central minister said. The minister was referring to the November bypolls to 10 Assembly seats and next year's polls to 82 civic bodies, including the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. A Trinamul general secretary appeared more vocal than the minister. "In an alliance, it cannot be a one-way traffic all the time. Didi feels that her writ will be enforced everywhere across Bengal but this is not possible if we are serious about taking the alliance forward till the 2011 Assembly polls," he said. However, it is unlikely that any of these leaders, none of whom was willing to go on record, will muster the courage to articulate their views in front of Mamata who spent the day in Delhi, refusing to meet Congress leaders. Mamata is expected to fly to Siliguri from Delhi on Sunday to address a public rally there to "publicly apologise" for not being able to form the civic board. The first round of apology was delivered today by Trinamul leader Partha Chatterjee in Siliguri. An unexplained factor in the Siliguri coup is how Deepa prevailed upon Mukherjee to give the green signal to go on the offensive. A section of Congress leaders have been saying that Mamata's decision to offer tickets to nine Congress dissidents in the October 13 elections in Arunachal Pradesh did not go down well with the Congress leadership. "Pranabda, who has always made himself available to Mamata's programmes, is upset at the way Mamata decided to honour Congress dissidents in Arunachal Pradesh," a state Congress leader said. It is not clear whether the ticket allocation also played a decisive role but Congress sources said it could have added to the tension building up over earlier snubs delivered by Mamata. http://www.telegraphindia.com/1091003/jsp/frontpage/story_11569629.jsp |
| Trinamul sniffs higher Cong conspiracy Forgive us, Partha tells Siliguri | ||
| OUR BUREAU | ||
Siliguri/New Delhi, Oct. 2: Trinamul leader Partha Chatterjee today accused the Congress of operating not at the local but at the state and national levels to bring down his party in Siliguri. The Opposition leader in the Assembly took out a procession in town to "seek forgiveness from the citizens of Siliguri" and condemn the Congress and the CPM. The Congress and Trinamul command equal number of seats in the Siliguri Municipal Corporation. When neither ally budged from its demand for the mayor's post, an election for the chair became inevitable. Yesterday, all the 17 councillors of the Left Front voted in favour of the Congress's mayoral candidate, Gangotri Dutta. "It was a deep-rooted conspiracy hatched at the state and central levels with the only motive to stop Mamata Banerjee and to keep the CPM alive," Chatterjee said at Baghajatin Park from where the protest march began this evening. "We condemn the conspiracy and seek forgiveness from the residents of Siliguri as we could not live up to their expectations." On Sunday, Trinamul chief Mamata Banerjee will address a meeting at the same park. Mamata, who is in Delhi, has refused to meet top leaders of the Congress. She is learnt to have indicated to her close aides that she does not want to meet Congress president Sonia Gandhi as that would be tantamount to "sacrificing her self-respect". Trinamul sources said Mamata felt Sonia could not have been "ignorant" of the Congress step to seek CPM help in Siliguri. "She feels personally betrayed by Sonia," a close Mamata aide said. In Siliguri, Chatterjee spoke of a "well-hatched" plan by some parties who want to cling to power. "People here had voted out the Left and brought the alliance to power. All this happened because of a well-hatched plan of some parties that were desperate to cling to power, ignoring the people's mandate," he said. CPM leaders in Siliguri, who too are facing questions from their partners, today spoke of continuing to mount pressure on anti-Left forces. "We protest yesterday's incident of ransacking by Trinamul supporters and want the guilty to be arrested," said urban development minister Asok Bhattacharya, who is believed to have worked out the deal with the Congress at the local level before extending support. Asked about their pact with the Congress, the CPM leader said his party had acted on the basis of a letter sent by the Darjeeling district Congress president, Shankar Malakar. "Whatever we have done is in the interest of Siliguri. We discussed the proposal and decided to vote for the Congress," he said. The Congress, which saw its own supporters go on the rampage with Trinamul activists yesterday, was silent. http://www.telegraphindia.com/1091003/jsp/bengal/story_11569588.jsp |
India's Jurassic nest dug up in Tamil Nadu
 Geologists in Tamil Nadu discover Dinosaur eggs. (TOI Photo)
Researchers from the Salem-based Periyar University found clusters of eggs of what they believe to be the most aggressive Carnosaur and the docile, leaf-eating Sauropod at Sendurai village. While Carnosaurs were large predatory dinasaurs, Sauropods were long-necked, herbivores which grew to enormous heights and sizes. That dinosaurs once roamed the area was known from the fossils found there on earlier expeditions. But this is the first time that hundreds of nests embedded with hundreds of clusters of dinosaur eggs have been unearthed in the district. Located on the highway between Chennai and Tiruchi, the Ariyalur and the neighbouring Perambalur geological sites nestle in the northern plains of the Cauvery river. The place is a veritable museum of ancient organisms, dating back to 140 million years. Ever since a British couple -- the Wines -- collected 32 boxes of "strange stone objects" in 1843, the Ariyalur region has drawn geologists from across the world for its rich fossil presence and diversity. Scientists have found the tiniest marine algae or the nano fossils besides the rare shell-like bivalve, gastropoda, telecypoda and brachiopoda in the geological sites spread across 950sqkm in Ariyalur and Perambalur districts. "We found clusters and clusters of spherical eggs of dinosaurs. And each cluster contained eight eggs," says Dr M U Ramkumar, geology lecturer of the Periyar University. Each egg was about 13 to 20 cm in diameter and they were lying in sandy nests which were of the size of 1.25 metres. In the 1860s, a British geologist first recorded the presence of bone remains of dinosaurs in Ariyalur. Over a century and a half later, the egg of a dinosaur was found in a cement factory of the state-owned Tamil Nadu Cements Ltd in 1990s. But officials realized that it was a dinosaur egg only 10 years later. On a sultry afternoon on September 12 this year, Ramkumar and his research students went to Ariyalur to scour the rocks and sediments as part of a study funded by Indian and German scientific institutions. As they paused by a stream on a grazing land at Sendurai, they found spherical-shaped fossils peeping out of the sand beds. "We got really excited. As I have seen a dinosaur egg, I was sure these were dinosaur eggs," said Ramkumar. A quick digging revealed clusters of eggs beneath seven layers of sand spread over two sqkm. The eggs may not have hatched due to the Deccan volcanic eruptions or seasonal flooding, surmise the team. "We suspect the extinction of dinosaurs was triggered by the Deccan volcano. Volcanic ashes cap the eggs," said one researcher. "This is a very significant finding as never before have we found so many dinosaur eggs in the country. Besides the spherical size of the eggs covered with sand and volcanic ash provide significant insight into the possible reasons for extinction of the species," says Dr Jyotsana Rai, senior scientist, Birbal Sahni Institute of Paleobotany in Lucknow. Her team will collect samples of these eggs to determine its exact age. Because a similar discovery in Jabalpur led to a plunder of the fossilized treasure, the researchers have requested the Ariyalur district administration to cordon off the site. Samples of the eggs will travel to Germany for further research. The vicinity of Jabalpur in Madhya Pradesh is considered the richest dinosaur field in the country. Didi to 'expose' Congress for its tie-up with Left 3 Oct 2009, 0522 hrs IST, ET Bureau NEW DELHI: The war of nerves between the Congress and Trinamool Congress is set to intensify in the coming days as a fuming Mamata Banerjee attempts Ms Banerjee, who charged the Congress with "breach of trust", will visit Siliguri next week to "apologise" to the voters for the Congress' betrayal. "The Congress is trying to become the B-Team of the CPM in West Bengal. I will tell the electorate in Siliguri about the betrayal of the Congress," Ms Banerjee said on Friday. Her aim would be to expand the Trinamool's influence in North Bengal, of which Siliguri is a part, and to dent the Congress in the region. With the Congress and Left having formed the corporation board together, after the Left front backed the Congress mayoral candidate, the Trinamool will project itself as the principal Opposition party in the state. Even as the Congress and the Trinamool fight it out, it is the Left which stands to gain. A weakened Opposition alliance would help the Left's come back bid after being defeated in string of elections. However, at the Central level, Ms Banerjee appears to be calibrating her response so as not to upset the existing arrangement. This was given away by her decision to attend the Cabinet meeting on Thursday despite the developments of the day. However, the alliance could henceforth be marked by a stiffness that could turn downright cold if the competitive streak between the two parties is mismanaged. This was reinforced by Ms Banerjee's decision not to take up the matter with the Congress high-command. Therefore for the Congress, the rift with its biggest ally in the UPA has come too soon in the life of the government. Though the Congress might have taken this audacious step in order to send the message to Ms Banerjee that it is not ready to be bossed around -- its MP from Raiganj in the region, Deepa Das Munshi, spearheaded the effort with the blessings of the high command -- it could face a backlash in North Bengal. The Congress has far greater influence in North Bengal as compared to the Trinamool, and the two-parties together had managed to breach the red bastion after 27-years on an anti-CPM plank. The Congress' backing of its cadre demands this time after having caved in on the Bowbazar and Sealdah seats during the August bye-elections, is based on the understanding that it is the Trinamool that needs the Congress to oust the Left in the state. The Congress, buoyed by the confidence of numbers at the Centre, is also gambling in order to pressurise the Trinamool for future seat-sharing negotiations. But its move has opened up the party to reprisal from Ms Banerjee's party, which will treat the incident in Sliguri, North Bengal's only municipal corporation and the second biggest in Bengal, as a prestige issue. Sensing Ms Banerjee's anger, the Congress spokesman Abhishek Manu Singhvi tried to downplay the Siliguri tie-up as a "very small local" issue. The general secretary in-charge of West Bengal, K Keshav Rao, said it was a decision taken at the local level not at the AICC or the Pradesh Congress Committee (PCC) level. However, the party would not have missed that for Ms Banerjee the local is global until the 2011 Assembly elections in the state. Mamata demands Centre's intervention in West Bengal STAFF WRITER 19:31 HRS IST New Delhi, Oct 1 (PTI) Accusing the ruling CPI(M) of targeting workers belonging to other political parties and unleashing a reign of terror in West Bengal, Railway Minister Mamata Banerjee today sought Centre's intervention to stop the "violence" in the state.
Obama to receive Manmohan Singh on first state visit! will host Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the White House on November 24 for the first official visit of his "This visit will be the first state visit of the administration and will highlight the strong and growing strategic partnership between the United States and India, and the friendship between the American and Indian people," the White House said in a statement yesterday. During the visit, the Obama and Singh are expected to discuss a range of global, regional, and bilateral issues of shared interest and common concern. The two leaders will also likely discuss the strategic dialogue that was launched in July during the visit of the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to India and review progress made in the dialogue. Obama and the First Lady, Mitchelle, will also host Singh and his wife Gursharan Kaur for an official state dinner on the night of November 24, it said. "President Obama looks forward to welcoming Prime Minister Singh to Washington and working with him to strengthen and enhance their partnership for the benefit of the people of both nations, and the world," the White House said. The grand alliance of Oxides, Carbides and Chlorides In India Manusmriti Apartheid Ruling Comrador Hegemony Zionist is Never Broken since Colonial Age, I always tried to prove. My young Journalist friends SHOMIK CHAKRABORTI BARNANKE and Nadim Siraj seem not to be Convinced! Last Night, I asked Mr. Barnanke,`What is the Topmost Priority of Ruling Hegemony in India which is represented by the UPA Government of India incs in the Centre?' `Simply to FINISH the Cattle Class', he replied very COOL! `Well, you do refer to the Mass Destruction Agenda!' Nadim made it clear, `Economic reforms in the Gloabl Village!' `Do the Gloabl Marxist and Communist parties have any Ideological difference in Post Modern Economic systems?' I asked. Barnanke: NO. `Then, Whya Indian Marxists should go against Marxist ways of Capitalism? ethnic Cleansing with a Human Face?' I questioned. The two Young men Kept MUM! Both asked in CORUS,` Why, the Marxists tried their best to Stop Indo US Nucealr deal as well as Strategic realliance in US ISRAEL lead?'
`Was there any Initiative by the Marxists to mobilise Nationwide Resistance while they sustain Complete MONOPOLY in Trade Unions besides having three Left Governments in Power! Speicially , the Marxist Brahamin Front rules Bengal for Thirty Two years without a break?' I asked. `But the Left withdrew support from UPA Government!' Nadim was confused. `At the same time, they continued to support UPA for its Economic Reforms and even Indo US Nuclear deal until it was AUTO Operational and they withdrew Support knowing the Hindutva Forces would bail out the government in the Parliament. They ENSURED the Pucca Polarisation jsut projecting Mayawati as the Next Prime Minister Face knowing well HINDUIndia may not Digest the attempt whatsoever MINOR to undermine the Eternal and Celetial Manusmriti rule!' They were still Confused. ` Any Resistance or Mass Movement is subject to be dealt with ultimate REPRESSION with Military option and Zero tolerance! The state Power has the License to Kill! It has got AFPSA and Twin Terror Acts liketools along with Fascist Blind nationalism if we forget Media mind Control and Corporate Manipulation at all!' `Yes!' They agreed at last. `But REPRESSION is not that easy in ORGANISED Sector! strikes in AVIATION sector has prooved it very recently!' `Then?' `The Government may not be able to enact Bank Regulation! It may not acomplish the DISINVESTMENT Target! It won`t be spared for JOB LOSS and Privatisation Drive if the Marxist chose to mobilise Trade Unions countrywide against the Economic Reforms!' I told them. Now they were getting the GIST. ` You want tosay that the Marxists are INDENSIBLE for the UPA government and alliance tocontinue the Economic Reforms without any Hinderance!' Nadim asked. Here you are! `It means they may Kickout even MS Mamata Banerjee to please the Marxists', Nadim was doubtful.
`I told you and you do agree that the ECONOMIC Reforms are on the Table and UPA may not dare to upset the Apple Cart of the AUTOCRACY!'
`Does Mamat not undrestand the Game?' Nadim questioned. `For mamata it is only politics limited to Elections to be won! She is not concerned for the Economics!' I answered. ` Whatabout the Intelligentsia , Civil scoiety and Economists supporting Mamata Banerjee?, Barnanke asked. `They are upto their Personal Mileage only. They are blind by politics and TMC, the Political Partywould be INDULGED in Blame Game jsut being Unaware of the NON Political India Inc hands behind! FII inflow crosses Rs 60 cr-mark! Overseas fund inflows into the Indian stock markets have crossed the Rs 60,000-crore (about USD 12 billion) mark so far this year. With investments Foreign institutional investors In September alone, foreign investors infused a hefty Rs 18,344 crore (USD 3.8 billion) in the local share markets. "FIIs have stashed a lot of money and they don't want to miss the opportunity in a fast growing market like India," Delhi-based Unicon Financial Intermediaries Chief Executive Gajendra Nagpal said. The country had witnessed the highest FII inflow in stock markets in the year 2007. That year, India attracted a whopping Rs 70,000 crore inflow in local markets, data since 1999 shows. However, last year (2008) FIIs pulled out a net Rs 52,000 crore from stock markets and remained net seller till February this year. The global economic meltdown created a panic among foreign investors, forcing them to pull-out money for safety. Overseas investors are significant players of the Indian stock markets. Suspected Naxals blew up railway tracks at Poisaita in Jharkhand and Kantadih in Purulia district of West Bengal early on Train services on Howrah-Mumbai route were affected due to the blast at Poisaita in Chakradharpur division of South Eastern Railway. Railway Police Superintendent Richard Lakra said, "Maoists triggered the blast to blow up about 18-metre rail track. Nobody was injured as the incident". Maoists have given the bandh call today in protest against the arrest of the convener of Maoist-backed People's Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA) Chhatradhar Mahato in West Midnapore district of West Bengal on September 26. Several long-distance trains, including Howrah-Bilaspur- New Delhi Rajdhani Express, were detained at several stations due to the rail track damage, railway officials said. Railway officials said Rajdhani Express was detained at Goilkera station. Besides, Howrah-Pune Azad Hind Express was detained at Chakradharpur, Sambleshwari Express at Sini, Hapa-Howrah Express at Tatanagar, Mumbai-Howrah Mail at Manoharpur, Pune-Howrah Express at Rourkela and Mumbai-Howrah Geetanjali Express at Jharsuguda and Ahmedabad-Howrah Express at Rourkela.  The signs of revival in the global economy should not be confused with the financial crisis being over and the countries should be ready with policies to sustain the recovery, multilateral lending agency IMF has said. "The current numbers should not fool governments into thinking that the crisis is over," IMF Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard said while releasing the World Economic Outlook. He also asked countries around the world to coordinate policies to achieve a global rebalancing and sustain the recovery. Olivier's remarks assume importance in the event of G-20 nations agreeing not to withdraw stimulus packages prematurely and coordinate actions among themselves in this regard. IMF in its outlook for the global economy has said that global activity is now on the rise again. However, the world economic growth is expected to be in the negative zone of 1.1 per cent in 2009, according to IMF. This is after, the Fund revised up its outlook on world economic growth by 0.3 percentage points for the current calendar year. The global economic growth is expected to reach 3 per cent by next year. Further, the IMF pointed out that after a deep recession, global economic growth has turned positive, driven by wide-ranging, coordinated public intervention that has supported demand and reduced uncertainty.
 ministers from the Group of Seven rich countries face concerns over the future of the U.S. dollar as they meet Saturday in a forum There was even some uncertainty ahead of the meeting whether the G-7 would issue a joint statement in the wake of the Group of 20's decision in Pittsburgh last week to declare the G-20, which includes developing countries such as China, Brazil and India, as the world's premier economic forum. That such a possibility even arises gives a further sign that power is shifting from the G-7 to the G-20. The G-7 nations are the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Canada and Italy. Despite the question marks, the finance ministers, who will be joined by their central bankers, have a number of issues to discuss as the world economy begins a slow recovery from the deepest recession since World War II. Chief among these is likely to be the dollar, which has been falling in foreign exchange markets in recent weeks and months. In recent days, it sank to an eight month low against the yen and nearly hit a year-high against the dollar, prompting concerns that a dollar crisis could bring the world recovery to a grinding halt. The dollar won some respite Friday ahead of the meeting as higher than expected U.S. job losses for September stoked a flight towards safe haven assets _ the dollar usually garners support in such situations. By early evening Istanbul time, the euro was steady around $1.46 but the dollar was up nearly 0.2 percent against the Japanese currency at 89.75 yen. A falling dollar hits exporting countries as they will find it more difficult to sell their products to the U.S. and raises the cost of commodities such as oil, which are priced in the U.S. currency _ potentially putting a break on global growth, which the IMF earlier said was fragile. ``It seems entirely logical that the G-7 may break with tradition at the end of their meeting this weekend and choose not to release a statement on the global economy and currencies,'' said Simon Derrick, currency strategist at Bank of New York Mellon. ``However, it is also clear from recent comments that tensions within G-7 over currency matters remain as high as ever.'' The Europeans appear to be expressing the most acute concerns about the situation in currency markets in the run-up to the meetings _ European Central Bank president Jean-Claude Trichet warned Thursday that excessive volatility in exchange rates could damage economic and financial stability. And though Japan's new finance minister Hirohisa Fujii said the country's monetary authorities would take ``appropriate measures'' if exchange rates move abnormally _ code for intervening in the markets. Neil Mackinnon, global macro strategist at VTB Capital in London, said it's ``highly likely'' that the finance ministers, including the U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, will try and talk up the U.S. currency, or at least prevent any further declines, even if they don't issue a communique. Bank of New York Mellon's Derrick doubts anything can really change without China's involvement. ``It looks as if the defining official event for the foreign exchange markets over the course of the current quarter will be the G-20 finance ministers meeting in Edinburgh in early November,'' he said. Most analysts think that the root of much of the tension in the currency markets center on the relationship between the dollar and the Chinese yuan. For many years the Chinese authorities have kept their currency artificially low against the dollar, partly as a means of boosting their exports to the United States. As a result, China has built up a massive trade surplus with the U.S. Leading officials at this week's annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have argued that a failure to deal with these imbalances, particularly between the U.S. and China, represents one of the biggest risks to the global economic outlook and one of the reasons why the G-20 is now the forum of choice. China is not in the G-7. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the IMF's managing director, even suggested that the world should pool its reserves to alleviate the need some countries feel to build up reserves to keep speculators at bay _ particularly governments in Asia in the wake of their financial crisis a decade ago. Robert Zoellick, the president of the World Bank and a former U.S. trade representative, has warned the U.S. authorities that the dollar's status as the world's leading reserve currency should not be taken for granted and that the euro and the Chinese yuan could win increasing acceptance in international currency markets.
EU backs US bid to corner India at climate talks Differences between the rich and the developing countries have turned into entrenched battle lines at the ongoing climate negotiations in While the US, which has not signed the Kyoto Protocol, has always suggested its demise as the only way forward, the EU had so far not displayed such an inclination. The coming together of industrialized countries over the past two days in the Thai capital signals a renewed and vigorous attempt to get emerging economies, including India, to take on a set of internationally binding emission reduction targets without financial or technical compensation to cover for the economic costs of achieving them. India is leading the charge along with other key developing countries against the move at the ongoing negotiations at Bangkok. The convention at present demands commitments only from industrialized countries to reduce their historically disproportionate emission levels. The protocol turns these commitments into hard targets to be achieved in fixed time. While India and other developing countries have demanded for last two years that the negotiations, as agreed upon under the Bali Action Plan in 2007, only look to enhance the commitments under Kyoto Protocol and the mother convention, industrialized nations made it clear in Bangkok that they wanted to alter the convention and the protocol in order to corner India and other large developing countries into taking commitments. The US wants another omnibus agreement or protocol which locks India, China, Brazil and South Africa into taking emission control targets. EU too has wanted action from the four to be brought under international scanner but had so far not shown too keen an interest in altering the existing protocol's basic structure which is under review for second phase of commitment levels. But at the Bangkok meet, EU made a tactical shift and said it would prefer a new single "instrument" which binds countries from both sides of the spectrum -- the industrialised and the developing -- into a single regime. Interestingly, it also wants pieces of the earlier protocol that are to its advantage to be chopped into the new deal. India and others pointed out at the meet that the existing convention and the understanding achieved by all countries at Bali in 2007 differentiates between "commitments" of the rich countries and the "actions" of the rest. They also pointed out that the actions of the developing countries, as per existing convention and decisions, is to be undertaken only when enabled by finances and technology transfer from the industrialized countries. A single regime as proposed by EU and US will break the equity-based differences enshrined in the convention and force the larger developing countries with much lower per capita emissions to be treated at par with the countries responsible for the historical responsibility of GHG emissions. Maoists demand release of leaders, threaten to kill Nitish
The banned CPI (Maoist) has threatened to kill Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar if two of their top leaders were not released from jail, official sources said on Friday. 'Dabloo', a naxalite leader, in an sms from the mobile phone number - 09308670993 - to a reporter of a private TV channel, claimed that there was a plan to kill the chief minister, State Home Department Principal Secretary Amir Subhani said. The message demanded the release of naxalite leaders 'Raviji' and Diren Singh. "Director General of Police Anand Shankar and IGP (Operations) S K Bhardwaj are probing the issue," Subhani said. "We have tightened the security for the CM," he said. In a midnight attack, heavily-armed suspected Maoists swooped down on a village in Bihar's Khagaria district and shot dead 16 villagers, mostly teenagers, after tying their hands and feet, police said on Friday. The gunmen pulled the victims out of their huts in Amosi Dharen Biara village, tied their hands and feet and fired at them.
Karan Johar apologises after MNS men disrupt film screening!
Noted film maker Karan Johar tendered an apology to MNS Chief Raj Thackeray after MNS activists stopped screening of his new film 'Wake Up Sid' in some cinema halls here, objecting use of word 'Bombay' instead of 'Mumbai' in the film. "It was a genuine mistake on our part. Henceforth, we will use Mumbai instead of Bombay. We have apologised for the same," Karan told reporters after meeting the MNS chief at the latter's residence in central Mumbai. Asked if this was a publicity stunt, Karan said "there are several other marketing platforms for publicity of the film. This was not a publicity stunt." "We will put a disclaimer in the film," he said.
Multiplex cancels screening of film in Pune A multiplex theatre in Pune cancelled the screening of Karan Johar-directed film "Wake up Sid" following a protest by Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS) activists over the use of word "Bombay" instead of "Mumbai" in the movie . Citypride, the multiplex, had to cancel the screening of the film after MNS activists protested against it, sources said. Local MNS leader Raje Gorde said that the theatre owner responded to party's appeal by cancelling the screening of the film released today. No untoward incident was reported in the city in connection with MNS' protest. India owes $82.5 bn to foreigners: RBIIndia owed USD 82.5 billion to foreigners as on June-end this year, 39 per cent higher than USD 59.4 billion three months back, in terms of the country's assets and liabilities to the international community."Net claim of non-residents on India as reflected by the net IIP (international assets minus international liabilities) as at June-end 2009, increased by USD 23.1 billion to USD 82.5 billion from USD 59.4 billion as at March-end 2009," RBI said.The total external financial assets increased by USD 10.2 billion to USD 360.2 billion as at June-end 2009 over the previous quarter, the central bank said in a statement.Among the external financial assets, reserve assets, including foreign currency assets, IMF reserve position, Special Drawing Rights and gold, improved by USD 13.2 billion over the March-end and stood at USD 265.1 billion at June-end.Direct investment abroad moved up by USD 2.6 billion over the previous quarter to USD 69.9 billion as at end-June 2009.Meanwhile, the total external financial liabilities increased significantly by USD 33.3 billion to USD 442.7 billion as at June-end over the previous quarter."This considerable rise in liabilities was mainly due to inflow on account of direct investment and portfolio | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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CHINA: TILTING THE BALANCE IN ITS APPROACH TO POST-COLD WAR SOUTH ASIA
Created: 10/27/1992
OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible
Directorate of Intelligence
Intelligence Memorandum
Office of East Asian Analysis2
DATE:S
China: Tilting the Balance in Its Approach to Post-Cold War South Asia
Summary
China has shifted its approach to South Asia in order io capitalize on the new opportunities brought about by the end of the Cold War. Beijing is strengthening its political and economic links to India to counter what it sees as ongoing efforts by the West to fill the political gap left by the decline of Soviet influence in the region. Beijing simultaneously views its continuing special military and political relationship with Islamabaday to constrain India's ambition to establish preeminence in South Asia. Increased pressure on China to participate in global arms control and greater economic dependence on access lo Western markets-especial ly that of the United States-have placed new limitations on that alliance, however.onsequence, we believe Beijing will eschew transferring complete ballistic missile systems that would be nuclear
3cu
Pursuing Improved Relations With ^
Despite historical Sino-Lhdian competition for influence in South Asia, Beijing in recent years has sought better relations with New Delhi as part of its effort to ease tensions with its neighbors in order to free resources for economic development Beijing, moreover, apparently believes that better ties to India will reduce the chances for military confrontation on the subcontinent by affording the opportunity to lobby New Delhi to participate in multilateral and bilateral discussions with Islamabad-except on those issues thai could require Chinese concessions. We believe part of Beijing's calculus is to cultivate Indiaounterweight to the United States and the West:
Since Rajiv8 visit to China, Beijing has steadily increased diplomatic contacts with New Delhi-culminating in Premier Li Peng's visit to India inndia and Chinaour-page communique* at the end of Li's trip, describing agreements on the exchange of consulates in Bombay and Shanghai, the resumption of bolder trade, and cooperation on peaceful applications of space technology. |
Both
sides have also sought an increased role for the United Nations, probably in the belief that the United Nations is less likely to be dominated by the United States and other Western countries because of China's position on the Security Council.
F
The Sino-Indian BorderNew" Chinese Proposal
The Sino-Indian border dispute revolves around two main areas of conflict In the west, China occupies an area0 square kilometers that India considers part of its Kashmir state. This area, known as Aksai Chin, is strategically important to China because the road that crosses it connects northwest China with Tibet in the east Indiasquaie-kilorneter area that it considers essential to the control of its sensitive northeast This area is now the state of Arunachal Pradesh. China and Indiaorder war over this eastern section6 and China still claims sovereignty over it| j
India insists that the border should be drawn along the mountain ridge lines and
should be determined sector by sector.]
Despite the advances that have been made in the Sino-Indian border dispute, the negotiating process remains slow and deliberate, and Beijing appears to have no sense of urgency in solving it Most Chinese statements regarding the border stress that the solution will be long in corning and will be possible only with negotiations and concessions by both sides,
The bilateral relationship has moved forward in other areas, demonstrating that Beijing is hoping to irunimiie the border disputeoadblock to other areas of cooperation. Beijing and New Delhi officially reopened cross-border trade through Tibet in holy, though total bilateral trade reached only0 million during the fust half of this year. Cross-border trade had been suspended forears before it was agreed during Li Peng's visit in December to resume trade between June and September of each year. Meanwhile. Beijing and New Delhi have expanded space cooperaoon discussionsove that buildspace technology accord signed in
A Scwlh'Asia Nuclear-Free Zone and tb* Rre-NaUon Talks
> .
With the goa] of blocking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction inand as an effort to reduce the risk of another Indo-Pakistani war that couldbelligerentsuclear exchange, the United States suggested multilateral(India, Pakistan. China, the United States, and the QS) talks to addressof nonproliferaaon and underlying security concerns.eriodBeijing last year agreed to participate in these talks. China maybeen concerned that the initiative would compromise its nuclear capabilities;to attend, Beijing has implied that its nuclear arsenal would not be subjectBeijing certainly realizes thai reduced tensions would create afor Chinese regional economic development by lessening the burdenthe Pakistani military at concessionary-
While reportedly supporting Pakistani callsuclear-weapons-free zone that would include India and Pakistan, the Chinese will remain wary of Indian arguments thai nonproUferaoonlobal issue. Beijing undoubtedly infers from this argument that Indiaouth Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone extending well into China and affecting missiles deployed in its southwest Despite progress on implementing conventional force confidence-building measurese believe Beijing would be wary of becoming engaged in nuclear CBMs, which would probably place unequal restrictions on the mature Chinese forces. Even if India made an effort to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict in South Asia, we believe China would continue to view Indiaotential threat and would not risk reducing its small
strategic arsenal while still facing perceived security threats from Russia and the
United States. P
Saw
Outlook
Wc believe Beijing will continue its dual-track approach to South Asia, hoping to rriaintain its delicate balancing act with India and Pakistan by tilting its policy away from outright support of Pakistan to allow cultivation of New Delhi. However, Beijing will continue to maintain close ties to Islamabad in order to preserve Pakistan's roleounterweight to India
|onsecpacnce, Cftina wiu continue to pusneaceful settlement of the Kashmir crisis while avoiding outright support of Pakistan on
the issue.
China will probably also pursue increased trade and technological cooperation with India for the economic benefits it derives. From the military perspective. China will probably reach agreement on conftdence-building measures and may well respond to India's decision to vrididraw its forces from disputed territoryOBecause of the complexities of the border talks and both sides' sensitivity onorder demarcation agreement will probably prove elusive.
A number of events, however, could upset Beijing's strategic calculations:
A breakdown in negotiations or the status quo between Islamabad and New Delhi that would force Beijing to take sides.
India's fielding of advanced, longer range strategic missile systems. Indian missile development would at least threaten continued Sino-Indian space cooperation and possibly also border negotiations by confinning Qiinese suspicions of India's nuclear threat. Tensions over such issues would be fueled if other irritants in the relationship were increased, such as pro-independence activities by Tibetan exiles in India.
Appendix
The China-PakisLan Relationship in Perspective
The relationship between China and Pakistan traces its roots to the era of Cold War diplomacy. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize the People's Republic of China after its founding and lobbied intensively for it to regain the China seat in the United Nations. Throughout. Pakistan paved the way for China to expand its relations with other countries, while China supported it rrulitarilyounterweight to Soviet influence in the region. This was especially true during the Indo-Pakistani Waroncerned by what China perceived as Moscow's effort to encircle it with pro-Soviet regimes, China backed the more rightwing Pakistanis over the Indians because the latter were being supported by the Soviets. Similarly during the Bangladesh independence warhina renewed its support for Pafcjstan--this time against Soviet-backed India and Bangladesh. This policy approach culminated in2 Chinese declaration of support for Pakistan in the event of offensive action by India.
For Pakistan, the relationship has meant developmenttronger voice in world forums, and greater security. Pakistan views Chinaounterweight to both India and the former Soviet Union in the region. Chinese support continues to include joint projects, such as the Sandak copper mine; financial and military aid. including
buitural and technical exchanges; cooperation in deiense ana space tecnnoiogy. such as the Chinese launch of the first Pakistani meterological satellite; and high-level political visits.
China has also sustained close military cooperation with Islamabad for over three decades. Almostercent of PaJrisian's tanks and more thanercent of its combat aircraft are Chinese, and the Pakistanis rely on China to help maintain the equipment. China, moreover, which previously was second only to the United States in supplying mililary equipment to Pakistan, has emerged as Pakistan's primary supplier now that the United States has suspended its military support
Sirril
INDO-RUSSIAN MILITARY AND NUCLEAR COOPERATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS
Jerome M. Conley
INSS Occasional Paper 31
Proliferation Series
February 2000
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
USAF Academy, Colorado
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air Force, the United States Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This paper is approved for public release by the Naval Postgraduate School; distribution is unlimited.
*******
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Major (Sel.) Jerome M. Conley was commissioned in the United States Marine Corps through the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps, College of the Holy Cross, in 1990, with a B.A. in Economics. His military occupational specialties include Weapons and Tactics Instructor, CH-46E pilot, Combat Engineer, and Regional Affairs Officer for the Former Soviet Union. He served with the Greyhawks of HMM-161 and deployed extensively to the Arabian Gulf, East Africa, and Southeastern Asia while conducting operations in Eritrea, Somalia, and Kuwait. Major (Sel.) Conley's military education includes The Basic School, Combat Engineer Officer Basic Course, Naval Aviation Training, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, the Defense Language Institute, and The Naval Postgraduate School. He holds a Masters in National Security Affairs from The Naval Postgraduate School and is presently assigned to the On-Site Inspection Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency as a Deputy Team Leader in the Open Skies Division. His personal awards include the Air Medal and the Navy/Marine Corps Commendation Medal. He is the author of the book,
Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Lessons and Options for U.S. Policy in South Asia (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, forthcoming).
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Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword vii
Executive Summary ix
Acknowledgements x
Introduction 1
The Cold War Years: 1947-1991 7
Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation 8
The Indo-American Rift 9
Indian Strategic Culture 10
New Dynamics and Continuities: The Post-Cold War Era 11
India's Post-Cold War Identity 11
Indo-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era 13
Russia's Post-Cold War View of India 14
Strained Indo-Russian Relations 17
India's Military Needs and Russia's Supplier-
Dependency 20
The Role of Russian Interest Groups 23
11 May 1998: Pokhran II 25
Post-Cold War Trends: A Balance Sheet 26
Conclusion: Implications for U.S. Security Interests 27
Indian Strategic Culture and Future Nuclear
Expansion 28
Russia's Support of Indian Expansion 33
Area Denial and the Indian Threat 35
Policy Options for the United States 36
Endnotes 40
FOREWORD
We are pleased to publish this thirtieth volume in the Occasional Paper series of the US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). This paper is derived from United States Marine Corps Major (select) Jerome M. Conley's Naval Postgraduate School thesis. It presents a detailed analysis of the Indian rationale behind their nuclear tests of 1998. As Major Conley concludes, "While some observers cite the inability of the United States to prevent India's overt testing in May 1998 as a failure in American efforts, the analysis in this thesis of India's strategic culture suggests that India's decision to test was driven primarily by domestic politics, and was therefore beyond the reach of American nonproliferation efforts." He then goes on to develop specific policy recommendations for the United States to engage the new nuclear powers of South Asia to shape their future nuclear development, to facilitate transparency and confidence-building measures, to educate the regions powers on the full costs of their recent decisions, and to supplant Russian influence. In short, he calls for active U.S. engagement and shaping of the nuclear future of the region.
About the Institute
INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF Academy. Our other sponsors currently include the Air Staff's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI); the Secretary of Defense's Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (incorporating the sponsorship of the Defense Special Weapons Agency and the On-Site Inspection Agency); the Army Environmental Policy Institute; the Plans Directorate of the United States Space Command; the Air Force long-range plans directorate (XPXP); and the Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency. The mission of the Institute is "to promote national security research for the Department of Defense within the military academic community, and to support the Air Force national security education program." Its research focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: arms control, proliferation, regional studies, Air Force policy, information warfare, environmental security, and space policy.
INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, selects researchers from within the military academic community, and administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and workshops and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of private and government organizations. INSS is in its eighth year of providing valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research products.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper analyzes the history of Indo-Russian military and nuclear cooperation. The "special" Moscow-New Delhi relationship during the Cold War, it concludes, was based upon Indian needs, American ambivalence, and Soviet opportunism. In the post-Cold War era this relationship has persisted due to continued American ambivalence, short-term Indian military needs, and Russian economic needs. This bond, therefore, may be fractured by an eventual improvement in Indian military self-reliance or a deepening in Indo-American military cooperation. India's strategic culture, rooted in Indian history, geography and political culture, has created an Indian strategic mindset impervious to American nonproliferation efforts. The paper finds, moreover, that there are no short-term "silver bullets" to cure the current Indo-American rift, which flows from causes in addition to India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998. While short-term measures can be taken to improve the bilateral relationship, the historical rift that has emerged between the two states cannot be easily mended. The United States, therefore, must strive to ensure that Indian nuclear expansion is conducted in a controlled, safe and limited manner.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank David Yost, Sumit Ganguly, Mikhail Tsypkin, Peter Lavoy, Gaurav Kampani, Michael Barletta, Robert Meagher, and George Perkovich for their expertise and assistance at various stages of this project. The opinions expressed in this paper are solely mine and do not necessarily reflect the views held by these individuals. Any factual errors also rest with me. I would also like to thank my wife for her patience and support throughout the numerous deployments and the hours of research.
Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Implications for U.S. Security Interests
INTRODUCTION
-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott
On 17 August 1999, India's National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) released a draft copy of its long awaited nuclear doctrine. Arriving fifteen months after the May 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests, the draft document refueled the debate within the United States over the future course of American policy towards India. But while the U.S. State Department was warning, "We think it would be unwise [for India] to move in the direction of developing a nuclear deterrent" due to the potential "action-reaction cycle" for a South Asian arms race, the Russian response was diametric. Rather than aligning Russia's reaction with that of the other global powers, Grigory Karasin, the Russian Deputy Minister in charge of relations with India, stated, "We shall carefully study this draft and in due time clearly state our opinion." More telling is the fact that as the Clinton Administration pushed for a continuation of sanctions against India, Russia was negotiating with India for the sale of TU-22 BM strike-bombers. This contrast in American and Russian approaches to Indian "security needs," and the legacy created by these polar approaches, typifies Indo-Russian and Indo-American relationships over the last five decades and is the focus of this paper.
Moreover, this paper is based in the proposition that the history of Indian procurement of Soviet/Russian military hardware provides a framework for understanding Indian strategic culture and its influence on past, present and future development of military and nuclear forces. Intertwined in the history of Indo-Russian military cooperation, one can also find the roots of the Indo-American diplomatic divide that continues to separate the world's two largest democracies. This divide, and the numerous factors that may prevent it from being completely bridged, is also discussed in this paper.
Finally, this paper examines the implications of the fact that India does not pose a direct military threat to the United States homeland. Any possibility for future strife between these two states, while remote, would most likely emerge from an area denial scenario in which the United States attempted to project military power into the Asian subcontinent or its surrounding waters. In this aspect, any possibility for military conflict between India and the United States would be, from an Indian perspective, the product of American aggression and Indian defense.
When the draft nuclear doctrine was released in August 1999, American policy goals in South Asia consisted of five short-term "steps" and one long-term goal. The short-term steps entailed: the signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); a cessation of the production of fissile material by both states; a limitation on the development and deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear capable aircraft; tightening the export controls in both India and Pakistan for nuclear technology; and the expansion of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan. The long-term objective of American policy in South Asia was "universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." To promote these "steps" and the end-state goal, the United States utilized a broad application of economic sanctions. American policy in South Asia during the fifteen months following Pokhran II can therefore be viewed as strictly nuclear-centric. Choosing a dialogue based on nonproliferation, the United States was certain to meet with eventual failure. As a proud nation and emerging power, India would not allow a foreign power, especially the United States, to dictate "internal" decisions, particularly with regard to national security and international status.
Contrary to America's nuclear-focused approach to India, Russia adopted a more balanced approach to India in the period following Pokhran II. While the reaction of Russia's political leadership to India's proliferation was mixed, the signing of a ten-year treaty of military and technological cooperation in December 1998 sent a clear signal that Russia would neither condemn India nor would it support American nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. Claiming that it would continue to honor the historically "special" relationship, Russia would solidify the Indo-Russian military bond during this period.
As defined by Ken Booth, strategic culture is the product of a nation's "history, geography and political culture," and it helps to "shape behavior on such issues as the use of force in international politics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil-military relations and strategic doctrine." As shown below, the value of this definition when applied to an analysis of India's nuclear weapons program is that it embraces three core theoretical models normally attributed to nuclear proliferation: the "security," "domestic politics" and "norms" models.
From an American policy perspective, an understanding of Indian nuclear proliferation must embrace a broad spectrum of proliferation incentives and the reality that "security," "domestic politics," and perceived international "norms" have all been instrumental at various times during the evolution of India's nuclear weapons program. As the status of India in the international arena has changed, Indian perceptions of international "norms" have also changed. Changes in India's domestic politics have sharply changed the role and influence of nuclear weapons as a symbol of national self-esteem and power. Furthermore, changes in the military and nuclear capabilities of Pakistan and China have reduced the geographic security of India and have provided nuclear proponents a rhetorical foundation, if not a fully credible military-technical foundation, for pursuing nuclear security. While the confines of this paper do not allow a detailed discussion of Indian strategic culture, critical junctures in Indian history, geographic security and political culture that influenced the evolution of India's nuclear program are highlighted below.
The second aspect of the American approach to the "Indian problem" is a failure to understand the dynamics of the "special" Indo-Russian relationship. The continued references by Indian and Russian officials to the unique quality of their bipolar relations imply a certain resilience and common perspective in Indian and Russian strategic, diplomatic and economic interests. This paper argues, however, that the Indo-Russian relationship is not "special" when placed in a vacuum, devoid of outside influences. While India and Russia have had, and will continue to have, common interests that are necessary for the development of a resilient bond, said commonality has not been in and of itself sufficient to solidify their relationship. The glue in the Indo-Soviet/Russian "special" relationship, therefore, has been and continues to be American ambivalence towards India and Indian military needs. If American ambivalence dissipates and India
's military-industrial complex achieves a high-level of self-reliance, the Indo-Russian bond will fragment.
India's Cold War military procurement decisions are summarized briefly here. Central to this period was an Indian desire for diplomatic independence and military self-reliance. Indeed, the Cold War Indo-Soviet relationship was created by Indian needs, Soviet opportunism, and American ambivalence. While not intended as a critique of American Cold War policies in South Asia, the pivotal decisions made by the United States in South Asia had significant short-term consequences on Indian military procurement, and a legacy of mistrust and suspicion was created towards the United States. This legacy continues to influence Indo-American and Indo-Russian relations today.
The paper focuses in detail on the period from the end of the Cold War up through the Pokhran tests of 1998. This period is defined by a shift in Indo-Russian relations as Russian economic needs became a dominating factor for continued military cooperation with India. While an Indian attempt to severe the umbilical cord to the Russian military- industrial complex would fall short, India would take advantage of Russian cooperation to expand its military base. Furthermore, a rigid American approach to India, centered on nonproliferation concerns, would permeate all aspects of Indo-American relations. This period represents an opportunity lost for American security interests in South Asia as Russian influence was allowed to remain and American influence was not properly developed.
Finally, the paper examines Indo-Russian and Indo-American relations in the post-Pokhran II era. The legacy of the Cold War will continue to influence bilateral interactions. Additionally, the ability of the United States to influence Indian nuclear expansion will be limited. With Russian assistance, India will pursue a nuclear triad and develop its "minimal" nuclear deterrent. The primary option available to the United States, therefore, will be to endeavor to ensure that Indian nuclear expansion is conducted in a controlled, safe, and limited manner, and to promote an improvement and redefining of the Indo-American dialogue. The future policy options of the United States will be weighed against Indian economic, political, and military needs, American strategic interests, and Russian influence. While no "silver bullet" for Indo-American bilateral bliss is evident, the need and the means to improve a teetering strategic situation are elucidated. This paper concludes that India does matter to future American security interests, and that future American policy must be scripted accordingly.
The real reason why there is now an increasingly open conflict between Western and Indian policy and attitudes on so many issues is, quite simply, almost tautologically, that the West and India are running an increasing risk of pursuing policies which cut severely across each other's interests. The Russians have done no more than act as a catalyst….The real symbol of what has happened is not the welcoming millions who cheered Messrs. Bulganin and Khruschchev in Calcutta, but the grim sharpness of the reaction which met Mr. Dulles's description of Goa as a "Province of Portugal."
This section only briefly summarizes Indo-Soviet and Indo-American diplomatic, economic, and military relations during the Cold War years from 1947 to 1991. * This summary can only highlight an historical pattern in the Indo-Soviet relationship that supported India's quest for regional security and independent global stature, and an oscillating Soviet vision of India based upon India's changing geo-strategic and diplomatic significance. As a result, far from being an enduring and close "special relationship," the historical foundations of the Indo-Soviet relationship reveal an opportunistic relationship in which "India's needs are a match for Soviet capabilities, and Soviet needs are a match for India's strengths." Moreover, the strength of the Indo-Soviet relationship depended upon the short-term impact of Indo-American interactions. Additionally, major South Asian policy decisions made by the United States during the Cold War show that the cementing of the "special" Indo-Soviet relationship was a product of American inattention as much as Soviet perseverance.
The pattern of Indian military procurement during the period 1947 to 1990 highlights three central themes of this study. The first is the fragile nature of the Indo-Soviet "special" relationship. The second theme is the emergence and growth of the Indo-American divide. The final theme is the evolution of India's strategic culture and its role in procurement decisions. A summary of these three topics is provided below.
Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation
The history of Indo-Soviet military cooperation can be summarized as a relationship determined by Indian needs, Soviet opportunism, and Western ambivalence. When India commenced the rapid modernization of its armed forces following the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, its initial objective was to continue and expand upon its historical Western supply-line. After failing to secure arms transfer agreements with the West, India turned to the Soviet Union out of "dire necessity." For India, the agreement was a commercial one based on economics. Soviet military contracts usually had favorable financial terms and included provisions for production licensing. But in the long-run, these deals became a burden as India failed to secure a reliable supply of spare parts and also experienced a drop in operational readiness due to a void in indigenous maintenance capabilities.
When India made a concerted effort in the 1980s to diversify its procurement portfolio, it found itself returning to the Soviet Union to satisfy its short-term military needs. With a long-term goal of self-reliance in military procurement, India would continue to use Soviet arms as a stepping stone between the bygone era of the British Raj and future Indian procurement autonomy. While Soviet arms would be used to offset American influence in South Asia, they did not pose a direct military threat to American forces during this period.
Central to the discussion of Indo-American relations during the Cold War is the fact that India did not play a vital role in American geo-strategic thinking during this period. The ideological significance of India as the world's largest democracy was negated by India's unwillingness to align itself with the West in the pivotal East-West struggle. From the American perspective, a lack of Indian support versus the "communist threat" equated to Indian hostility. India's quest for diplomatic independence and self-reliance did not fit into the American paradigm for a bipolar world.
From the Indian perspective, the confrontational American style threatened a return to colonial methods and subservience. In Indian eyes, America's willingness to engage Pakistan and China, and thereby impair India's regional security, illuminated American hegemonic aspirations and American indifference towards less developed countries. The unwillingness of the United States to provide arms to a fellow democracy when needed seemed hypocritical and incredible. The essence of the Indo-American "problem" was quite clear. Both states were acting in the same manner and securing their own national needs, with little regard for what other states might desire. The United States believed that as a superpower it had the right to take a superior position. India felt that as the world's largest democracy, and a victim of centuries of repression, it had the right to demand equality. With both states proceeding forward and neither willing to give way to the other, a collision was imminent.
History, geography, and political culture all played crucial roles in the development of India's conventional forces and nuclear capabilities during the Cold War. India's sudden emancipation in 1947 after centuries of subservience created "a fierce determination to preserve Indian independence no matter what the cost—an attitude often bordering on paranoia." Any attempt by outside powers, whether Soviet or Western, to exert influence upon India was often met with open defiance. While the Soviet Union, especially under Khrushchev, would be more understanding of India's "paranoia" and would treat India with respect, the United States often presented India with demands, even when providing food aid. Furthermore, the United States would exacerbate India's geographic isolation by providing arms and technical data to both Pakistan and China, thus adding fuel to Indian militarism.
Finally, India's political and bureaucratic leaders were crucial in determining the course that India would take in weapons development and procurement. Nehru neglected the country's military forces until it was too late to recover. Shastri provided the green signal to Bhabha, who manipulated the emerging Chinese threat skillfully. When Sarabhai replaced Bhabha in crucial posts within India's atomic energy program, pursuit of the nuclear option was neglected. Indira Gandhi preferred cooperation with the Soviet Union during her first premiership (1966-1977), then became more pro-Western during her second term (1980-1984). Desai understood the limitations of a single-track procurement source and set the course for diversified procurement. While all these individuals had the will to shape and direct India's weapons programs, their hands were often tied by financial, technical and diplomatic constraints. When these bonds began to loosen in the post-Cold War era, the influence and role of India's political culture would become even more decisive.
NEW DYNAMICS AND CONTINUITIES: THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
India is becoming a harder, more selfish and pragmatic entity. No longer encumbered by leaders besotted by larger-than-life images of themselves on the international stage, the new India is inclined to look at the world in terms of its own interests.
The Soviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1989 and the end of the Cold War brought about a drastic change in India's geo-strategic and diplomatic importance. At the same time, India experienced internal economic turmoil and an increase in domestic instability due to numerous insurgency movements. These factors contributed to a sharp decrease in Indian military expenditures and arms importation. Furthermore, a rigid American approach to India, centered on nonproliferation concerns, would permeate all aspects of Indo-American relations and prevent a broadening of these relations. Finally, the foundations of the Indo-Soviet/Russian military relationship would shift from Indian needs and Soviet opportunism to Russian economic needs and Indian military needs and opportunism. This section encompasses the period from the end of the Cold War up through the Pokhran tests of 1998. This period represents a lost opportunity for American security interests in South Asia as Russian influence was allowed to remain while Indian suspicions of American intentions were continually validated.
India's Post-Cold War Identity
Having defined its identity and prestige in international politics as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, India's raison d'être and identity in international relations became uncertain with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. "The pursuit of autonomy without power was premised, first, on a balanced stalemate between the Atlantic and Soviet blocs...." The removal of the "Soviet bloc" from the "stalemate" effectively ended the stalemate and, consequently, the rationale for the non-aligned movement. Indians also came to realize that the absence of a bilateral competition between the two superpowers meant that India's geo-strategic role as a "counter-weight" no longer existed. "When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, India found that few people outside the region cared much about the country. India neither had economic influence nor risked becoming a major source of instability—the two most important criteria for earning foreign attention." Furthermore, the rise of secessionist movements throughout India, South Asia and Central Asia shifted Indian defense concerns back to the issue of internal stability. Finally, after three decades of protectionist economic policies, India was forced to abandon its Soviet-supported "fortress mentality" and turn to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for economic rejuvenation.
Aiding the collapse of the Indian "fortress" was a realization among Indian elites that other Asian countries were experiencing rapid economic growth via the global market. It was during this transition period of the early 1990s that India emerged from centuries of subservience to (or, during the Cold War, dependence on) external powers to begin defining a global role for itself that was solely egocentric and not centered on India's reliance on other states. On the strategic level, to rephrase Ashley Tellis' Cold War depiction of India, the post-Cold War era became a time of transition as India evolved from being a consumer of security to being a producer of its own security.
Indo-American Relations in the post-cold war era
In the early 1990s, economic reforms in India and the end of the East-West competition of the Cold War provided an opportunity for improved Indo-American relations. Many observers hoped that the continued growth in Indo-American trade relations would provide a "cornerstone" for improved relations. As a result of India's Economic Reform Programme, foreign investment in India had risen sharply, with the United States taking the lead as India's largest foreign investor. Additionally, the United States became a major source of technology for India.
Against this backdrop of opportunity, however, the legacy of the Cold War Indo-American rift persisted. During the 1990-91 Gulf War, India had silently allowed American cargo aircraft transiting from the Philippines to the Gulf States to refuel at several airports. When an Indian press photographer happened upon an American aircraft in Bombay that was delayed due to maintenance problems, the story exploded into the Indian press. Domestic politics elevated the refueling operations into a breech of India's nonalignment policies, and the new Indian Prime Minister, Chandra Shekhar, was forced to halt the operations.
Following the Gulf War, however, Indo-American military cooperation improved as the two nations conducted a joint naval exercise in 1992 and signed a pact on military cooperation in 1995. Additionally, the United States continued to provide technical support to India's Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program and also authorized the transfer of 315 Texas Instruments Paveway bomb-guidance kits to the Indian Air Force. Despite these efforts, Indo-American relations continued to flounder.
During the first term of the Clinton Administration, the United States adopted foreign policy goals in South Asia based upon human rights issues, the desire to resolve tensions in Kashmir, and the need to "cap, roll-back and eliminate" nuclear weapons in the region. As the Clinton Administration continued into its second term, there appeared to be no attempt to readdress Indo-American relations. "One third of the Clinton Administration saw India in terms of arms control, one third saw it as an economic opportunity and one third saw it as a possible strategic partner. There was no policy review, no attempt to bring all this together." Additionally, in 1995, the U.S. Congress passed the Brown Amendment, which lifted most of the sanctions dictated by the Pressler Amendment and allowed the sale of $658 million worth of military equipment to Pakistan. Finally, the United States chose not to impose sanctions on China for the transfer to Pakistan of M-11 missiles and parts and 5,000 ring magnets for Pakistan's unsafeguarded centrifuges. From the Indian perspective, in the early post-Cold War years, the United States continued to show a preference towards Pakistan and China while simultaneously infringing upon Indian sovereignty.
Russia's Post-Cold War View of India
Unable to stabilize its own domestic environment, Russia's leadership, specifically President Boris Yeltsin, emphasized a need for the "'de-ideologization' of its foreign policy." This "de-ideologization" policy resulted in Russia adopting a "wait and see" policy towards India. "The main thing was that Moscow wanted its policy towards India to be pragmatic and flexible." Perhaps the greatest source of Russian neutrality towards India during the transition period of the early 1990s was a Russian political leadership that was "dominated by 'Westerners' and the 'Atlanticists.'" Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin both appeared to rest their hopes for a rejuvenation of the Russian economy on some variant of the Marshall Plan. Both men failed to understand that a Marshall Plan scenario—at least in the variation pursued in West Germany—required not only defeat but also an occupation of the targeted state to ensure that the required infrastructure and "rule of law" were in place. As is well documented, the tremendous amount of corruption and disorganization within Russia's bureaucracy curtailed the potential effectiveness of Western financial assistance.
The foreign policy struggle between the "Westerners" and "Asia first" groups in the new Russian state placed Indo-Russian relations in a precarious position. Two schools of thought concerning India existed within Russia in the early 1990s. The first school was composed of academics, members of the Duma and the defense industry who believed that Russia should maintain its "special" relationship with India. A strong India, they argued, could help fight the wave of Islamic fundamentalism that was sweeping across the Central Asian region between Russia and India. Additionally, this group believed that a strong India could offset the hegemonic status of the United States. If Russia promoted areas of regional strength throughout the globe, this school believed, the United States' ability to rest upon its post-Cold War laurels would be short-lived. Finally, India was the top importer of Soviet armaments during the final years of the Cold War, and many experts in Russia believed that this income source was crucial in Russia's transition to a free-market economy.
The second Russian school of thought concerning future relations with India was headed by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. This group believed that Pakistani relations were more valuable in fulfilling Russia's immediate foreign policy and security concerns. The southern periphery of Russia was a hotbed for Islamic fundamentalism and Pakistan held the necessary credentials to be an effective middleman for Russia. This view obviously countered the pro-India school that believed the solution to the growing Islamic threat was a strong Indian counter-balance. Finally, the Russian Foreign Ministry considered Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey as having a higher priority than India due to their geographic proximity to Russia.
As the transition from Soviet to Russian rule took place, the anti-India school of thought dominated Russian foreign policy-making. This domination resulted in a major shift in Soviet/Russian policy towards South Asia. "In November 1991, when the Soviet Union was breathing its last, in a dramatic change of policy, Moscow suddenly supported the Pakistan-sponsored UN Resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia to the great consternation of New Delhi." A nuclear-free zone would mean that both India and Pakistan would discontinue their nuclear programs and become "equals" as non-nuclear states. The signal sent by the collapsing Soviet regime, with many of its leaders taking positions in the new Russian government, was that it sided with the West and Pakistan against India's ambitions for regional leadership and security.
A second impetus for Soviet/Russian support of the Pakistani-sponsored resolution may have been the strong desire to put closure to the war in Afghanistan. To accomplish this, the Soviet/Russian leadership wanted to "secure the release of their prisoners of war who were in the custody of the Pakistan-backed Mujahideen factions." In January 1992, one month after a delegation of Afghan Mujahideen traveled to Russia, Moscow severed all "military supplies, ordnance and fuel for military transport" that were sustaining the Najib government's war effort against the Mujihadeen. This decision effectively negated the airpower advantage that the Najib government had held over the Mujihadeen and tilted the conflict back in favor of the insurgents. New Delhi felt a certain sense of betrayal because of the reversal in Soviet policy since the Indian government had worked with the Soviet Union in supporting the nationalist and secular Najib government.
Strained Indo-Russian Relations
It was in this atmosphere of uncertain Russian foreign policy objectives that the post-Cold War relations between Russia and India were further strained by two events. The first of these destabilizing events centered around a contract dispute between the Russian space directorate "Glavkosmos" and the government of India for the purchase of cryogenic engines and the related technology. The contract, signed on 18 January 1991, stemmed from India's desire to gain knowledge of the liquid oxygen propulsion system of Russian cryogenic engines in order to advance India's geo-synchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV) program. If produced indigenously and without Russian assistance, the project was forecast to require fifteen years until it would be operational. For Glavkosmos, the $350 million deal would provide crucial funds during a period of tremendous reductions in Russian defense expenditures.
Over the next two years, the United States protested the proposed transfer of missiles and technology to India on the grounds that the sale would violate the April 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The growing threat of missile proliferation became well known to the United States following the Iraqi Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War and the testing of India's Agni IRBM missile in 1989. However, the ability of the United States to coherently protest the sale was hampered by the changing of governments in Moscow as the Soviet Union collapsed and as the U.S. Executive Branch changed administrations from President Bush to President Clinton.
From the Indian and Russian perspectives, the cryogenic engine deal was legal under the MTCR on the grounds that the treaty did not block the support of "peaceful space ventures." Furthermore, India asserted that U.S. attempts to block the sale were financially motivated since General Dynamics and the French space-booster manufacturer Arianespace had both been outbid by Glavkosmos.
The new Russian government under Boris Yeltsin promised India's leadership that it would not give in to U.S. diplomatic pressure. This promise was compromised, however, after the United States applied sanctions in May 1992, and threatened further economic measures. On 16 July 1993, Boris Yeltsin agreed to suspend the transaction and to alter the nature of the transfer to the sale of only the cryogenic engines and not the technology. In exchange, Glavkosmos was given bidding rights on over $950 million worth of future U.S. space projects.
While the ability of India to indigenously produce GSLVs and ICBMs was delayed by several years due to the cancellation of the original cryogenic engine deal, the main concern in New Delhi was that the Yeltsin government had given in to Western pressure. "The conclusion they drew was that Russia's overriding need for American economic aid would make it susceptible to American pressure. In Indian eyes, Russia is unreliable, and it has also lost its international stature." As Indo-Russian relations appeared to weaken under Western pressure, direct bilateral interactions between the two states also revealed tensions.
During the same time frame as the cryogenic engine fiasco, the "rupee versus ruble" debate flared up in Indo-Russian relations. As the Cold War concluded, India had an amassed debt of $12-16 billion owed to the Soviet Union for arms purchases. While India proved willing to pay off its debt, a dispute emerged between the two states over the nature of the currency and the exchange rate that would be used. As noted earlier, the Soviet Union had been willing to accept rupee-for-arms arrangements since the initial Soviet intent in the military cooperation was to use India as a strategic counter-balance, not a financial pool. Since there was not a huge demand for Indian imports in the Soviet Union, almost half of the rupee-based debt remained in Indian banks uncollected. When the new and financially strapped Russian state took over the old Soviet trade books, the vast Indian debt became an issue of concern. "Goodwill alone cannot forge mutually advantageous economic ties. Trade between Russia and India almost collapsed in 1991-92 because of arguments over the rupee-ruble exchange rate and the amount India owed Russia as the successor state to the USSR." After much domestic squabbling in each country, a resolution was reached in January 1993 that called for India to repay Russia $1 billion a year in Indian goods until 2005, after which the remaining thirty-seven percent of the debt would be repaid, interest free, over forty-five years.
Although a repayment schedule was established, controversy over distribution of the "Rupee Fund" continued. Russia had originally agreed to establish a three-year import schedule with India which would allow Indian exporters to forecast the amount of products needed in advance. In September 1994, the Russian government reversed this decision out of fear that long-term financial commitments would be too constricting. The new plan offered by Moscow provided a 180-day export forecast to Indian producers.
To further stimulate investor interest in India's currency, the Russian government began to auction off vast sums of the Indian currency to Russian importers at discounted rates. The average discount of fifteen percent during the auctions led to rampant corruption and manipulation of the rupee fund, especially among Russia's banking oligarchy. Meanwhile, the Indian government continued to petition Russia to accelerate the repayment schedule while it simultaneously maintained its protectionist import-export policies. By 1993, the level of bilateral trade between India and Russia had dropped to one-fifth of the 1990 level of $5.5 billion.
India was finally revived in the Russian strategic focus in January 1996, when Yevgeny Primakov replaced the pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev as Russia's Foreign Minister. The result was an immediate swing in Russia's foreign policy focus that included considerations for both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. A clear signal was sent by Moscow to New Delhi, and the rest of the world, one year later when an agreement was reached to build two Russian light-water nuclear reactors (LWR) in India in defiance of a Nuclear Suppliers Group ban. "The two countries signed an accord paving the way for the construction of two 1,000 MW light water nuclear reactors at Kudankalam in Tamil Nadu. Hence it seems that Russia would not succumb to external pressure this time." Diplomatically, Russia appeared to no longer look strictly westwards.
India's Military Needs and Russia's supplier-dependency
The primary short-term military concern for India in the early 1990s was its limited supply of spare parts and supplies for its Soviet-produced armaments. After three decades of reliance on Soviet-produced hardware, India was in a position in 1991 in which seventy percent of Army armaments, eighty percent of Air Force armaments, and eight-five percent of Navy armaments were of Soviet origin. Lacking the indigenous capability to produce spare parts and supplies for these systems, India's military faced an immediate crisis. The break-up of the Soviet Union had caused a fracture in the Soviet-Indian military supply-line as the administrative control and actual locations of the Soviet defense industries were situated throughout the newly independent states. "As Air Vice-Marshall S. Krishnaswamy noted with some understatement, there was a 'hiccup' in supply relations during 1991-92." Over-reliance on Soviet military hardware had allowed India to postpone developing a self-reliant indigenous defense industry. More to the point, "the dependence on Russian weapons over 30 years was a serious strategic defect."
In response to its economic crisis in 1990-91 and the temporary loss of its primary foreign arms supplier, India imposed a reduction in defense expenditures and a sharp reduction in arms importation (see Figures 1 and 2 below). After having been the top importer of conventional weapons in the world during the period from 1988 to 1992, India was ranked as the twenty-third largest importer of conventional arms by 1996. Meanwhile, Russia's share of the global arms market dropped from thirty-two percent in 1989 to eight percent in 1994. The inability of Russia to continue the Soviet flow of military hardware, coupled with the sharp reduction in Indian military expenditures, weakened the primary bond that had united India and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (see Figure 3).
Figure 1: Indian Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP, 1988-96
Source: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, SIPRI Yearbook 1998 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 230.
Figure 2: Indian Arms Imports in Constant 1996 U.S. dollars
Source: Data obtained from, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1998), Table II. Available online: <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/wmeat97/wmeat97.pdf>.
Figure 3: Percentage of Indian Arms Imported from the Soviet Union/Russia
Source: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 482. Table 11.8.
the role of Russian Interest groups
Until the communist collapse, the Indo-Soviet relationship prospered because of the need for a balance against the West, and shared security and geopolitical concerns. The new Indo-Russian relationship will have to be based primarily on business interests, and colored only marginally by geopolitics and security.
By the mid-1990s, however, the recovery of the Indian economy and the financial needs of Russia's military-industrial complex quickly mended the temporary "hiccup" in Indo-Russian military cooperation. In 1995, the sale of Russian arms on the international market increased by sixty percent over the previous year's total as the state shifted from "an ideological to a market-driven approach to selling its military hardware." Along with this shift in Russian arms sales practices came the decisive influence of Russian interest groups. During the Cold War, decisions to sell Soviet weaponry abroad had been made by the Politburo. But in the post-Cold War era, the choice of where and when to sell Russian arms rested with the power-brokers of the Russian military-industrial complex. As Vitaly Kataev, the General Director of Russia's Center of Military Industrial Complex, remarked, "Economics dictate the routes of trade."
The likelihood of Russian interest groups dictating future military cooperation with India appears high. India buys more hardware from the Russian defense industry than Russia's own military forces. Estimates show that about eight hundred Russian defense production facilities are kept in operation by Indian defense contracts. Russian exports to China and India amount to about forty-one percent of the total revenue brought in by Russia's defense industry. The signing of a ten-year Indo-Russian agreement on military-technical cooperation, worth $15 billion, in the aftermath of the Pokhran II tests is an example of this trend. "In this sense it can be assumed that at the very least up to 2010, when aging begins of the most advanced Russian models already existing (SU-30MK and SU-35/37, T-90S tank, Mi-28 and Ka-50/52 attack helicopters), Russia can count on preserving a stable Indian demand for relatively large lots of arms and for their manufacturing technology."
Outside the paradigm of arms sales, several trends are emerging that may promote strong Indo-Russia cooperation. The first is a common security interest as both countries have strong concerns about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, the potential Chinese threat, and the prospect of U.S. world hegemony. "In private discussions Russian and Indian diplomats willingly open the cards: both Moscow and New Delhi see a threat in the excessive strengthening of China and the Islamic extremists." Furthermore, by promoting the rise of Indian power, Russia may be able to offset the "heat of NATO's eastward extension." There also remains a school of thought that Russia may be able to learn from India some lessons for sustaining a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic democratic state. Finally, both states face an increasing criminal threat centered around narcotics and illegal arms smuggling.
The current disharmony, therefore, between India and the rest of the globe is that India has moved from being totally moralistic to being a little more realistic, while the rest of the nuclear world has arrived at all its nuclear conclusions entirely realistically. With a surplus of nuclear weapons and the technology for fourth-generation weapons, the other nuclear powers are now beginning to move towards a moralistic position. Here is the cradle of lack of understanding about the Indian stand.
-Jaswant Singh
A decisive turn was made along the historical path of India's nuclear program when the Rajastan desert was rocked by three nuclear explosions on 11 May 1998. This decision to overtly weaponize after twenty-four years of "restraint" has been the subject of much scrutiny in nonproliferation studies. The reasons normally highlighted as possible catalysts include: technological considerations, in that India needed to update the limited test data acquired in the 1974 test to allow supercomputer simulations for designing future warheads; security concerns, in that the recent testing of Pakistan's IRBM Ghauri missile and increasing Sino-Pakistani military cooperation reduced India's geo-strategic buffer zone; normative factors; in that nuclear weapons remain a symbol of international power; and domestic politics, in that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had recently become the major party in the ruling Indian coalition after an election campaign which included an open promise to make India a nuclear power. Of these four rationales for India's 1998 tests, the normative and domestic politics motivations appear most salient when subjected to close scrutiny.
Post-Cold War trends: A Balance Sheet
In the post-Cold War era, several definitive trends have emerged that do not bode well for American security interests in South Asia. India and the United States have allowed Cold War differences to persist untreated. These differences have consequently festered into a "we-versus-they" dialogue that promotes conflict rather than cooperation. While the decision to conduct the Pokhran II tests was motivated only partially by sentiments against American unilateralism, the effect has been a widening gap in Indo-American ties.
Furthermore, the revival of Indo-Russian military ties, driven by economic factors, has placed the United States in a quandary in which the Indo-Russian connection can only be severed by counter-offers of third-party arms or the slow but eventual emergence of Indian self-sufficiency. These options are long-term in nature and cannot offset India's short-term dependence on its Soviet-era military systems. Moreover, the likelihood of the United States authorizing the sale of high-technology arms to India after years of nonproliferation-centric diplomacy is minimal.
Finally, the most recent developments in Indian strategic culture have rejuvenated India's quest for global status and equity. The rise of the BJP has resulted in a new approach to international nuclear politics in New Delhi. India has played its nuclear card in the hope of receiving international power status. Having based Indian nationalism on the image of nuclear strength, it is unlikely that India will unilaterally rollback its program.
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS
Civilization clash is not so much over Jesus Christ, Confucius, or the Prophet Mohammed as it is over the unequal distribution of world power, wealth and influence, and the perceived lack of respect accorded to small states and peoples by larger ones. Culture is the vehicle for expression of conflict, not its cause.
Although it has become fashionable to argue that economic strength, not military might, is now the international currency of power, neither the patterns of post-cold war military expenditure and arms development nor the primacy of muscle and force in international relations supports that thesis…India has learned the hard way that a unilateral desire for peace cannot bring about peace. A country can enjoy peace only if it can defend peace.
The above statements highlight the crucial contradiction that currently exists between Western nonproliferation goals in South Asia and Indian nuclear aspirations. While foreign and domestic critics of India's nuclear program have argued that the direct costs and opportunity costs associated with developing a nuclear deterrent are too high for an economically strapped nation such as India to undertake, the statement by Brahma Chellaney, one of the creators of India's new draft nuclear doctrine, asserts that economic concerns are secondary to the strategic and normative advantages afforded to India by the acquisition of nuclear arms. These polar views result in a "chicken or the egg scenario" in which one side argues that economic strength and stability are a prerequisite to modern global power and the other side argues that modern global power, symbolized by nuclear strength, provides security and can open the door to future economic growth. In this scenario, the resilience of the Indian view is amplified by a strategic culture that exudes suspicion towards Western motives as well as a deep drive towards decision-making free from external pressures.
This section explores three crucial topics surrounding the current nonproliferation standoff between the United States and India. The first is an analysis of the most likely path that India will pursue in the development of its nuclear deterrent. Enmeshed in this discussion is the role of Russia, and other foreign suppliers, in assisting the creation of a "credible" Indian nuclear triad. The second topic discusses the extent to which India's nuclear program is a direct threat to American security interests. This discussion includes both the global implications for American nonproliferation efforts and the hypothetical existence of a direct military threat to American power projection in the Indian Ocean. Finally, the third topic explores future policy options for the United States in India specifically, and South Asia in general.
indian Strategic Culture and Future nuclear Expansion
In the preceding discussion of the parallels between India's strategic culture and the development of its nuclear weapons program, the key aspect of the "green signals" of 1948, 1964, 1974 and 1998 is that they all symbolize an Indian stair-stepping approach to the creation of a nuclear arsenal.* From the Indian perspective, which is crucial to understand in a nonproliferation framework, the Indian nuclear weapons program has demonstrated fifty-one years of "restraint." This Indian perspective is well encapsulated by a policy paper delivered by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee two weeks after the Pokhran III tests.
Our nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and openness. Restraint, however, has to arise from strength. It cannot be based upon indecision or doubt. Restraint is valid only when doubts are removed. The series of tests undertaken by India have led to the removal of doubts.
The argument about a "restrained" Indian nuclear weapons program is not meant to discount the motives of many members of the Indian "bomb-lobby." As mentioned above, strategic concerns, domestic politics, and international norms have all played crucial roles in the growth of the Indian bomb program. Homi Bhabha utilized the strategic fears created by the Chinese nuclear test in 1964 to obtain authorization to develop the nuclear option. Despite these strategic "fears," Prime Minister Shastri authorized the pursuit of the nuclear option, but did not authorize the actual building of a weapon. While this may seem to be a simple case of semantics, from the viewpoint of Indian strategic culture and nonproliferation analysis, a nuclear option and a nuclear weapon are two diametric concepts. One represents strength and the other represents restrained strength. It was quite fitting, therefore, that when "India…moved from being totally moralistic to being a little more realistic" and conducted the Pokhran II tests, the operation would be codenamed "Operation Shakti" (Strength). The most recent step up the ladder of Indian nuclear restraint was the release of India's draft "minimal deterrent doctrine." If one were to project the next rung up the ladder, the signing of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) or a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would still allow India to develop its arsenal while restraining the size of the arsenal. As India views most arms control treaties as discriminatory in nature, these treaty options would only come to fruition if the original P-5 states also became signatories and ratified the treaties.
Before projecting what step, or series of steps, India might take next in the development of its nuclear arsenal, it is necessary to evaluate the strength of current strategic, normative and political incentives for further proliferation. As the above discussion highlighted, domestic politics have always been a necessary catalyst for any major progression in India's program. The obvious difficulty with basing a projection on proliferation on the domestic politics of another country is that politics can be very difficult to predict and, from a policy standpoint, the ability to influence domestic politics within another country may be nearly nonexistent.
Despite this obstacle, certain trends in Indian politics can be tracked, especially in light of recent Indian national elections. Since the initial euphoria that swept India following the Pokhran tests of 1998, domestic politics have returned to the normal subjects of infrastructure improvements, overpopulation, insurgencies, illiteracy, and poverty. Unable to deliver in these key areas, the BJP lost a significant segment of its voter base early in 1999 and subsequently lost cohesion within the ruling coalition with a resulting fall from political power. While serving as a caretaker and awaiting elections in the fall, Prime Minister Vajpayee returned the nation's focus to the same issue that was central to his election victory in 1998, nationalism based on Indian military strength. In the three months leading up to the fall 1999 elections, three events signaled that the BJP would indeed continue to use the nuclear issue as a tool in domestic politics.
The first was the BJP's use of the fighting in Kargil between Indian armed forces and Islamic insurgents and Pakistani armed forces. The BJP successfully packaged the military operation as a "victory" for India. Adding to Indian nationalism was the outrage caused by the torture and execution of captured Indian pilots and soldiers. Kargil also fueled the nuclear issue in India due to BJP claims that the fighting in Kashmir validated the decision to go nuclear in 1998 since the overall threat of nuclear retaliation prevented Pakistan from escalating the conflict. This last view has been sharply contested by critics who hold that the Kargil crisis would not have even started without Pakistan having been afforded strategic parity with India after testing its own nuclear weapons in response to the Indian nuclear tests.
The second recent signal of a BJP-driven resurgence of nuclear politics came in August 1999 during several Independence Day speeches in which Prime Minister Vajpayee and other BJP leaders declared that India would induct its new Agni II IRBM missile into the operational inventory. Coming one month before the commencement of national elections, this declaration that India would pursue the deployment of a missile that has been specifically advertised as a deterrent asset against China has again shown the willingness of the BJP to utilize the "Chinese threat" as a tool in domestic politics.
The final example of the BJP's willingness to utilize India's nuclear weapons for the garnering of votes can be seen in the decision to release the draft of India's nuclear doctrine. Despite the fact that the draft had been approved for release for over two months, the BJP-led government did not publish the document until weeks before the commencement of national elections. What this incident and the Kargil and Agni II examples have demonstrated is that the BJP, unable to resolve the true domestic concerns of poverty, overpopulation and infrastructure bottlenecks, has continued to show a willingness to engage in nuclear gestures to secure its political power base.
While domestic politics may be pushing India's nuclear program towards expansion, the primary obstacles to the growth of India's nuclear program are financial and technological. The greatest criticism of the draft nuclear doctrine is that it does not specify the actual size of India's "minimal deterrent." The absence of size projections and deployment timelines has led to greater ambiguity over how much India's nuclear deterrent will cost. What seems to be a common opinion is that the decision to pursue a nuclear triad is not, from an economic viewpoint, "minimal."
One study projects a nuclear arsenal of 328 warheads with a nuclear triad and the required command and control structure costing $14.2 billion over thirty years. The study goes on to highlight an opportunity cost of over $48 billion due to "sanctions, lost business, trade and investment," bringing the total cost of the arsenal to approximately $62 billion over a thirty year period (in 1998 prices). This equates to 2.38 percent of India's GDP annually. Not included in this estimate, however, are the vast costs associated with training personnel and deploying and maintaining equipment. According to one study, "building bombs consumed just seven percent of the total cost of the U.S. nuclear weapons program."
The lost opportunity costs associated with India's nuclear weapons program are particularly difficult to predict, but also crucial to understand, in light of India's domestic needs. Dr. Peter Lavoy, who is currently the Director of Counterproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, cites one study that concludes that "a single Agni missile costs as much as the annual operation of 13,000 health care centers." Additionally, numerous studies have shown that crucial foreign investments have dropped in India due to loss of confidence in India's economic future. While the BJP remains adamant that sanctions and the costs associated with building a credible deterrent are only short-term in nature, one can argue otherwise.
India's ability to develop a credible nuclear deterrent also centers on its ability to produce, procure, and maintain the delivery vehicles and warheads associated with a "minimal deterrent." At the time of its tests in May 1998, India was believed to have twenty to thirty nuclear warheads in its arsenal. If Indian designs require five kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium per bomb, and India has an on-hand store of approximately 400 kilograms and a production capacity of 20 kilograms (four bombs) of weapons-grade plutonium a year, India can reach a level of just under 200 warheads by 2020.
The greatest obstacle to the deployment of a nuclear triad by India, however, lies in the issue of delivery vehicles. While continuing to emphasize the need to develop self-reliance in the procurement of its military hardware, India has been unable to surmount many of the technological, bureaucratic, and financial obstacles to self-sufficiency.
Russia's Support of Indian Expansion
While India continues to invest in the development of its indigenous aviation, naval, and tank programs, notably the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) and Arjun tank, it has been forced to continue to rely upon imports to meet its requirements for modernization of its conventional forces and the development of a nuclear triad. For strike aircraft, India is acquiring forty SU-30MKIs aircraft, plus IL-78 refuelers and IL-76 airborne early warning aircraft for strike support. Additionally the purchase of four Russian TU-22Ms strike aircraft and 16 to 18 French 2000 D Mirage fighter aircraft "soft wired for carrying nuclear missiles" is also being negotiated. To compensate for the high cost associated with the direct purchase of these systems, Russia has even offered to "lease" IL-76s and Tu-22s to India.
The most controversial area, however, where India is reported to be receiving military assistance is in the development of its "indigenous" nuclear-powered submarine and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). India's Advanced Technological Vessel (ATV) program dates back to 1988 when India leased a Soviet Charlie-I Class SSN for three years. The knowledge shared and relationships established with the Soviet Navy during this period are reported to continue today as India struggles with the design of its propulsion plant and the installation of the reactor in the submarine hull. Additional reports indicate that the hull design and reactor design of the two unfinished ATVs are based on the new Russian Project 885 Severodvinsk Class and its 190MW pressurized water reactor. Additionally, the former "apprentices" of the Indian Navy during the three-year period of the submarine lease "have taken key posts in Indian design offices developing nuclear submarines." Finally, an entire Indian submarine crew is reported to have spent at least six months during 1999 "on an official mission" in the closed northern Russian city of Severodvinsk.
The U.S. Department of State reported during 1998 that Russia was helping India develop the "Sagarika," a submarine-launched ballistic missile. The Sagarika has caused Indian scientists difficulty, especially with its guidance systems, and many foreign observers state that the system is a "far cry" from being operational. Again, Russian scientists are reported to be supporting this "indigenous" project.
While the transfer of nuclear technology for military purposes is in violation of numerous international treaties, it is difficult to determine whether "Russian support" of the ATV and Sagarika projects is state-sponsored or a product of individual scientists left unemployed and unaccounted for after the collapse of the Soviet Union. "No one knows where all the weapons scientists have gone." However, if one considers the role of Russian interest groups in influencing Russian policy decisions, it is worth noting that the Rubin design bureau of St. Petersburg, one of Russia's two major submarine design bureaus, designed and developed the Severodvinsk-class submarine.
Area Denial and the Indian "Threat"
The current inability of the United States to exert successful unilateral diplomatic or economic pressure on India highlights a pattern of waning U.S. prestige and diplomatic power toward India since the end of the Cold War. Because America is unable to achieve its ends through economic and diplomatic means alone, some Indian observers have speculated, the United States may decide to utilize "the military option" to influence India during future regional crises. Reviving Indian images of the show of force by the U.S.S. Enterprise in 1971, this U.S. military "influence" would most likely be naval in nature and would entail power projection. From the viewpoint of Indian analysts, the United States is already preparing for this inevitability by conducting war-game simulations of such a scenario.
To counter American intervention, India's military establishment has advocated the procurement of "sea-denial assets," such as the ATV project. "The Indian Navy would need to possess the ability to raise the costs of American military and naval intervention against India…. The development of even limited 'sea denial' capabilities against US military forces at sea could assist an attempt to deter an attack of this nature in the first place." Since it is unlikely that the Indian government would attempt to engage the United States in a full-blown war, India's strategy would center on making the cost of any U.S. intervention too high. As an internal Indian Navy study, dated one week after the Pokhran II tests, states: "Should it be possible for the target nation to be able to retaliate to cause significant losses, casualties or embarrassment, the strategy of intervention is not normally resorted to." While the possibility of a direct military confrontation between India and the United States may seem remote, this possibility has evidently been considered in New Delhi.
Policy Options for the United States
In 1998, both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. Neither country has real-time surveillance capability; reliable command, control and communications; or early warning systems. This vulnerability could lead to a launch on warning posture, further aggravating the subcontinent's already serious instability. Moreover, this rivalry increases the possibility of Chinese and Russian involvement and more explicit missile and nuclear assistance.
-The Deutsch Report, 1999
The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 awoke the world to the reality that the spread of nuclear weapons had reached a dangerous new phase. Two regional powers with unresolved antagonisms had made their nuclear ambitions overt. The tests reflected the failure of global non-proliferation norms to prevail over regional security imperatives, and increased fears that regional conflicts could turn into real nuclear wars.
-The Tokyo Forum, 1999
Having reviewed the historical motivations for nuclear proliferation in India and the current prospects for India to continue to expand its nuclear weapons capabilities, policy options for the United States must be discussed. Pokhran II has taught the United States several lessons concerning its nonproliferation policies that can be applied in South Asia and, to some extent, globally. While some observers cite the inability of the United States to prevent India's overt testing in May 1998 as a failure in American efforts, the analysis in this thesis of India's strategic culture suggests that India's decision to test was driven primarily by domestic politics, and was therefore beyond the reach of American nonproliferation efforts.
The ability of the United States to rollback and eliminate India's nuclear arsenal hinges on the willingness of the other P-5 states to pursue this objective, and this is unlikely in the foreseeable future. As early as 1965, a National Security Council report to President Johnson noted that "lessened emphasis by the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons and agreements on broader arms control measures must be recognized as important components on the overall program to prevent nuclear proliferation." The statement by Brahma Chellaney, quoted in the beginning of this chapter, expresses the Indian belief that nuclear weapons remain a symbol of global power. If the United States and the other members of the P-5 opt to retain nuclear weapons, Indians argue, they cannot realistically expect India to abandon its arsenal; and they should therefore abandon such foreign policy goals.
Additional South Asian foreign policy objectives of the United States that require review are the goals of obtaining accession to the CTBT and the projected FMCT by India and Pakistan and a bilateral no-first-use agreement. Until the United States Senate ratifies the CTBT, or another treaty regime with significant testing restrictions, India's leadership will continue to view its stance on the treaty as "vindicated." Pakistan in turn has linked its accession to the CTBT with India's; and Islamabad also appears unlikely to adhere to the projected FMCT due to a perception of strategic inferiority, in view of India's superior air force and air defense systems. Moreover, the likelihood of securing a Pakistani promise for no-first-use of nuclear weapons is minimal as this strategic inferiority feeds Pakistan's sense of vulnerability.
American foreign policy in South Asia should recognize that India and Pakistan will expand their nuclear arsenals. It is incumbent upon the United States to ensure that said expansion is conducted in a limited and safe manner. The concerns highlighted above by the Deutsch Report and the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament are real. While both India and Pakistan claim that their nuclear arsenals are stable and safe due to their limited size, factors other than "size" can trigger nuclear release. Included in these factors are the lacunae of "real-time surveillance capability; reliable command, control and communications; or early warning systems."
According to some interpretations of the NPT, the United States cannot provide India and Pakistan with nuclear-related command and control systems. However, transparency can be created with the sharing of American-provided intelligence and monitoring data with both states. The possibility of a border conflict escalating into a nuclear exchange should be weighed against the limited real-time intelligence capabilities of both states. During the Kargil crisis of 1999, a recurring complaint was that India's satellites and airborne reconnaissance assets did not provide adequate early-warning and imagery quality. A Pakistani P-3 maritime surveillance aircraft was shot down during the waning days of the conflict while it performed a reconnaissance mission. Lacking the technical capability for transparency during regional conflicts, India and Pakistan may fall victim to misperceptions.
The benefit of American-provided technical transparency is it would take the orchestration of confidence-building measures out of the hands of India and Pakistan and direct it equitably to both states. While this may appear to be a case of American intervention in the internal matters of the subcontinent, India and Pakistan both proved willing to accept American-supplied intelligence as a de-escalatory mechanism during the 1990 Kashmir crisis. Left to their own devices, India and Pakistan have not historically taken confidence-building measures seriously enough. Providing the rhetoric but not the action, neither state's leadership has viewed CBMs for what they are: potentially useful instruments of national security, at least in some circumstances.
Additionally, the United States should actively educate India and Pakistan about the vast hidden costs associated with deploying and maintaining a nuclear triad. While such information may not sway deployment decisions, a foundation of nuclear knowledge can influence the deployment levels selected.
Another area of potential U.S. engagement in India concerns its vulnerable and crucial domestic economy and infrastructure projects. Measures to encourage U.S. investment in India will not only improve diplomatic ties between the countries, but will also greatly reduce anti-American sentiment among the Indian populace. Additionally, the arena of joint oil exploration projects holds promise: "By the early part of the next century, India would become the third largest consumer of petroleum products in the world, after the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia." In 1996-97, India imported approximately fifty percent of its crude oil demand, and by 2010, this import-to-domestic-demand percentage is expected to increase to seventy-three percent.
Finally, the United States must address the role of Russia in South Asia. While there is no reason to recreate the Cold War competition, the willingness of Russia to undermine U.S. nonproliferation and security policies in South Asia raises serious questions. The difficulty arises, however, when American policy must cater to and "buy-out" Russian interest groups. While the United States may have been successful in such an endeavor with the cryogenic engine deal, the recent failure to block the sale of two light-water reactors to India shows the limits of American diplomatic and financial weight. The United States does, however, continue to hold considerable influence in the World Bank and the IMF and can affect investor confidence in Russia through these institutions.
The history of Indo-Russian military cooperation provides a foundation for understanding the current rift in Indo-American relations and the ability and willingness of India to defy American nonproliferation goals. Moreover, Indian strategic culture highlights the likely course of military and nuclear expansion in India and how said course may cross the path of American forces and interests. While India is not a rogue state, future policy and doctrinal decisions by its leadership could result in the first bilateral nuclear exchange in history (with Pakistan or China) or lead to direct conflict with the United States. It is imperative that future American policy be designed to avoid such events.
ENDNOTES
UNITED STATES REVERSES GEARS IN SOUTH ASIA
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
The paper expresses the personal views of the author. May be read with (1) Indo-US Strategic Partnership: The Advent of the Inevitable www.saag.org/papers2/paper120.html
(2)United States Policies in South Asia Under Bush: Continuity is expected www.saag.org/papers2/paper181.html
(3) United States and the Agra Summit www.saag.org/papers3/paper291.html
The turn of the millennium heralded a significant change in the tenor of United States - India relations. From estranged democracies, the path seemed to lead towards engagement without misgivings. This was signaled during the historic visit by President Clinton to India in March 2000. The joint declaration i.e. "India-US Relations :A Vision for the 21st Century" incorporated two important statements 'Natural partnership of shared endeavours' and significantly that 'In many ways the character of the 21st century will depend on the success of our cooperation for peace, prosperity, democracy and freedom'.
India reciprocated the above spirit when during his visit to the United States in September 2000, Prime Minister Vajpayee termed India and United States as being "natural allies" which drew bi-partisan support both in India and the United States.
American think-tanks and noted American foreign policy analysts stressed: (1) Bi-partisan consensus existed in USA for better relations with India (2) Better US-India relationship was emerging not from individual preferences, but from increasing convergence of interests and more significantly (3) Fundamental changes had taken place in US perceptions of India. India was no longer seen as confined to South Asia but central to Asian balance of power.
With the advent of the Republican Bush Administration in January 2001, with no adverse developments having taken place to sour US-India relations, India hoped and so analysed by analysts like this author that the Bush Administration would : (1) Continue to reflect the bi-partisan support in USA for a better and broader US-India relationship (2) In keeping with the past Republican Administrations of President Reagan and President Bush Sr build upon the pre-eminent status of India in South Asia and (3) Contemporaneous review of Asia-Pacific security environment by Bush Administration would lead to adding value to US-India strategic convergence of interests.(paper181 refers)
Notwithstanding visits of Bush Administration luminaries to India during this year, recent statements emanating out of Washington officialdom and leaders, somehow seem to negate the promising trend in US-India relation outlined above. More meaningfully are the changing nuances of the Bush Administration on United States policies towards China and Pakistan as discernible to analysts like us. At the outset it needs to be emphasised that while the United States can afford the luxury of viewing its relationships with China and Pakistan, independently of India, the latter cannot do so. China and Pakistan, independently and in collusion have weighed heavily in India's strategic calculus for over half a century. India cannot be oblivious to their conflictual record so far. US policies on China and Pakistan therefore impact on India's security.
From India's viewpoint, American statements, moves and developments emerging from the Bush Administration which cause disquiet and indicate a trend-in-the-making (hopefully not) pertain to Kashmir, state sponsored terrorism, Pakistan, China and the overall vision of the US-India relationship.
United States Changes Tack on Kashmir: President Bush Sr (Republican) before laying down office, reiterated in 1991 that Kashmir was a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan and needs to be resolved within the purview of the Simla Agreement (1972). President Clinton (Democrat) despite his earlier indifference, realised realistically towards the end of his tenure that not only Kashmir was a bi-lateral issue but also that for peace in South Asia, the sanctity of the LOC had to be respected by Pakistan. It was this realisation which made President Clinton to call on Pakistan to call off its aggressive misadventure in Kargil in 1999 and withdraw Pak forces to its own side of the LOC. Therefore, in the last decade under both the Republican and Democratic Administrations, the policy of endorsement of the Simla Agreement(1972) and respecting the sanctity of LOC in J&K stood unchanged. (Paper No 291 refers)
Any third party mediation or interference on Kashmir is ruled out by US bi-partisan policy stances. Further, it is repugnant to India. If that be so what was the necessity of US Secretary of State, General Colin Powell's offer to "lend the good offices" of USA on this issue.
Change of tack, like the above are not conducive to promote trust and faith in India in United States motives and intentions. No wonder Indian analysts termed it as "not only outrageous and unwarranted, but out of context".
It would have been advisable to adhere to the US endorsements on the Kashmir issue by former President Bush Sr and President Clinton. They effectively discarded the Cold War dictated tenets of America's stands on Kashmir.
Irrespective of Indian Government stances, the Indian masses have an intense sensitivity and strong opinions on Kashmir. Any change of tack in American policies in terms of endorsement of the Simla Agreement (1972) and respect for the sanctity of LAC by Pakistan, is likely to arouse strong anti-American sentiments in India.
United States Disappointing Responses to State Sponsored Terrorism: Indians stand aghast at the verbal camouflage that United States resorts to and takes refuge in while over-looking Pakistan's active role in unleashing Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in J&K and ISI sabotage all over India. While United States is ready to launch Cruise missiles against Osama-bin-Laden's camps in Afghanistan, it shies away from condemning Pakistan, the cess-pool of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism not only against India, but the United States too.
Indians are appalled at statements emanating from Washington officialdom on this crucial issue when daily scores of innocent lives are being lost because of Pakistan's state-sponsored terrorism. Here is a sampling of the latest statements from Washington officialdom carried in the issue of India Abroad of August 17, 2001.
Harry Thomas, Director South Asia, in the present US National Security Council, (served in New Delhi under US Ambassador Frank Wisner, for 3 years) while briefing a group of Indian-Americans at the White House stated that naming Pakistan a sponsor of terrorism would make it a failed state and lead to its Talibanisation. Further, he noted: "I am very sympathetic to the victims of terrorism. It's a stretch to say the Government of Pakistan is a state sponsor of international terrorism."
Another US official is quoted as stating: "Just because a terrorist organisation is based or operating from Pakistan does not necessarily mean Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism".
Obviously, it is statements like the above which stretch United States credibility to breaking point and stoke anti-American sentiments in India. It also makes that much more difficult the task of any Indian Government wishing to promote better US-India relations. Further, the United States should not expect India to co-operate and assist in global counter-terrorism efforts, if they are intended to serve areas of concerns of the United States only. Any joint counter-terrorism efforts should address India's concerns too, more specifically Islamic Jehadi Terrorism in J&K.
Bush Administration Softens On Pakistan: United States perceptions on Pakistan may currently be centred on: (1) Pakistan should not be allowed to disintegrate into a failed state (2) Pakistan is crucial to furthering US interests in Central Asia (3) Pakistan Should be prevented from being Talibanised and (4) Pakistan should be kept engaged to keep its nuclear waywardness under restraint (Paper No 181)
Laudable objectives for United States policy interests, but the question that begs an answer is as to how India is responsible for or contributing to Pakistan's disintegration, Talibanisation or nuclear waywardness? It is Pakistan's misgovernance, its Islamic fundamentalist policies, its China fuelled nuclear weapons and missiles build-up and its self-acquired and self-professed role as crusader of pan-Islamic causes which have contributed to its present state - held together by military rule of Islamic fundamentalist Generals.
Pakistan has strong supporters in the Cold War oriented civilian bureaucracy of the United States Department of Defence (Pentagon) and also in a sizeable number of US Senators and Congressmen funded by Pakistan Govt and Pakistan expatriates in USA. No wonder it led to a Washington despatch covering Condoleeza Rice's views (Sadiq Ahmed, Washington, The Bush Effect, Outlook, Dec 25, 2000, p39) stating that Pak lobby in USA could undermine efforts by Bush Administration to achieve a higher degree of compatibility with New Delhi. Bush Administration's softening towards Pakistan can be gauged from: (1) According legitimacy to the military dictator of Pakistan, General Musharraf, via Indian proxy i.e. the Agra Summit (Paper No 291 refers) (2) Permissive attitude towards Pakistan's policies of state-sponsored terrorism against India (3) Reversing of President Clinton's hard line US policies towards Pakistan (4) Facilitating monetary tranches from the IMF and World Bank to Pakistan on the plea that General Musharraf is attempting to restore democracy.
That the United states is attempting at a resurrection of its relationship with Pakistan is well exemplified by the statements of Peter Rodman, US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Affairs (Times of India, August23, 2001, p10 quotes) "Our relationship with Pakistan is valuable to us. And I don't think this Administration is going to lose sight of that..... but Pakistan has been an ally over many decades. I don't think , we as a great power, should be dispensing with allies, when you know that we think conditions have changed. Its an Islamic country in a very complicated region of the world. I think it is useful to have a friend in that part of the world".
The above stands in a significant contrast to a RAND Report authored by Zalmay Khalilzad (former Assistant Secretary, Defence in President Bush Sr Administration) which sought from President Bush Jr Administration: (1) President Bush Jr to urge Pakistan to exercise restraint on Kashmir (2) Pakistan "is in serious crisis and is pursuing policies counter to US interests" and (3) De-couple India and Pakistan.
The sudden softening of US policy stance towards Pakistan is currently being attributed to oil politics of the Caspian Region, the proposed oil-pipelines through Afghanistan and Pakistan's leverage over the Taliban in Afghanistan. What is being implied in these formulations is uncharitable towards the Bush Administration, but then it is the Bush Administration that has to disabuse the minds of analysts that its intentions are otherwise.
By any stretch of imagination, today, Pakistan is neither placed nor equipped to further United States strategic interests in the Middle East or Central Asia. To maintain that Pakistan as an Islamic country is better placed to serve American interests in these regions is a facile argument. The Gulf War dispelled the myths of Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic unity.
Bush Administration Gets Permissive on China: Like the Clinton Administration, President Bush during the run-up to elections was hard on China. Yet within eight months, his Administration has become as permissive towards China as were his predecessors. The change is significantly notable in terms of nuclear missiles proliferation in South Asia. CIA reports recently indicated that China had shipped a sizeable number of Shaheen I and Shaheen II missiles to Pakistan by the land route i.e. via the Karakoram Highway. The CIA had also authentically indicated that China had passed along solid propulsion missile technology in recent months. The US responses to this serious violation of MTCR by China have been as permissive as the previous Administration.
These permissive reactions i.e. absence of any sanctions against China, as per US laws, are in marked contrast to what the current US national Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice stated in December 2000 that China is a security concern for USA because Beijing transfers technology for weapons of mass destruction to Iran and Pakistan.
The United States has a historical narcisstic obsession for China, which India can do nothing about . But where China does impinge on India's national security interests and to which sensitivity the United States should be alive to is China's nuclear weapons and missiles build up of Pakistan with Chinese off-the-self sales, supplies of components in knocked-down kits and transfer of blue prints and technology.
United States official permissiveness on this aspect cannot but be perforce construed as complicity in harming India's national security . Indians have strong feelings on such complicity and permissiveness of China's attempts to strategically de-stabilise India by proxy through Pakistan.
United States Distorts Over-all Vision of United States -India Relationship: India through its Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee indicated it vision of United States -India relationship in September 2000 at the Asia Society dinner on September7. When it was declared "we feel as do our policy makers that India and the United States are natural allies." There could not be a more visionary statement concerning the US-India relationship nor a more convincing commitment.
President Bush Jr. himself echoed similar sentiments during the presentation of credentials by India's Ambassador, Lalit Mansingh in June 2000. President Bush stated that "After years of estrangement, India and United States together surrendered to reality. They recognised an unavoidable fact-they are destined to have a qualitatively different and better relationship than in the past."
In marked contrast to the promising vision espoused by the Indian and American leaders, the statements emanating from Washington's officialdom were disappointing. Peter Rodman, US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Affairs recently stated (Times of India, August 23,2001): "Our relationship with India is different, but Pakistan has been an ally over many decades....India is not going to become an ally of the United States. I think India values its independence. It values its non-alignment. So I don't think that anybody should expect that India is going to collude with us." It would be wrong for any US Administration official or political leader to distort the overall vision of the US-India relationship as given out in the New Delhi Joint Declaration of March 2000 which spoke of "cooperation for peace, prosperity, democracy and freedom." The said declaration did not enshrine "collusion" or "alliance" as prevalent in the mind-sets of the leftover "Cold War Warriors" of Washington.
Conclusion: India is neither in a position nor inclined to pass judgements or dictate what US foreign policies should be towards any region or country of the world. However, India perceiving itself as a partner in a cooperative endeavour as enshrined in the New Delhi Joint Declaration of March 2000, would expect that the vision so envisaged by both nations moves along the endorsed lines and policies followed so far. United States policies towards building a more broader framework of relations, enjoying bi-partisan political support, should not be put in reverse gear because of political or individual predelictions.
The United States, in my view has very difficult options in South Asia. It cannot have "balanced and strong relations with both countries (India and Pakistan)" as US Secretary of State, General Powell said after the failed Agra Summit. United States should recognise the reality (and China should follow suit) that external balancing of India's natural pre-eminence and power i.e. by aiding Pakistan has been historically fruitless.
In the years to come neither the United States nor China can hope to restrict India within South Asian boundaries or be held a captive in the region by the Sino-Pak collusion. One cannot help but borrow what Sunanda K Datta Ray states in a recent issue of the ASIAWEEK (August 24, 2000 P 18) : "But don't expect India to become America's tame kitten. The country will resist its efforts to limit its freedom of action in the sub-continent or in pursuit of what it sees as a legitimate global status." India like China in the 1980s despite any perceived weakness, is today in a position to play the "India Card". For those like this author who have hoped for a " Indo-Us Strategic Partnership "as an Advent of the Inevitable" fervently hope that the United States , does not reverse the gear.
(Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He can be reached on e-mail for discussion at esdecom@vsnl.com)
Sino-Indian War
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| Sino-Indian War | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 The Sino-Indian War occurred between India and China. | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
| India |  China | ||||||||
| Commanders | |||||||||
| Brij Mohan Kaul Jawaharlal Nehru |  Zhang Guohua[2] Mao Zedong | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| 10,000-12,000 | 80,000[3][4] | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| 1,383 Killed[5] 1,696 Missing[5] 3,968 Captured[6][5] 1,047 Wounded [5] | 722 Killed. [5] 0 Captured[5] 1,697 Wounded[5][7] | ||||||||
 | This article contains Chinese text. Without proper rendering support, you may see question marks, boxes, or other symbols instead of Chinese characters. |
 | This article contains Indic text. Without proper rendering support, you may see question marks or boxes, misplaced vowels or missing conjuncts instead of Indic text. |
The Sino-Indian War (Hindi: भारत-चीन युद्ध Bhārat-Chīn Yuddh), also known as the Sino-Indian Border Conflict (simplified Chinese: 中印边境战争; traditional Chinese: 中印邊境戰爭; pinyin: Zhōng-Yìn Biānjìng Zhànzhēng), was a war between China and India that occurred in 1962. A disputed Himalayan border was the main pretext for war, but other issues played a role. There had been a series of violent border incidents after the 1959 Tibetan uprising, when India had granted asylum to the Dalai Lama. Under a Forward Policy, India placed outposts along the border, including several north of the McMahon Line, the eastern portion of a Line of Actual Control proclaimed by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959.
The Chinese launched simultaneous offensives in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line on 20 October 1962, coinciding with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chinese troops advanced over Indian forces in both theaters, capturing Rezang la in Chushul in the western theater, as well as Tawang in the eastern theater. The war ended when the Chinese declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, and later withdrew from the disputed area.
The Sino-Indian War is notable for the harsh conditions under which much of the fighting took place, entailling large-scale combat at altitudes of over 4,250 metres (14,000 feet).[6] This presented enormous logistics problems for both sides. The Sino-Indian War was also noted for the non-deployment of navy or air force by either the Chinese and Indian sides.
Contents[hide] |
[edit] Location
China and India share a long border, sectioned into three stretches by Nepal and Bhutan, which follows the Himalayan mountains between Burma and what was then West Pakistan. A number of disputed regions lie along this border. At its western end is the Aksai Chin region, an area the size of Switzerland, that sits between the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang, and Tibet (which China declared as autonomous regions in 1965). The eastern border, between Burma and Bhutan, comprises the present Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the North East Frontier Agency). Both of these regions were overrun by China in the 1962 conflict.
Most combat took place at high altitudes. The Aksai Chin region is a vast desert of salt flats around 5,000 metres above sea level, and Arunachal Pradesh is extremely mountainous with a number of peaks exceeding 7000 metres. According to military doctrine, to be successful an attacker generally requires a 3:1 ratio of numerical superiority over the defender; in mountain warfare this ratio should be considerably higher as the terrain favours defense.[citation needed]China was able to take advantage of this: the Chinese Army had possession of the highest ridges in the regions. The high altitude and freezing conditions also cause logistical and welfare difficulties; in past similar conflicts (such as the Italian Campaign of World War I) more casualties have been caused by the harsh conditions than enemy action. The Sino-Indian War was no different, with many troops on both sides dying in the freezing cold.[8]
[edit] Background
The cause of the war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely-separated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Aksai Chin, claimed by India to belong to Kashmir and by China to be part of Xinjiang, contains an important road link that connects the Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. China's construction of this road was one of the triggers of the conflict. Arunachal Pradesh (called South Tibet by China) is also claimed by both nations—although it is roughly the size of Austria, it is sparsely inhabited (by numerous local tribes) due to its mountainous terrain.[citation needed] The Indian state Arunachal Pradesh has a population of over one million as of today.
[edit] The Johnson Line
The western portion of the Sino-Indian boundary originates in 1834, with the Sikh Confederation's conquest of Ladakh. In 1842 the Sikh Confederacy, which at the time ruled over much of Northern India (including the frontier regions of Jammu and Kashmir), signed a treaty which guaranteed the integrity of its existing borders with its neighbours.[9] The British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846 resulted in transfer of sovereignty over Ladakh, part of the Jammu and Kashmir region, to the British, and British commissioners contacted Chinese officials to negotiate the border. The boundaries at its two extremities, Pangong Lake and Karakoram Pass, were well-defined, but the Aksai Chin area in between lay undefined.[10]
In 1865, British surveyor W H Johnson came to an agreement with the Maharaja of Kashmir, in whose service he was employed,[11] on a proposed "Johnson Line" which placed Aksai Chin in Kashmir.[12] China rejected the arrangement, and the British government also harboured doubts, so decided to take up the issue in an attempt to reach a settlement. However in 1892, before the issue had been resolved, China erected boundary markers at Karakoram Pass on the ancient caravan route between Xinjiang and Ladakh (which were disputed by the British Indian Government).[6][12]
Throughout most of the 19th century Great Britain and the expanding Russian Empire were jockeying for influence in Central Asia, and Britain decided to hand over Aksai Chin to Chinese administration as a buffer against Russian invasion. The newly-created border was known as the MacCartney-MacDonald Line, and both British-controlled India and China now began to show Aksai Chin as Chinese.[12] In 1911 the Xinhai Revolution resulted in power shifts in China, and by 1918 (in the wake of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution) the British no longer saw merit in China's continuing possession of the region. On British maps the border was redrawn as the original Johnson Line,[6] but despite this reversion the new border was left unmanned and undemarcated.[6][12] According to Neville Maxwell, the British had used as many as 11 different boundary lines in the region, as their claims shifted with the political situation.[13] By the time of Indian independence in 1947, the Johnson Line had become India's official western boundary.[6] On 1 July 1954, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru definitively stated the Indian position.[14] He claimed that Aksai Chin had been part of the Indian Ladakh region for centuries, and that the border (as defined by the Johnson Line) was non-negotiable.[15] According to George N. Patterson, when the Indian government finally produced a report detailing the alleged proof of India's claims to the disputed area, "the quality of the Indian evidence was very poor, including some very dubious sources indeed".[16][17]
During the 1950s, China constructed a road through Aksai Chin, connecting Xinjiang and Tibet, which ran south of the Johnson Line in many places.[6][12][15] Aksai Chin was easily accessible to the Chinese, but access from India, which meant negotiating the Karakoram mountains, was more problematic.[15] Consequently India did not even learn of the existence of the road until 1957 — finally confirmed when the road was shown in Chinese maps published the following year.[2]
[edit] The McMahon Line
In 1826 India and China gained a common border, including the area of what is now called Myanmar, following British annexations in the Anglo-Burmese Wars. In 1847, Major J. Jenkins, Agent for the North East Frontier, reported that the Tawang was part of Tibet. In 1872, four monastic officials from Tibet arrived in Tawang and supervised a boundary settlement with Major R. Graham, NEFA official, which included the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. Thus, in the last half of the 19th century, it was clear that the British treated the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. This boundary was confirmed in a June 1, 1912 note from the British General Staff in India, stating that the "present boundary (demarcated) is south of Tawang, running westwards along the foothills from near Ugalguri to the southern Bhutanese border." [6] A 1908 map of The Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam (32 miles to the inch), prepared for the Foreign Department of the Government of India, showed the international boundary from Bhutan continuing to the Baroi River, following the Himalayas foothill alignment.[6] In 1913, representatives of Great Britain, China and Tibet attended a conference in Simla regarding the borders between Tibet, China and British India. Whilst all three representatives initialed the agreement, Beijing later objected to the proposed boundary between the regions of Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet and did not ratify it. The details of the Indo-Tibetan boundary was not revealed to China at the time.[6] The foreign secretary of the British Indian government, Henry McMahon, who drew up the proposal, decided to bypass the Chinese (although instructed not to by his superiors) and settle the border bilaterally by negotiating directly with Tibet.[15] According to later Indian claims, this border was intended to run through the highest ridges of the Himalayas, as the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian.[18] However, the McMahon Line lay south of the boundary India claims.[15] India's government held the view that the Himalayas were the ancient boundaries of the Indian subcontinent, and thus should be the modern boundaries of India[18] while it is the position of the Chinese government that the disputed area in the Himalayas have been geographically and culturally part of Tibet since ancient times.[19]
Months after the Simla agreement, China set up boundary markers south of the McMahon Line. T O'Callaghan, an official in the Eastern Sector of the North East Frontier, relocated all these markers to a location slightly south of the McMahon Line, and then visited Rima to confirm with Tibetan officials that there was no Chinese influence in the area.[6] The British-run Government of India initially rejected the Simla Agreement as incompatible with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which stipulated that neither party was to negotiate with Tibet "except through the intermediary of the Chinese government".[20] The British and Russians cancelled the 1907 agreement by joint consent in 1921.[21] It was not until the late 1930s that the British started to use the McMahon Line on official maps of the region.
China took the position that the Tibetan government should not have been allowed to make a such a treaty, rejecting Tibet's claims of independent rule.[15] For its part, Tibet did not object to any section of the McMahon Line excepting the demarcation of the trading town of Tawang, which the Line placed under British-Indian jurisdiction.[15] However, up until World War II, Tibetan officials were allowed to administer Tawang with complete authority. Due to the increased threat of Japanese and Chinese expansion during this period, British Indian troops secured the town as part of the defense of India's eastern border.[6]
In the 1950s India began actively patrolling the region. It found that, at multiple locations, the highest ridges actually fell north of the McMahon Line.[15] Given India's historic position that the original intent of the Line was to separate the two nations by the highest mountains in the world, in these locations India extended its forward posts northward to the ridges, regarding this move as compliant with the original border proposal, although the Simla Convention did not explicitly state this intention.[15]
On Oct. 29, 2008, David Miliband, the British foreign secretary, announced that the previous British actions including the Simla Accord (1913) and thus the McMahon Line had been an anachronism and a colonial legacy. He apologized to China for not having renounced those actions earlier. He was supported by Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, who called the British position embodied in the Simla Accord (1913) a "quaint eccentricity".[22][23]
[edit] Events leading up to war
[edit] Tibet controversy
The 1940s saw huge change in South Asia with the Partition of India in 1947 (resulting in the establishment of the two new states of India and Pakistan), and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. One of the most basic policies for the new Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China, reviving its ancient friendly ties. India was among the first nations to grant diplomatic recognition to the newly-created PRC.[24]
At the time, Chinese officials issued no condemnation of Nehru's claims or made any opposition to Nehru's open declarations of control over Aksai Chin. In 1956, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stated that he had no claims over Indian controlled territory.[24] He later argued that Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction, implying that there was therefore no contradiction with his earlier statement since China did not regard the region as "Indian controlled", and that since the British hand-over China had regarded the McCartney MacDonald Line as the relevant border.[15] Zhou later argued that as the boundary was undemarcated and had never been defined by treaty between any Chinese or Indian government, the Indian government could not unilaterally define Aksai Chin's borders.[13]
However, within a short time the PRC announced its intention to reclaim Tibet from the British, and later extended its influence by placing border posts within the Indian-claimed territory of Aksai Chin.[12] India protested against these moves and decided to look for a diplomatic solution to ensure a stable Sino-Indian border.[12][24] To resolve any doubts about the Indian position, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared in parliament that India regarded the McMahon Line as its official border.[24] The Chinese expressed no concern at this statement,[12][24] and in 1951 and 52, the government of China asserted that there were no frontier issues to be taken up with India.[24]
In 1954, Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memo calling for India's borders to be clearly defined and demarcated:[14] in line with previous Indian philosophy, Indian maps showed a border that, in some places, lay north of the McMahon Line.[25] Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in November 1956, again repeated Chinese assurances that the People's Republic had no claims on Indian territory, although official Chinese maps showed 120,000 square kilometres of territory claimed by India as Chinese.[24] CIA documents created at the time revealed that Nehru had ignored Burmese premier Ba Swe when he warned Nehru to be cautious when dealing with Zhou.[26] They also allege that Zhou purposefully told Nehru that there were no border issues with India.[26]
In 1950 the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered Tibet. Four years later, in 1954, China and India negotiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence by which the two nations agreed to abide in settling their disputes. India presented a frontier map which was accepted by China, and the Indian government under Prime Minister Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers). According to Georgia Tech political analyst John W Garver, Nehru's policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino-Indian partnership which would be catalyzed through agreement and compromise on Tibet. Garver believes that Nehru's previous actions had given him confidence that China would be ready to form an "Asian Axis" with India.[2]
This apparent progress in relations suffered a major setback when, in 1959, Nehru accommodated the Tibetan religious leader, the Dalai Lama, who was fleeing Lhasa after a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule. The Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, was enraged and asked the Xinhua News Agency to produce reports on Indian expansionists operating in Tibet.
Border incidents continued through this period. In August 1959, the PLA took an Indian prisoner at Longju, which had an ambiguous position in the McMahon Line,[6][12][25][27] and two months later in Aksai Chin a clash led to the death of nine Indian frontier policemen.[12]
On 2 October, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev defended Nehru in a meeting with Mao. This action reinforced China's impression that the Soviet Union, the United States and India all had expansionist designs over China. The PLA (People's Liberation Army) went so far as to prepare a self-defensive counterattack plan.[2] Negotiations were restarted between the nations, but no progress was made.[14][28]
As a consequence of their non-recognition of the McMahon Line (see above), China's maps showed both the North East Frontier Area (NEFA) and Aksai Chin to be Chinese territory.[18] In 1960, Zhou Enlai unofficially suggested that India drop its claims to Aksai Chin in return for a Chinese withdrawal of claims over NEFA. Adhering to his stated position, Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over either of these territories, and thus was not ready to concede them. This adamance was perceived in China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet.[2] Nehru declined to conduct any negotiations on the boundary until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin; a position supported by the international community.[15] India produced numerous reports on the negotiations, and translated Chinese reports into English to help inform the international debate. China believed that India was simply securing its claim lines in order to continue its "grand plans in Tibet".[2] India's stance that China withdraw from Aksai Chin caused continual deterioration of the diplomatic situation to the point at which internal forces were pressurizing Nehru to take a military stance against China.
[edit] The Forward Policy
According to James Barnard Calvin of U.S. Navy, in 1959, India initiated a forward policy of sending Indian troops and border patrols into disputed areas. This program created both skirmishes and deteriorating relations between India and China.[6]
At the beginning of 1961, Nehru appointed General B M Kaul as army Chief of General Staff,[29] but he refused to increase military spending and prepare for a possible war.[29] That summer, China's continuing patrols south of the McMahon Line provoked an Indian response known as the "Forward Policy".[6] The aim of this policy was to create outposts behind advancing Chinese troops to interdict their supplies, forcing their return to China.[6][24][27][30] There were eventually 60 such outposts, including 43 north of the McMahon Line.[6][14] China viewed this as further confirmation of Indian expansionist plans directed towards Tibet. According to the Indian official history, implementation of the Forward Policy was intended to provide evidence of Indian occupation in the previously unoccupied region through which Chinese troops had been patrolling. Kaul was confident, through contact with Indian Intelligence and CIA information, that China would not react with force.[15] Indeed at first the PLA simply withdrew, but eventually Chinese forces began to counter-encircle the Indian positions. This led to a tit-for-tat Indian reaction, with both forces attempting to outmanoeuver each other. However, despite the escalating nature of the dispute, the two forces withheld from engaging each other directly.[2]
Chinese attention was diverted for a time by the military activity of the Nationalists on Taiwan, but on 23 June the U.S. assured China that a Nationalist invasion would not be permitted.[31] China's heavy artillery facing Taiwan could then be moved to Tibet.[32] It took China six to eight months to gather the resources needed for the war, according to Anil Athale, author of the official Indian history.[32] The Chinese sent a large quantity of non-military supplies to Tibet through the Indian port of Calcutta.[32]
[edit] Early incidents
Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China flared up throughout the summer and autumn of 1962. In May, the Indian Air Force was told not to plan for close air support, although it was assessed as being a feasible way to repel the unbalanced ratio of Chinese to Indian troops.[33] In June, a skirmish caused the deaths of dozens of Chinese troops. The Indian Intelligence Bureau received information about a Chinese buildup along the border which could be a precursor to war.[33]
During the period of June–July 1962, the Indian military planners began advocating "probing actions" against the Chinese, and accordingly, moved mountain troops forward to cut off Chinese supply lines. According to Patterson, the Indian motives were threefold:
- Test Chinese resolve and intentions regarding India.
- Test whether India would enjoy Soviet backing in the event of a Sino-Indian war.
- Create sympathy for India within the US, with whom relations had deteriorated after the Indian annexation of Goa.[16][34]
On 10 July 1962, 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post in Chushul but withdrew after a heated argument via loudspeaker.[8] On 22 July, the Forward Policy was extended to allow Indian troops to push back Chinese troops already established in disputed territory.[24] Whereas Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self-defense, all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon Chinese forces if threatened.[24] In August, the Chinese military improved its combat readiness along the McMahon Line and began stockpiling ammunition, weapons and gasoline.[6]
[edit] Confrontation at Thag La
In June 1962, Indian forces established an outpost at Dhola, on the southern slopes of the Thag La Ridge.[6] Dhola lay north of the McMahon Line but south of the ridges India maintains the McMahon Line was supposed to represent.[15][25][35] In August, China issued diplomatic protests and began occupying positions at the top of Thag La.[6][2] On 8 September, a 60-strong PLA unit descended to the south side of the ridge and occupied positions that dominated one of the Indian posts at Dhola. Fire was not exchanged but Nehru said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to "free our territory" and the troops had been given discretion to use force.[2] On 11 September, it was decided that "all forward posts and patrols were given permission to fire on any armed Chinese who entered Indian territory".[24]
However, the operation to occupy Thagla was flawed in that Nehru's directives were unclear and it got underway very slowly because of this.[6][15] In addition to this, each man had to carry 35 kg of luggage over the long trek and this severely slowed down the reaction.[36] By the time the Indian battalion reached the point of conflict, Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namka Chu River.[6] On 20 September, Chinese troops threw grenades at Indian troops and a firefight developed, triggering a long series of skirmishes for the rest of September.[6][36]
Some Indian troops, including Brigadier Dalvi who commanded the forces at Thag La, were also concerned that the territory they were fighting for was not strictly territory that "we should have been convinced was ours".[27] According to Neville Maxwell, even members of the Indian defence ministry were categorically concerned with the validity of the fighting in Thag La.[15]
On 3 October, a week before the triggering of the war, Zhou Enlai visited Nehru in New Delhi promising there would be no war. On 4 October, Kaul assigned some troops with securing regions south of the Thagla Ridge.[6] Kaul decided to first secure Yumtso La, a strategically important position, before re-entering the lost Dhola post.[24] Kaul had then realised that the attack would be desperate and the Indian government tried to stop escalation into an all-out war. Indian troops travelling to Thagla had suffered in the previously unexperienced conditions, two Gurkha troops died of pulmonary edema.[36]
On 10 October, an Indian Punjabi patrol of 50 troops to Yumtso La were met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1,000 soldiers.[6] Indian troops were in no position for battle, as Yumtso La was 16,000 feet (4,900 m) above sea level and Kaul did not plan on having artillery support for the troops.[36] The Chinese troops opened fire on the Indians under their belief that they were north of the McMahon Line. The Indians were surrounded by Chinese positions which used mortar fire. However, they managed to hold off the first Chinese assault, inflicting heavy casualties.[6]
At this point, the Indian troops were in a position to push the Chinese back with mortar and machine gun fire. However, Brigadier Dalvi opted not to fire, as it would mean decimating the Rajput who were still in the area of the Chinese regrouping. They helplessly watched the Chinese ready themselves for a second assault.[36] In the second Chinese assault, the Indians began their retreat, realising the situation was hopeless. The Indian patrol suffered 25 casualties, with the Chinese suffering 33. The Chinese troops held their fire as the Indians retreated, and then buried the Indian dead with military honors, as witnessed by the retreating soldiers. This was the first occurrence of heavy fighting in the war.[6]
This attack had grave implications for India and Nehru tried to solve the issue, but by 18 October it was clear that the Chinese were preparing for an attack on India, with massive troop buildups on the border.[6] A long line of mules and porters had also been observed supporting the buildup and reinforcement of positions south of the Thagla ridge.[36]
[edit] Preparations for war
[edit] Motives
Two of the major factors leading up to China's eventual conflicts with Indian troops were India's stance on the disputed borders and perceived Indian subversion in Tibet. There was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, Indian efforts which were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre-1949 status quo ante of Tibet". The other was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border". John W. Garver argues that the first perception was incorrect based on the state of the Indian military and polity in the 1960s, it was, nevertheless a major reason for China's going to war. However, he argues the Chinese perception of aggression to be "substantially accurate".[2]
The CIA's recently declassified POLO documents reveal contemporary American analysis of Chinese motives during the war. According to this document, "Chinese apparently were motivated to attack by one primary consideration--their determination to retain the ground on which PLA forces stood in 1962 and to punish the Indians for trying to take that ground".[26]
Another factor which affected China's decision for war with India was a perceived need to stop a Soviet-US-India encirclement and isolation of China.[2] India's relations with the Soviet Union and United States were both strong at this time, but the Soviets were preoccupied by the Cuban Missile Crisis and would not interfere with the Sino-Indian War.[6] P.B. Sinha suggests that China timed the war exactly in parallel with American actions so as to avoid any chance of American or Soviet involvement. American buildup of forces around Cuba occurred on the same day as the first major clash at Dhola while China's buildup between the 10th and 20th of October coincided exactly with the United States establishment of a blockade against Cuba which began on the 20th of October.[24]
Garver argues that the Chinese correctly assessed Indian border policies, particularly the Forward Policy, as attempts for incremental seizure of Chinese-controlled territory. On Tibet, Garver argues that one of the major factors leading to China's decision for war with India was a common tendency of humans "to attribute others behavior to interior motivations, while attributing their own behavior to situational factors". Studies from China published in the 1990s confirmed that the root cause for China going to war with India was the perceived aggression in Tibet, with the forward policy simply catalyzing the aggressive Chinese reaction.[2]
Neville Maxwell and Allen Whiting argue that the Chinese leadership believed they were defending territory they believed to be legitimately Chinese, and which was already under de facto Chinese occupation prior to Indian advances, and regarded the Forward Policy as an Indian attempt at creeping annexation.[2] Mao Zedong himself compared the Forward Policy to a strategic advance in Chinese chess:
Their [India's] continually pushing forward is like crossing the Chu Han boundary. What should we do? We can also set out a few pawns, on our side of the river. If they don't then cross over, that's great. If they do cross, we'll eat them up [chess metaphor meaning to take the opponent's pieces]. Of course, we cannot blindly eat them. Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans. We must pay attention to the situation.[2]
The motive for the Forward Policy was to cut off the supply routes for Chinese troops posted in NEFA and Aksai Chin.[6] According to the official Indian history, the forward policy was continued because of its initial success, as Chinese troops withdrew when they encountered areas already occupied by Indian troops. The Forward Policy was having success in cutting out supply lines of Chinese troops who had advanced South of the McMahon Line. However, the Forward Policy rested on the assumption that Chinese forces "were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in a position to do so". No serious reappraisal of this policy took place even when Chinese forces ceased withdrawing.[24]
By early 1962, the Chinese leadership began to fear that India's intentions were to launch a massive attack against Chinese troops, and that the Indian leadership wanted a war.[6][2] In 1961, the Indian army had been sent into Goa, a small region without any other international borders apart from the Indian one, after Portugal refused to surrender the exclave colony to the Indian Union. Although this action met little to no international protest or opposition, China saw it as an example of India's expansionist nature, especially in light of heated rhetoric from Indian politicians. India's Home Minister declared, "If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by it, India will have to repeat what she did in Goa. India will certainly drive out the Chinese forces",[6] while another member of the Indian Congress Party pronounced, "India will take steps to end [Chinese] aggression on Indian soil just as she ended Portuguese aggression in Goa".[16] By mid-1962, it was apparent to the Chinese leadership that negotiations had failed to make any progress, and the Forward Policy was increasingly perceived as a grave threat as Delhi increasingly sent probes deeper into border areas and cut off Chinese supply lines.[16] Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi commented at one high-level meeting, "Nehru's forward policy is a knife. He wants to put it in our heart. We cannot close our eyes and await death."[2] The Chinese leadership believed that their restraint on the issue was being perceived by India as weakness, leading to continued provocations, and that a major counterblow was needed to stop perceived Indian aggression.[2]
Xu Yan, prominent Chinese military historian and professor at the PLA's National Defense University, gives an account of the Chinese leadership's decision to go to war. By late September 1962, the Chinese leadership had begun to reconsider their policy of "armed coexistence", which had failed to address their concerns with the forward policy and Tibet, and consider a large, decisive strike.[2]
The Chinese leadership initially held a sympathetic view towards India as the latter had been ruled by British colonial masters for centuries. However, Nehru's forward policy convinced PRC leadership that the independent Indian leadership was a reincarnation of British imperialism. Thus, the Indian government must be taught an unforgettable lesson. Mao Zedong stated: "Rather than being constantly accused of aggression, it's better to show the world what really happens when China indeed moves its muscles."
[edit] Military planning
The Indian side was confident war would not be triggered and made little preparations. India had only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict.[37] In August 1962, Brigadier D.K. Palit claimed that a war with China in the near future could be ruled out.[37] Even in September 1962, when Indian troops were ordered to "expel the Chinese" from Thag La, Maj. General J.S. Dhillon expressed the opinion that ""experience in Ladakh had shown that a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause them to run away."[2][24] Because of this, the Indian army was completely unprepared when the attack at Yumtso La occurred.[6][37]
Recently declassified CIA documents which were compiled at the time reveal that India's estimates of Chinese capabilities made them neglect their military in favour of economic growth.[38] It is claimed that if a more military-minded man had been in place instead of Nehru, India would have been more likely to have been ready for the threat from China.[38]
On 6 October 1962, the Chinese leadership convened. Lin Biao reported that PLA intelligence units had determined that Indian units might assault Chinese positions at Thag La on 10 October (Operation Leghorn). The Chinese leadership and the Central Military Council decided upon war to launch a large-scale attack to punish perceived military aggression from India.[2] In Beijing, a larger meeting of Chinese military was convened in order to plan for the coming conflict.[2]
The Mao and the Chinese leadership issued a directive laying out the objectives for the war. A main assault would be launched in the eastern sector, which would be coordinated with a smaller assault in the western sector. All Indian troops within China's claimed territories in the eastern sector would be expelled, and the war would be ended with a unilateral Chinese ceasefire and withdrawal to prewar positions, followed by a return to the negotiating table.[2]
Diplomatically, Mao acknowledged possible diplomatic isolation as the Soviet Union, the United States, the Republic of China and other misinformed countries would oppose China's actions. India led the Non-Aligned Movement, Nehru enjoyed international prestige, and China, with a larger military would be portrayed as an aggressor. However, he said that a well-fought war "will guarantee at least thirty years of peace" with India, and determined the benefits to offset the costs.[2]
On 8 October, additional veteran and elite divisions were ordered to prepare to move into Tibet from the Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions.[2]
On October 12, Nehru declared that he had ordered the Indian army to "clear Indian territory in the NEFA of Chinese invaders" and personally met with Kaul, issuing instructions to him.
On October 14, an editorial on People's Daily issued China's final warning to India: "So it seems that Mr. Nehru has made up his mind to attack the Chinese frontier guards on an even bigger scale....It is high time to shout to Mr. Nehru that the heroic Chinese troops, with the glorious tradition of resisting foreign aggression, can never be cleared by anyone from their own territory... If there are still some maniacs who are reckless enough to ignore our well-intentioned advice and insist on having another try, well, let them do so. History will pronounce its inexorable verdict... At this critical moment...we still want to appeal once more to Mr. Nehru: better rein in at the edge of the precipice and do not use the lives of Indian troops as stakes in your gamble."[5]
Marshal Liu Bocheng headed a group to determine the strategy for the war. He concluded that the opposing Indian troops were among India's best, and to achieve victory would require deploying crack troops and relying on force concentration to achieve decisive victory. On 16 October, this war plan was approved, and on the 18th, the final approval was given by the Politburo for a "self defensive counter-attack", scheduled for 20 October.[2]
[edit] Chinese offensive
On 20 October 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1000 kilometers apart. In the western theater, the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the eastern theater, the PLA sought to capture both banks of the Namka Chu river. Some skirmishes also took place at the Nathula Pass, which is in the Indian state of Sikkim (an Indian protectorate at that time). Gurkha rifles travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire. After four days of fierce fighting, the three regiments of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory.[6]
[edit] Eastern theatre
Chinese troops launched an attack on the southern banks of the Namka Chu River on 20 October.[36] The Indian forces were undermanned, with only an understrength battalion to support them, while the Chinese troops had three regiments positioned on the north side of the river.[36] The Indians expected Chinese forces to cross via one of five bridges over the river and defended those crossings.[6] However their strategy was wrong. As the Indian troops settled for the night on the banks of the river, the PLA crossed over the shallow October river and made their way to the other side. They gathered themselves up into battalions on the Indian-held south side of the river in the camouflage of the night, with each battalion assigned against a separate group of Rajputs.[36]
At 5:14 am, Chinese mortar fire began attacking the Indian positions. Simultaneously, the Chinese cut the Indian telephone lines so that the Indians could not make contact with CHQ. At about 6:30 am, the Chinese infantry, who had been positioned behind the Indians in the night, made their surprise attack and forced the Indians to leave their trench positions. [36]
The Chinese troops overwhelmed the Indians. Proceeding attacks from flanking positions south of the McMahon Line overwhelmed the Indian troops and caused withdrawal from Namka Chu.[36] Fearful of continued losses, Indian troops escaped into Bhutan. However, Chinese forces respected the border and ignored Tsang Le.[6] Now the Chinese troops had occupied the area which was under dispute in the confrontations at Thag La, but they continued to advance into the rest of NEFA.[36]
On 22 October, at 12:15 am, the PLA launched a mortar attack on Walong, on the McMahon line.[39] 400 troops proceeded to launch fire on the Indians posted there. Lights fired by Indian troops on 23 October showed the presence of numerous Chinese milling around the valley.[39] The Indians tried to use their mortars against the Chinese but the PLA then lit a bushfire to create great confusion amongst the enemy troops.[39] The Chinese eventually captured Walong at the cost of more than 200 dead or wounded, while Indian casualties were also heavy.
On 23 October, Chinese troops launched a three-pronged attack on Tawang, which the Indians evacuated without any resistance.[6]
[edit] Western theatre
On the Aksai Chin front, China already controlled most of the disputed territory. China quickly and efficiently got rid of remnants of Indian troops.[40] On 20 October, operations in the Chip Chap Valley, Galwan Valley, and Pangong Lake were successful for the PLA.[41] Many outposts and garrisons comprised were unable to defend against the surrounding Chinese troops. Most Indian troops positioned in these posts fought and were either killed or taken prisoner. India did not support its troops, as the Galwan post had been surrounded by China in August and had received no land support from India since then. After the 20 October attack, this post was not heard from again.[6]
Late on 19 October, Chinese troops launched various attacks throughout the western theatre.[8] By 22 October, all posts north of Chushul had been cleared .[8]
Later on 24 October, there was a battle on the Rezang La Ridge to defend an air strip from impending Chinese takeover.[42]
After realizing the magnitude of the attack, Indian Western Command withdrew many of the isolated outposts to the south-east. Daulet Beg Oldi was also evacuated, but it was south of the Chinese claim line and was not approached by Chinese forces. Indian troops were withdrawn so that they could regroup and be ready if China probed south of their claim line.[6]
Indian forces were hampered by their significant inferiority in numbers and lack of combat readiness. The Indian deployment was sparsely put and needed new commanders in the second phase of the war.
[edit] Lull in the fighting
By 24 October, the PLA had entered territory previously administered by India to give the PRC a diplomatically strong position over India. The majority of Chinese forces had advanced sixteen kilometres south of the border. Four days of fighting were followed by a three-week lull. Zhou ordered the troops to stop advancing as he attempted to negotiate with Nehru. The Indian forces had retreated into more heavily fortified positions around Se La and Bombdi La which would be difficult to assault.[6] Zhou sent Nehru a letter, proposing
- A negotiated settlement of the boundary
- That both sides disengage and withdraw twenty kilometers from present lines of actual control
- A Chinese withdrawal north in NEFA
- That China and India not cross lines of present control in Aksai Chin.[6]
Nehru's 27 October reply expressed interest in the restoration of peace and friendly relations and suggested a return to the "boundary prior to 8 September 1962". He was categorically concerned about a mutual twenty kilometer withdrawal after "40 or 60 kilometers of blatant military aggression". He wanted the creation of a larger immediate buffer zone and thus resist the possibility of a repeat offensive. Zhou's 4 November reply repeated his 1959 offer to return to the McMahon Line in NEFA and the Chinese traditionally claimed MacDonald Line in Aksai Chin. Facing Chinese forces maintaining themselves on Indian soil and trying to avoid political pressure, the Indian parliament announced a national emergency and passed a resolution which stated their intent to "drive out the aggressors from the sacred soil of India". The United States and the United Kingdom supported India's response, however the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis and did not offer the support it had provided in previous years. With the backing of other great powers, a 14 November letter by Nehru to Zhou once again rejected his proposal.[6]
Neither side declared war, used their air force, or fully broke off diplomatic relations; however, the conflict is commonly referred to as a war. This war coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis and was viewed by the western nations at the time as another act of aggression by the Communist bloc.[6][43] According to Calvin, the Chinese side evidently wanted a diplomatic resolution and discontinuation of the conflict.[6]
[edit] Continuation of war
After Zhou received Nehru's letter, the fighting resumed on the eastern theater on 14 November (Nehru's birthday), with an Indian attack on Walong, claimed by China, launched from the defensive position of Se La and inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese. The Chinese resumed military activity on Aksai Chin and NEFA hours after the Walong battle.[6]
[edit] Eastern theatre
On the eastern theater, the PLA attacked Indian forces near Se La and Bomdi La on 17 November. These positions were defended by the Indian 4th Division. Instead of attacking by road as expected, PLA forces approached via a mountain trail, and their attack cut off a main road and isolated 10,000 Indian troops.
Se La was very high, and faced with this strategic problem, the Chinese captured Thembang, which was a supply route to Se La. [6]
[edit] Western theatre
On the western theatre, PLA forces launched a heavy infantry attack on 18 November near Chushul. Their attack started at 4:35 am, despite a mist surrounding most of the areas in the region. At 5:45 the Chinese troops advanced to attack 2 platoons of Indian troops at Gurung Hill.
The Indians did not know what was happening, as communications were dead. As a patrol was sent, China attacked with greater numbers. Indian artillery could not hold off against superior Chinese forces. By 9:00 am, Chinese forces attacked Gurung Hill directly and Indian commanders withdrew from the area.[8]
The Chinese had been simultaneously attacking Rezang La which was held by 118 Indian troops. At 5:05 am, Chinese troops launched their attack audaciously. Chinese medium machine gun fire pierced through the Indian tactical defences.[8]
At 6:55 am the sun rose and the Chinese attack on the 8th platoon began in waves. Fighting continued for the next hour, until the Chinese signaled that they had destroyed the 7th platoon. Indians tried to use light machine guns on the medium machine guns from the Chinese but after 10 minutes the battle was over.[8] Logistical inadequacy once again hurt the Indian troops.[44] The Chinese gave the Indian troops a respectful military funeral.[44] The battles also saw the death of Major Shaitan Singh of the Kumaon Regiment, who had been instrumental in the first battle of Rezang La.[44] The Indian troops were forced to withdraw to high mountain positions. Indian sources believed that their troops were just coming to grips with the mountain combat and finally called for more troops. However, the Chinese declared a ceasefire, ending the bloodshed.[8]
Indians suffered heavy casualties, with dead Indian troops' bodies being found in the ice, frozen with weapons in hand. Chinese forces also suffered heavy casualties, especially at Rezang La. This signalled the end of the war in Aksai Chin as China had reached their claim line - many Indian troops were ordered to withdraw from the area. China claimed that the Indian troops wanted to fight on until the bitter end. However, the war ended with their withdrawal, so as to limit the amount of casualties.[6]
[edit] United States intervention
The PLA penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometers from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border. [15] The local government ordered the evacuation of the civilians in Tezpur to the south of the Brahmaputra River, all prisons were thrown open, and government officials who stayed behind destroyed Tezpur's currency reserves in anticipation of a Chinese advance.[24]
[edit] Ceasefire
China had reached its claim lines so the PLA did not advance farther, and on 19 November it declared a unilateral cease-fire. Zhou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire to start on midnight, 21 November. Zhou's ceasefire declaration stated,
Beginning from 21 November 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border. Beginning from 1 December 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometers behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on 7 November 1959. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometers back from that line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometers from the line of actual control.
Zhou had first given the ceasefire announcement to Indian chargé d'affaires on 19 November, (before India's request for United States air support) but New Delhi did not receive it until 24 hours later. The aircraft carrier was ordered back after the ceasefire and thus American intervention on India's side in the war was avoided. Retreating Indian troops, who hadn't come into contact with anyone knowing of the ceasefire, and Chinese troops in NEFA and Aksai Chin, were involved in some minor battles[6] but for the most part the ceasefire signalled an end to the fighting. The United States Air Force flew in supplies to India in November 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities.
Toward the end of the war India increased her support for Tibetan refugees and revolutionaries, some of them having settled in India, as they were fighting the same common enemy in the region. The Nehru administration ordered the raising of an elite Indian-trained "Tibetan Armed Force" composed of Tibetan refugees.[45] The CIA had already begun operations in bringing about change in Tibet.
[edit] Casualties
The military casualty figures for China according to Chinese government are 722 killed, 1,697 wounded, and 0 captured[5]. The military casualty figures for India according to Indian government stand at 1,383 killed, 1,696 missing in action, 3,968 captured, and 1,047 wounded.[5]
[edit] World opinion
The Chinese military action has been viewed by the United States as part of the PRC's policy of making use of aggressive wars to settle its border disputes and to distract from its internal issues.[46] According to James Calvin from the United States Marine Corps, western nations at the time viewed China as an aggressor during the China-India border war, and the war was part of a monolithic communist objective for a world dictatorship of the proletariat. This was further triggered by Mao Zedong's views that: "The way to world conquest lies through Havana, Accra, and Calcutta". Calvin believes that Chinese actions show a "pattern of conservative aims and limited objectives, rather than expansionism" and blames this particular conflict on India's provocations towards China. However, Calvin also expresses that China, in the past, has been adamant to gain control over regions to which it has a "traditional claim", which triggered the dispute over NEFA and Aksai Chin and indeed Tibet. Calvin's assumption, based on the history of the Cold War and the Domino Effect, assumed that China might ultimately try to regain control of everything that it considers as "traditionally Chinese" which in its view includes the entirety of South East Asia.[6]
The Kennedy administration was disturbed by what they considered "blatant Chinese communist aggression against India". In a May 1963 National Security Council meeting, contingency planning on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was discussed. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. Kennedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally, saying, "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India".[47] The Johnson Administration considered and then rejected giving nuclear weapons technology to the Indians.
The non-aligned nations, perhaps unsurprisingly, remained non-aligned, and only the United Arab Republic openly supported India.[48] Of the non-aligned nations, six, Egypt, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Indonesia, met in Colombo on 10 December 1962.[49] The proposals stipulated a Chinese withdrawal of 20 km from the customary lines without any reciprocal withdrawal on India's behalf.[49] The failure of these six nations to unequivocally condemn China deeply disappointed India.[48] Recently declassified CIA reports made in 1964 indicate that U.S. intelligence regarded India as an aggressor who invited humiliation from a superior power[6].
In 1972, Chinese Premier Zhou explained the Chinese point of view to President Nixon of the US. As for the causes of the war, Zhou asserted that China did not try and expel Indian troops from south of the McMahon line and that three open warning telegrams were sent to Nehru before the war. However, Indian patrols south of the McMahon line were expelled and suffered casualties in the Chinese attack.[50] Zhou also told Nixon that Chairman Mao ordered the troops to return to show good faith.[51] The Indian government maintains that the Chinese military could not advance further south due to logistical problems and the cut-off of resource supplies.
While Western nations did not view Chinese actions favourably because of fear of the Chinese and competitiveness,[6] Pakistan, which had had a turbulent relationship with India ever since the Indian partition, improved its relations with China after the war.[52] Prior to the war, Pakistan also shared a disputed boundary with China, and had proposed to India that the two countries adopt a common defense against "northern" enemies (ie China), which was rejected by India.[24] However, China and Pakistan took steps to peacefully negotiate their shared boundaries, beginning on 13 October 1962, and concluding in December of that year.[15] Pakistan also expressed fear that the huge amounts of western military aid directed to India would allow it to threaten Pakistan's security in future conflicts. Mohammed Ali, External Affairs Minister of Pakistan, declared that massive Western aid to India in the Sino-Indian dispute would be considered an unfriendly act towards Pakistan. As a result Pakistan made efforts to improve its relations with China. The following year, China and Pakistan peacefully settled disputes on their shared border, and negotiated the China-Pakistan Border Treaty in 1963, as well as trade, commercial, and barter treaties.[52] On 2 March 1963, Pakistan conceded its northern claim line in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir to China in favor of a more southerly boundary along the Karakoram Range.[15][49][52] The border treaty largely set the border along the MacCartney-Macdonald Line.[14] Because of India's failure against China, Pakistan triggered the Second Kashmir War with India. However, it effectively ended in a stalemate as Calvin states that the Sino-Indian War had caused the previously passive government to take a stand on actively modernizing India's military.[6] China offered diplomatic support to Pakistan in this war but did not offer military support.[49] In January 1966, China condemned the Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan as a Soviet-US plot in the region.[49] In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Pakistan expected China to provide military support, but it was left alone as India successfully helped the rebels in East Pakistan to found the new nation-state of Bangladesh.[53]
On Oct. 29, 2008, Britain for the first time recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, in a parliamentary statement by the British Foreign Secretary David Miliband.[54]
'Our ability to get our points across has sometimes been clouded by the position the UK took at the start of the 20th century on the status of Tibet, a position based on the geo-politics of the time. Our recognition of China's "special position" in Tibet developed from the outdated concept of suzerainty. Some have used this to cast doubt on the aims we are pursuing and to claim that we are denying Chinese sovereignty over a large part of its own territory. We have made clear to the Chinese Government, and publicly, that we do not support Tibetan independence. Like every other EU member state, and the United States, we regard Tibet as part of the People's Republic of China. Our interest is in long term stability, which can only be achieved through respect for human rights and greater autonomy for the Tibetans.'
Tibetologist Robert Barnett thinks that the decision has wider implications. India's claim to a part of its northeast territories, for example, is largely based on the same agreements — notes exchanged during the Simla convention of 1914, which set the boundary between India and Tibet — that the British appear to have just discarded.[55]
[edit] Aftermath
[edit] China
According to the China's official (communist) military history, the war achieved China's policy objectives of securing borders in the western sector, as China retained de facto control of the Aksai Chin. After the war, India abandoned the Forward Policy, and the de facto borders stabilized along the Line of Actual Control.
However according to James Calvin even though China had won a military victory it may have lost in terms of its international image. Western nations, especially the United States, were already suspicious of Chinese attitudes, motives and actions. These nations saw China's goals as world conquest, and clearly viewed China as the aggressor in the Border War. China's first nuclear weapon test in October 1964, and her support of Pakistan in the 1965 India-Pakistan Border War tended to confirm the American view of communist world objectives, including Chinese influence over Pakistan.[6]
[edit] India
At the end of the war, memorials were erected for the Indian troops who died in the war. Arguably, the main lesson India learned from the war was the need to strengthen its own defences and a shift from Nehru's foreign policy with China based on his stated concept of "brotherhood". Because of India's inability to anticipate Chinese aggression, Prime Minister Nehru faced harsh criticism from government officials, for having promoted pacifist relations with China.[15] Indians in general became highly skeptical of China and its military. Many Indians view the war as a betrayal of India's attempts at establishing a long-standing peace with China. The war also put an end to Nehru's earlier hopes that India and China would form a strong Asian Axis to counteract the increasing influence of the Cold War bloc superpowers.[2] The Indian role in international affairs after the border war was also greatly reduced after the war and India's standing in the non-aligned movement suffered[15].
The unpreparedness of the army was blamed on Defense Minister Menon, who resigned his government post to allow for someone who might modernize India's military further. India's policy of weaponisation via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency was thus cemented. Sensing a weakened army, Pakistan, a close ally of China, initiated the Second Kashmir War with India in 1965, however, India had set up the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report to determine what the reason was behind India's unpreparedness in the war, and, when Pakistan attacked, India was prepared. The result was inconclusive, since sources were divided on what decides victory. Some sources argued that since India had captured more territory than Pakistan, India had clearly won. However, others argued that India had taken significant losses considering the country's larger military and hence, the outcome of the war was inconclusive. Two years later in 1967, there was a short border skirmish, dubbed "Chola Incident" by India, between PLA troops and Indian troops. In this incident 8 chinese soldiers were killed while India lost 4 soldiers. [56]
Historian and journalist Neville Maxwell writes that the "hopelessly ill-prepared Indian Army that provoked China on orders emanating from Delhi, and paid the price for its misadventure in men, money and national humiliation".[57] As a result of the war, the Indian government commissioned an investigation, resulting in the classified Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report on the causes of the war and the reasons for failure. India's performance in high-altitude combat in 1962 led to an overhaul of the Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organization and equipment.
According to James Calvin, an analyst from U.S. Navy India gained many benefits from the 1962 conflict. This war united the country as never before. India got 32,000 square miles of disputed territory even if she felt that NEFA was hers all along. The new Indian republic had avoided international alignments; by asking for during the war, India demonstrated her willingness to accept military aid from several sectors. And, finally, India recognized the serious weaknesses in her Army. She would more than double her military manpower in the next two years; and she would work hard to resolve the military's training and logistic problems. India's efforts to improve her military posture significantly enhanced her army's capabilities and preparedness.[6]
[edit] Later skirmishes
India also reported a series of skirmishes after the 1962 war, which were never confirmed by China. One report provided by India shows that in late 1967, there were two skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces in Sikkim. The first one was dubbed the "Nathu La incident", and the other the "Chola incident". Prior to these incidents had been the Naxalbari uprising in India by the Communist Naxalites and Maoists.[58]
[edit] Diplomatic process
 | The neutrality of this article is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved. (March 2008) |
In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords, an agreement to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group have taken place to determine where the LoAC lies, but little progress has occurred.
India is concerned about China's military modernisation. On 20 November 2006 Indian politicians from Arunachal Pradesh appealed to parliament to take a harder stance on the PRC following a military buildup on the border similar to that in 1962.[59] Additionally, China's military aid to Pakistan as well is a matter of concern to the Indian public,[37] which fought another war with Pakistan in 1999.
On 6 July 2006, the historic Silk Road passing through this territory was reopened. Both sides have agreed to resolve the issues by peaceful means.
[edit] Further reading
- Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984). "The China-India Border War". GlobalSecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB.htm. Retrieved 2006-06-14.
- Lamb, Alastair (1964). The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries. L. Oxford University Press.
- Neville Maxwell's India's China War, Pantheon Books, USA, 1971
- Gunnar Myrdal. Asian Drama; An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New York: Random House, 1968
- History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992. — Official Indian history of the Sino-Indian War.
- Allen S. Whiting. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina.
[edit] Notes
| This article's citation style may be unclear. The references used may be made clearer with a different or consistent style of citation, footnoting, or external linking. (September 2009) |
- ^ 6月，印度军队加快了武装入侵中国的速度，东段已越过"麦克马洪线"，进入西藏山南的扯冬地区。截至8月底，印军在中国境内建立了一百多个据点。
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z China's Decision for War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver
- ^ H.A.S.C. by United States. Congress. House Committee on Armed Services — 1999, p. 62
- ^ War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet by Eric S. Margolis, p. 234.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i The US Army[1] says Indian wounded were 1,047 and attributes it to Indian Defence Ministry's 1965 report, but this report also included a lower estimate of killed.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984). "The China-India Border War". Marine Corps Command and Staff College. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB.htm. Retrieved 2006-06-14.
- ^ http://books.google.com/books?id=PsoDGLNmU30C&pg=PA188&lpg=PA188&dq=sino+indian+war+wounded&source=web&ots=goq1pcQc50&sig=FOQDKdciOn6VAd3fOCInHKhOu3U&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=6&ct=result
- ^ a b c d e f g h Battle of Chushul
- ^ The Sino-Indian Border Disputes, by Alfred P. Rubin, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan., 1960), pp. 96–125.
- ^ Maxwell, Neville (9 September 2006). "Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues" (PDF). Economic and Political Weekly 41 (36): 3876. http://www.epw.org.in/articles/2006/09/10532.pdf. Retrieved 2006-09-29.
- ^ "Obituary: Mr. W. H. Johnson". Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography, New Monthly Series, Vol. 5, No. 5 (May, 1883) , pp. 291-293. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0266-626X%28188305%292%3A5%3A5%3C291%3AOMWHJ%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T&size=LARGE&origin=JSTOR-enlargePage. Retrieved 2007-05-31.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Mohan Guruswamy, Mohan, "The Great India-China Game", Rediff, 23 June 2003.
- ^ a b China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute. Neville Maxwell. The China Quarterly, No. 43. (Jul. – Sep., 1970), pp. 47–80.
- ^ a b c d e A.G. Noorani, "Fact of History", India's National Magazine, 30 September 2003.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t Maxwell, Neville, India's China War, New York, Pantheon, 1970.
- ^ a b c d George W. Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963
- ^ Patterson, p. 275.
- ^ a b c VK Singh resolving the boundary dispute
- ^ The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute, Foreign Language Press of the People's Republic of China, 1961
- ^ GUPTA, Karunakar, "The McMahon Line 1911–45: The British Legacy", The China Quarterly, No. 47. (Jul. – Sep., 1971), pp. 521–45.
- ^ Free Tibet Campaign, "Tibet Facts No.17: British Relations with Tibet".
- ^ Richard Spencer, UK recognises China's direct rule over Tibet, The Daily Telegraph, 5 November 2008
- ^ Robert Barnett, Did Britain Just Sell Tibet?, The New York Times, 24 November 2008
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India, 1992.
- ^ a b c A.G. Noorani, "Perseverance in peace process", India's National Magazine, 29 August 2003.
- ^ a b c Chinese deception and Nehru's naivete led to 62 War Times of India
- ^ a b c India's Forward Policy, Review author[s]: A. G. Noorani, The China Quarterly © 1970 School of Oriental and African Studies
- ^ "The Shade of the Big Banyan" Time, Dec. 14, 1959.
- ^ a b Maxwell, Neville (April 2001). "Henderson Brooks Report: An Introduction". stratmag.com. http://www.stratmag.com/issue2Dec-1/kargil.htm. Retrieved 2006-08-18.
- ^ Gregory Clark, "Remembering a War — The 1962 India-China Conflict", Rediff
- ^ Chang, Jung and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (2006), pp. 568, 579.
- ^ a b c "Military Nonsense"
- ^ a b CIA Journals 1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on Air Power by R. Sukumaran
- ^ Patterson, p. 279
- ^ JOSHI Manoj, "Line of Defense", Times of India, 21 October 2000
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Battle of Namka Chu
- ^ a b c d Swaminathan South Asia Analysis Group Lessons of 1962: A stock taking after 40 years.
- ^ a b China feared military coup in India during 60s DNA India
- ^ a b c The Battle of Walong
- ^ eg. Chip Chap Valley, Pangong
- ^ Burkitt, Laurie; Scobell, Andrew; Wortzel, Larry M. (July 2003), THE LESSONS OF HISTORY: THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AT 75, Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 340-341, ISBN 1-58487-126-1, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf
- ^ Men of Steel on Icy Heights Mohan Guruswamy Deccan Chronicle.
- ^ Goldman, Jerry; Stein, Giel (October 1997). "The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 18-29 1962". hpol.org. http://www.hpol.org/jfk/cuban/. Retrieved 2006-08-18.
- ^ a b c YADAV, Atul, Injustice to the Ahir Martyrs of the 1962 War. The Tribune. 18 November 1999
- ^ Chushi Gangdruk "Chushi Gangdruk: History", ChushiGangdruk.Org
- ^ Abstract of "Fighting to Make a Point: Policy-Making by Aggressive War on the Chinese Borders" by Jr Pettis Roy C. — National War College
- ^ [2] — Taipei Times,[3] Indian American Center for Political Awareness
- ^ a b "India: A Year of Stability and Change". Ralph J. Retzlaff. Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1962: Part II. (Feb., 1963), pp. 96–106.
- ^ a b c d e Rediff Indo-China timeline
- ^ "China", "Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, p. 722", October 1971 – February 1972 (Declassified)
- ^ "China", "Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, p. 723", October 1971 – February 1972 (Declassified)
- ^ a b c Dobell, W. M. (Autumn 1964). "Ramifications of the China-Pakistan Border Treaty". Pacific Affairs 37 (3): 283–95. doi:. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-851X%28196423%2937%3A3%3C283%3AROTCBT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1.
- ^ The Men Behind Yahya in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 by Stephen R. Shalom, professor of Political Science
- ^ David Miliband, Written Ministerial Statement on Tibet (29/10/2008), Foreign Office website.
- ^ New York Times
- ^ The Chola Incident
- ^ [4], Rediff.com
- ^ Remembering Naxalbari Day
- ^ India soft on Arunachal Pradesh
[edit] External links
- Sino-Indian Border Dispute (Top Secret CIA report, 1964, Declassified 2007)
- Sino-Indian War (1962)
- Remembering a War: The 1962 India-China Conflict — Rediff.com.
- Neville Maxwell: Henderson Brooks Report
- 1962 Sino-Indian War, Hindustan Times
- War in the Himalayas: 1962 Indo-Sino Conflict (includes official war history) from History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India
- Critical Asian Studies Article: Sino Indian War 1962
- India, China to speed up border dispute talks: 2005 Xinhuanet
- The Rediff Special/Claude Arpi
- 1962 War and Its Implications For Sino-India Relations
- History of Sino-India Border War (Chinese)
- Historical maps of the Sino-Indian border (Chinese)
- Conflict in Kashmir: Selected Internet Resources by the Library, University of California, Berkeley, USA; University of California, Berkeley Library Bibliographies and Web-Bibliographies list
- Frontier India India-China Section
- Why China is playing hardball in Arunachal by Venkatesan Vembu, Daily News & Analysis, 13 May 2007
- China, India, and the fruits of Nehru's folly by Venkatesan Vembu, Daily News & Analysis, 6 June 2007
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Bureaucratic activism stifling panchayats: Sonia
Nagaur(Rajasthan) Expressing serious concern over increasing bureaucratic activism in the Panchayati Raj, Congress president Sonia Gandhi today said that despite all efforts, there was a deterioration in the rural administration system and the voice of villagers was being muzzled.
"Several state governments
did not conduct timely elections for local bodies and panchayats just for gaining political mileage, which led to deterioration of Panchayati Raj system rendering them helpless. The role of the administration became increasingly important and the peoples' voice started getting muzzled." She was speaking at a rally organised here to mark the golden jubilee celebration of Panchayati Raj system.
Recalling her husband and former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's contribution to enacting the Panchayati Raj Act, the UPA chairperson said, "When Rajiv Gandhi was the Prime Minister, he was saddened to see the condition of the people and took a pledge to bring a change in their living standards."
She said, "Due to the strengthening of the Panchayati Raj system, at least 12 lakh women of the country today could freely express their voice on issues concerning them."
Gandhi also said that the Centre was committed to empowering the panchayats to enable villagers to fulfil the dream of first Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru The UPA chairperson also asked the people to strengthen the National Rural Employment Guarantee Yojana (NREGA) and Panchayati Raj.
World Bank warns on 2010 as US job losses mount
ISTANBUL: The World Bank on Friday warned the global economy was on unsteady legs, saying that 2010 would be "a highly uncertain economic year" as
The warning came as stock markets tumbled around the world and the United States, the world's biggest economy, said job losses had accelerated to 263,000 in September and the unemployment rate rose to 9.8 percent.
The International Monetary Fund raised its economic growth forecasts for next year for most major advanced and emerging economies on Thursday.
But experts warn that unemployment will continue to rise, that recovery will be slow at best, and that there could even be a return to recession.
"We've broken the fall of the financial crisis but it's certainly too early to declare success," World Bank president Robert Zoellick said in Istanbul in the run-up to the annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank next week.
"2009 will continue to be a difficult year and 2010, when much of the stimulus action will run out, remains a highly uncertain economic year," he said, citing in particular the risk of inflation in Asian economies.
"We expect that unemployment will continue to go up and it'll be slow in coming down.... When you have large-scale unemployment those at the bottom are hurt the most and have the least cushion," he added.
IMF managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn warned unemployment would continue to rise for around a year, saying: "I'm still very much concerned about unemployment... It casts a long shadow over the recovery."
In Europe, figures released on Thursday showed the unemployment rate in the 16-nation eurozone hit 9.6 percent in August.
"We have arrested seven persons, including the mastermind O P Shah and detained more than 12 persons for interrogation", Superintendent of Police I N Mishra said.
"It is a major breakthrough in the investigation into the case," Mishra said.
Regarding the involvement of Naxalites in the killing, Mishra said it was still being probed whether the carnage was "a handiwork of CPI (Maoist) ultras."
Sixteen people, including five teenagers, belonging to backward classes were dragged out of their camps and gunned down by at Amosi Bharen late on Thursday night in Khagaria district.
The Maoists had carried out the attack with the intention of grabbing land belonging to the backward classes, ADG (HQ) Neelmani had said. The victims, who belonged to Koeri and Kurmi castes of Amdaicharua village, had put up camps there.
Ten persons were detained at Alauli police station in the district for interrogation yesterday.
Anna Hazare begins fast
Hazare began the hunger strike at Yadavbaba temple in Ralegansiddhi.
He alleged that he has so far launched agitations against several political parties but no other political party was as dangerous as the Sharad Pawar led NCP.
Former Maharashtra home minister R R Patil who now heads NCP's state unit, tried to persuade Hazare to call off the hunger strike but the social activist did not heed his request.
IMF, World Bank warn global cooperation could falter
"The danger today is one of complacency. "There will be a natural tendency to return to business as usual, and it will become harder to convince countries to cooperate in order to address many of the problems that led to this crisis, that put millions of livelihoods of people at risk."
IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn, speaking as top financial officials from across the globe arrived in Istanbul for semiannual IMF and World Bank meetings, also used the word "complacency" in describing the risk of policy errors. He said governments might be tempted too early to unwind expensive rescue measures for their economies, such as fiscal stimulus programmes and injections of huge amounts of money into their banking systems.
"My worry is governments say, 'That's it, we're out of the crisis, it's time to go back to normal' -- that would be the real error and it's one of the risks we must be sure to ward off."
COMPROMISES
The warnings by both the world's premier multilateral lending organisations reflected concern that governments might not make the difficult policy choices and compromises needed to tackle the root causes of the financial crisis. The IMF declared on Thursday a global recovery had begun, raising its forecast for growth next year to 3.1 percent from the 2.5 percent that it had projected in July. Last month, the Group of 20 major nations agreed in principle to cooperate in reducing the trade imbalances that contributed to the financial crisis, and to set tougher rules for the banking system.
But there are signs that as the recovery of the global financial system reduces the urgency of such reforms, the political will to press them is fading among many governments. IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard said on Thursday that rebalancing the world economy would not be possible without the appreciation of some Asian currencies. But China is still resisting pressure to appreciate its tightly controlled yuan, which could help to cut its trade surplus.
Germany's DAX closed down 1.6 per cent at 5,467.9, Britain's FTSE 100 lost 1.2 per cent to 4,988.7 and France's CAC-40 was 1.9 per cent lower at 3,649.9.
Major Asian indexes earlier closed down by 2 per cent or more, while on Wall Street
the Dow industrials fell 0.2 per cent to 9,491.75 in midday trading New York time, and the Standard & Poor's 500 index dropped 0.4 per cent to 1,025.52. The US Labor Department said the country lost a net total of 263,000 jobs in September, more than the 201,000 shed in August. It is also more than the 180,000 Wall Street was expecting and pushed the unemployment rate up to 9.8 per cent from 9.7 per cent.
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The figure weighed on sentiment because it suggests that US consumer spending, which accounts for more than two-thirds of American economic growth and a fifth of the world economy, will remain weak and keep the pace of recovery slow.
``It is clear that the labor market remains very weak,'' said Paul Dales, economist at Capital Economics.
He warned not to interpret too much from one month's set of figures and said he expected the labor market to improve in coming months. However, a stabilization in job losses would still not be the end of the US economy's problems.
``The next big concern will be falling wage growth,'' said Dales. ``Earnings growth is likely to continue to fall and may even turn negative, further undermining consumption.''
Markets were also watching the Group of 7 meeting of finance ministers from industrialized nations in Istanbul, Turkey, for any comments about the dollar, which has weakened in recent months.
``The risk is that the rhetoric on the fringes will continue to try and talk the dollar higher,'' said Daragh Maher, analyst at Calyon.
He noted that the referendum in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty, a set of EU reforms held back only by Ireland's vote _ will also be watched closely, with the expected ``yes'' result likely to give the euro a boost.
Meanwhile, shares in British Airways were down 3.6 per cent after EU regulators said expansion plans at its Oneworld alliance, with American Airlines and Iberia, would break antitrust rules on trans-Atlantic routes.
In Asia, Japan's Nikkei 225 average dropped 2.5 per cent to 9,731.87, with shares of carmakers like Toyota and Nissan especially hard hit. Hong Kong's Hang Seng lost 2.8 per cent to 20,375.49 after being closed Thursday for a national holiday.
Elsewhere, Taiwan's index shed 1.8 per cent, Australia's market lost 2.1 per cent, and Indonesia's benchmark was down 0.2 per cent.
South Korea's market was closed for a holiday as were those in mainland China and India.
Oil prices fell $1.64 to $69.18 on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The dollar was unchanged at 89.6 yen and the euro rose 0.43 per cent to $1.4604.
RBI has told banks to meticulously assess the inherent group risk of their borrowal accounts falling under the purview of the real estate sector and to look at borrowers' financial credentials on a consolidated basis. In India, real estate firms have a host of subsidiaries, since each new project is kicked off under a new subsidiary.
This arrangement is reckoned to be good as obtaining legal and municipal approvals are easier. Borrowings for such new projects by realty firms are also through such specific subsidiaries.
Of 22 listed realty companies, most of them have borrowed through their subsidiaries. Companies such as DLF, Unitech, and Orbit have contracted over 30% of their debt through their subsidiaries. Others such as Anant Raj, Kolte Patil, Mahindra Lifespaces and Indiabulls real estate have raised more debt through their subsidiaries than through their parent companies.
On a standalone basis, these numbers may not be quite striking considering that real estate is a capital-intensive business. However, if one were to take consolidated figures into account, it would clearly reflect the high leverage of the group. Typically, as these subsidiaries are not listed, such data are not easily available. Investors come to know of the large debt pile of these subsidiaries of listed realtors when the annual reports are released.
Companies such as Mahindra Lifespaces and Indiabulls Real Estate, which have substantial borrowings through their sister firms, have seen a drastic fall in interest coverage ratio on a consolidated basis. A fall in this ratio implies that on a standalone basis, these companies earn sufficient profits, but when the interest liability of their subsidiaries is included, the ICR takes a hit, thus, hurting the interests of shareholders.
Down the road, if RBI tightens the lending norms to the real estate sector as it had done two years ago to prick a bubble, many realty firms may find the going tough.
Even after receiving billions of dollars of stimulus funds, state governments lost 10,000 jobs -- all in education -- and the trend may get worse in coming months. "I don't believe that states have bottomed out yet," said Raymond Scheppach, executive director of the National Governors Association. "This fiscal year 2010 will be the worst year."
Since May, states have shed 49,000 jobs. In September, they lost 15,600 education positions while gaining 5,500 jobs in other areas, in an indicator of how stretched states' finances are, Scheppach said. States usually work to shield their schools from harm caused by economic recessions, and will use reserves or cut spending to preserve education jobs.
"States won't come back to the 2007 revenues until 2014 or 2015. This is long and deep and it's going to be a slow recovery in terms of jobs," he said. State revenues dropped 12 percent in the first quarter of the calendar year from the same period in 2008 and fell another 18 percent in the second quarter, Scheppach said.
| Also Read |
| → World unemployment rising; rates, responses vary |
| → World markets sink on weak US jobs data |
| → IMF, World Bank warn global cooperation could falter |
HEMORRHAGE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
The picture was even worse for local government jobs in September. Cities and counties shed 37,000 positions -- with education losing 13,400 of those jobs. Generally, cities have cut workers in parks and recreation departments and libraries, said National League of Cities Research Director Christopher Hoene, although some have also reduced their public safety staffs.
Kojagari Lakshmi Puja is observed on the Purnima (full moon day) after Durga Puja. Kojagari Lakshmi Puja 2009 date is October 3. Kojagari Laxmi Pooja is dedicated to Goddess Lakshmi and is observed in Bengal, Orissa, and other parts of eastern India and also in some regions in western India.
In Hinduism, Goddess Lakshmi symbolizes prosperity and wealth and it is believed that on Kojagari Poornima night in Aashin month or Ashwin Mahina she visits the homes of devotees and blesses them. Therefore special Laksmi Puja is held in the evening on the day in homes.
On the day women draw Alpana or Alpona patterns (something similar to Rangoli) at homes. Most preferred Alpana is that of Goddess Lakshmi's feet.
In Bengal and other parts of Eastern India, Goddess Lakshmi is believed to be the daughter of Goddess Durga.
Small clay idols of Goddess Lakshmi are installed in many households and in pandals for community puja. The rituals associated with Lakshmi puja varies locally and is also different for different communities. The pandals which were erected for Durga Puja also conduct the traditional Kojagari Lakshmi Puja.
Elaborate traditional Lakshmi Pujas, which needs the help of a priest or elderly person, are conducted on the day by communities and organizations.
Today, many people also perform a simple Kojagari Lakshmi Puja on the day at home sticking to the main traditions.
Special vegetarian dishes, fruits and sweets are offered to Goddess Lakshmi on the day.
You may also like to read
Kojagari Lakshmi Puja Story - Kojagari Laxmi Puja Vrat Katha
http://www.hindu-blog.com/2009/09/kojagari-lakshmi-puja-2009-laxmi-pooja.html
Price rise mars Bengal's basics
| Font Size |
Express News Service
Posted: Oct 03, 2009 at 0234 hrs IST
Kolkata Frugal welcome for Goddess of Wealth as fruit
prices shoot north
This year, celebrating Lakshmi Puja could leave a hole in your pocket. With prices of fruits and vegetables at an all-time high, consumers have been left fuming.
"Forget about Lakshmi Puja. If this continues then it will become difficult to even eat after a while. The prices of fruits and vegetables have risen so much that it is becoming difficult to hold Lakshmi Puja these days and we might even be compelled to discontinue the tradition," said an angry Jaya Basu, a resident of Shyampukur Street in north Kolkata.
Vendors say they are helpless as the production has been low this year which has led to an astronomical hike in prices. The prices have risen sharply from what it was three months ago. "A few months ago, we would sell potatoes at Rs 7 a kg but now we are selling it at Rs 22 a kg," said Shankar, a vegetable vendor in New Market.
Vendors say prices have more than doubled from what it was last year. Last year, apples were being sold at Rs 40 a kg and humble cucumber at Rs 10 a kg. This year, apples cost Rs 60-70 per kg and cucumber Rs 15 a kg. (See Box for other items)
"Nowadays people think twice before buying fruits and vegetables in bulk, and buy exactly what they need. Most believe we are trying to rip them off, but if we keep reducing the prices then how are we supposed to survive either?" said Kesto Das, another vendor in New Market.
The only relief is that the prices now have gone down marginally as compared to what it was a week ago during the peak of Durga Puja celebrations.
"Due to the Pujas, the stock had been held up and it is now reaching the market. This has to an extent pushed down the prices in comparison to what it was even a week ago," said Bilu, a fruit vendor at Hathibagan market.
Till last week, apples were selling at Rs 100 and cucumbers at Rs 25 a kg.
| Lakshmi Puja | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
 | Lakshmi Puja is another Bengali festival that is celebrated in every household. Goddess Lakshmi, the Goddess of wealth is worshipped just after Durga Puja. Lakshmi is one of the daughters of Durga who symbolizes wealth, peace and prosperity. On a full moon night people worship her at their homes and pray for her bessings. All the rites performed during the | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Lakshmi Puja are followed with utmost care and the Lakshmi Puja time schedule is also maintained well by the devoted. Delicious Bengali Recipes on Lakshmi Puja night are cooked and are then given to Goddess Laxmi as an offering.It is considered that Goddess Lakshmi visits homes of the devotees and replenishes them with wealth. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Goddess Lakshmi has generally been thought to have existed first as the daughter of the sage Bhrigu and to have taken refuge in the ocean of milk during a period when the gods were exiled from their kingdom as a result of a rishi's curse. She was reborn during the churning of the milk ocean as Lakshmi, one of the fourteen precious things.The Goddess of Wealth, emerged from the ocean forth fully grown | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| and radiant, bearing a lotus in her hand. Goddess Lakshmi was then married to Vishnu and has a clear share in Vishnu's activities as preserver, and this reinforces her earlier character as goddess of fortune and giver of wealth. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Accessories required for Kojagari Lakshmi Puja______________ | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Price-rise woes in worship of wealth goddess - Households prune budgets and guest lists to compensate for 28 per cent jump in rates of puja items | |||
| DEEPANKAR GANGULY | |||
The goddess of wealth is feeling the price pinch this Lakshmi puja. An average 28 per cent increase in the prices of various commodities since last autumn has forced most Calcuttans to prune their budgets for Saturday night's puja to the bare minimum. "We have organised puja at home like every year but our guest list includes only a few relatives. We would earlier invite close to 80 people. A kg of sona moong dal (a must-have for the traditional puja bhog) costs Rs 90 now; how can the average family afford such a luxury?" wondered government employee Joyeeta Banerjee, shopping at Gariahat market on Friday. More than 3 lakh households in the city are estimated to organise Lakshmi puja at home, spending Rs 2,000 on an average on the midnight rituals and the vegetarian feast that follows. "That translates into something like a Rs 100-crore market, which is huge for a single-day festival that does not include the revelry associated with Durga and Kali puja," said an official of the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority's social welfare wing. Going by the prevailing rate charts at New Market, Gariahat and Sealdah, which usually attract the most shoppers on Lakshmi puja-eve, the prices of all items except white poppy seeds have risen sharply since last October. Potato, available for Rs 9 a kg last Lakshmi puja, has burned the biggest hole in the pocket with a more than 100 per cent jump in price. A kg of good-quality potato costs Rs 22 and brinjal is priced at Rs 35, up by around Rs 10. Mustard oil has become dearer by around Rs 8 a litre.
Randhir Kumar Gupta, who owns a shop in New Market, said prices could peak in the fortnight leading to Diwali. "The trend has been there all year but the biggest jump was before Id and Durga puja. If there is any possibility of the graph sliding, it will be after Diwali." Wholesalers blame the poor start to the monsoon and the damage wrought by the cyclone Aila in May for the rising prices. For homemaker Maya Dutta, a resident of Ramgarh, not being able to organise Lakshmi puja the way she would have liked to is the saddest part of the price-rise story. "What is the government doing? It has no control over market prices. What bhog will we offer the goddess?" The traditional Lakshmi puja fare includes khichuri made of Govindabhog rice and sona moong dal, accompanied by fried brinjal and spinach, potato and cauliflower curry, tomato chutney and payesh. Ramen Saha, a trader at Sealdah market, said business volumes were definitely lower than last year. "The flow of customers hasn't been affected but people are buying less because of the price rise." |
Lakshmi
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| This article may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. Please improve this article if you can. (August 2008) |
| Lakshmi | |
|---|---|
 Lakshmi by Raja Ravi Varma. | |
| Devanagari | लक्ष्मी |
| Affiliation | Devi (Tridevi), Shakti |
| Consort | Vishnu |
| Mount | Owl |
Lakshmi (Sanskrit: लक्ष्मी lakṣmī, Hindi pronunciation: [ˈləkʂ.miː]) is the Hindu goddess of wealth, prosperity, light, wisdom, fortune, fertility, generosity and courage; and the embodiment of beauty, grace and charm. Representations of Lakshmi (or Shri) are found also in Jain monuments.
She is believed to protect her devotees from all kinds of misery and money-related sorrows.
Lakshmi in Sanskrit is derived from its elemental form "lakS," meaning to perceive or observe.[1] This is synonymous with lakṣya, meaning aim or objective. Lakshmi is thus goddess of the means to achieving objectives, including prosperity in the lives of humankind.
She is the consort of Vishnu[2] and married Rama (in her incarnation as Sita) and Krishna (as Radha [3][4][5] and later Rukmini).
Contents[hide] |
[edit] Evolution and Legends
Deva and Asuras were both mortal (mrita) at one time. Seeking immortality, they churned the ocean of milk. Vishnu incarnated as "kurma" the tortoise, on which was placed a mountain, and Vasuki the great venom spewing serpent was wrapped around it and used to churn the ocean.
A host of divine celestial objects came up during the churning. Among these, importantly, was Goddess Lakshmi, the daughter of the king of the milky ocean. The last to come up was "amritam", the "nectar of immortality". With this the avatar of "kurma", the tortoise ended. Vishnu, then took up form of a beautiful maiden to distract "raakshasas" and gave immortality to the "deva". Sri Lakshmi, very much later married Shri Vishnu. Shri is a honorific address that is probably derived from Lakshmi and is used until the present day for males all over India. The equivalent for married females is "Srimati".
The moon also appeared from the ocean during the churning, the 'moon' (chandra) making it her brother. Alakshmi, the goddess of misfortune, is Lakshmi's elder sister. According to the Vishnu Purana, Lakshmi is the daughter of Bhrigu and Khyaati and resided in Swarga but due to the curse of Durvasa, she left Swarga and made Ksheersagara her home.
The etymology and meanings of the word lakshmi is best given in Monier Williams' Sanskrit–English Dictionary compiled in the 19th century in British India.
1. laksmIka meaning a mark, sign, token is in Rik Veda x, 71, 2 and Nirukta iv, 10.
2. laksmi ( with or without pAp'I ) is a bad sign or an impending misfortune referred to Atharva Veda and Apasthambha Shrauta Suutra.
3. In older Sanskrit language it is used used usually with "p'uNyA" meaning a good sign, good fortune, prosperity, success, happiness in Atharva Veda.
4. Laksmi personifies wealth, riches, beauty , loveliness , grace , charm , splendour , lustre in Mahabharata.
5. Laksmi as noun is goddess of fortune and beauty ( frequently in the later mythology identified with Śrī and regarded as the wife of Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa )
6. According to Sir Monier Williams, "Religious thought and life in India", 45 , 40-43 she sprang with other precious things from the foam of the ocean when churned by the gods and demons for the recovery of the Amṛta. She appeared with a lotus in her hand , whence she is also called Padmā.
7. According to another legend she appeared at the creation floating over the water on the expanded petals of a lotusflower , she is also variously regarded as a wife of Sūrya, as a wife of Prajā-pati, as a wife of Dharma and mother of Kāma, as sister or mother of Dhātṛ and Vidhātṛ, as wife of Datt^atreya, as one of the 9 Śaktis of Viṣṇu, as a manifestation of Prakṛti &c., as identified with Dākshāyaṇī in Bharat^aśrama, and with Sītā, wife of Rāma, and with other women )
[edit] Explanation of Mahalakshmi
Mahalakshmi is the presiding Goddess of the Middle episode of Devi Mahatmya. Here she is depicted as Devi in her universal form as Shakti. The manifestation of the Devi to kill Mahishasura is formed by the effulgences of all the gods. The Goddess is described as eighteen armed bearing string of beads, battle axe, maze, arrow, thunderbolt, lotus, bow, water-pot, cudgel, lance, sword, shield, conch, bell, wine-cup, trident, noose and the discus sudarsana. She has a complexion of coral and is seated on a lotus.[6] She is known as Ashta Dasa Bhuja Mahalakshmi.
She is seen in two forms, Bhudevi and Sridevi, both either side of Sri Venkateshwara or Vishnu. Bhudevi is the representation and totally of the Material world or energy called the aparam Prakriti, in which She is called Mother Earth. Sridevi is the Spiritual world or energy called the Param Prakriti. Most people are mistaken that they are separate beings although they are one, Lakshmi. Lakshmi is the power of Lord Vishnu.[citation needed]
Mahalakshmi's presence is also found on Lord Sri Venkateswara (at Tirumala) or Vishnu's chest, at the Heart. Lakshmi is the embodiment of Love, from which devotion to God or Bhakti flows from. It is through Love/Bhakti or Lakshmi that the atma or soul is able to reach God or Vishnu. Lakshmi plays a special role as the mediator between her husband Lord Vishnu and his worldly devotees. While Vishnu is often conceived of as a stern, easily-perturbed patriarch, Lakshmi represents a more soothing, warm and approachable mother figure who willingly intervenes in the lives of devotees on his behalf. Often, it is Lakshmi who acts as the advocate for the request of a given mortal. When asking Vishnu for grace or the forgiveness of sins, Hindus often approach him through the intermediary presence of Lakshmi.[7] She is also the personification of the Spiritual energy within us and universe called Kundalini. Also, she embodies the spiritual world, also known as Vaikunta; the abode of Lakshmi-Narayana or Vishnu, or what would be considered Heaven in Vaishnavism. She is also the Divine qualities of God and the soul. Lakshmi is the embodiment of God's superior spiritual feminine energy or the Param Prakriti, which purifies, empowers and uplifts the individual. Hence, she is called the Goddess of Fortune. Due to her motherly feelings and being the consort of Narayan (Supreme Being), She is believed as the Mother of the Universe.[8][9][10]
[edit] Epithets
Lakshmi has many names. She is known to be very closely associated with the Lotus, and her many epithets are connected to the flower, such as:
- Padma: lotus dweller.
- Kamala: lotus dweller.
- Padmapriya: One who likes lotuses
- Padmamaladhara devi: One who wears a garland of lotuses
- Padmamukhi: One whose face is as beautiful as a lotus
- Padmakshi: One whose eyes are as beautiful as a lotus
- Padmahasta: One who holds a lotus
- Padmasundari: One who is as beautiful as a lotus
- Vishnupriya: One who is the beloved of Vishnu
- Ulkavahini: One who rides an owl
Her other names include: Rama, Indira, Manushri, Chakrika, Kamalika, Lalima, Nandika, Rujula, Vaishnavi, Narayani, Bhargavi, Sridevi, Chanchala, Bhumi Devi, Jalaja, and Aiswarya. She is also referred to as Jaganmaatha (mother of the universe) in Shri Mahalakshmi Ashtakam. Rama and Indira are popular.
[edit] Iconography
Physically, goddess Lakshmi is described as a fair lady, with four arms, standing upon a lotus, dressed in fine garments and precious jewels, bestowing coins of prosperity and flanked by elephants signifying her royal power. However in some texts, she has an owl as her vahana. Her expression is always calm and loving. The most striking feature of the iconography of Lakshmi is her persistent association with the lotus. The meaning of the lotus in relation to Shri-Lakshmi refers to purity and spiritual power. Rooted in the mud, but blossoming above the water, completely uncontaminated by the mud, the lotus represents spiritual perfection and authority which rises above worldly contamination. Furthermore, the lotus seat is a common motif in Hindu iconography. The lotus also symbolizes the fertile growth of organic life, as the world is continually reborn on a lotus growing out of Vishnu's navel. Lakshmi is worshiped daily, but special focus is given in the month of October. Her worship ceremonies include people offering food and sweets, chanting her 108 names, prayers repeated, and devotional songs being sung.
Goddess Lakshmi's traditionally accepted vehicle, the owl (Ulooka in Sanskrit), is a bird that sleeps through the day and prowls through the night.
A 1400 years old - rare granite sculpture of Goddess Lakshmi has been recovered at the Waghama village along the Jehlum in Anantnag district of Jammu and Kashmir[11]
[edit] Ashta Lakshmi
Ashta Lakshmi (Sanskrit: अष्टलक्ष्मी,Aṣṭalakṣmī, lit. "eight Lakshmis") are a group of eight secondary manifestations of the goddess Lakshmi, who preside over eight sources of wealth and thus represent the powers of Shri-Lakshmi. They are:
| 1) | आदि लक्ष्मी | Ādi Lakṣmī | [The First manifestation of Lakshmi] | |
| 2) | धान्य लक्ष्मी | Dhānya Lakṣmī | [Granary wealth] | |
| 3) | धैर्य लक्ष्मी | Dhairya Lakṣmī | [Wealth of courage] | |
| 4) | गज लक्ष्मी | Gaja Lakṣmī | [Elephants, symbols of wealth] | |
| 5) | सन्तान लक्ष्मी | Santāna Lakṣmī | [Wealth of continuity, progeny] | |
| 6) | विजय लक्ष्मी | Vijaya Lakṣmī | [Wealth of victory] | |
| 7) | विद्या लक्ष्मी | Vidyā Lakṣmī | [Wealth of knowledge and education] | |
| 8) | धन लक्ष्मी | Dhana Lakṣmī | [Monetary wealth] |
[edit] Celebration in Hindu society
Hindus worship Lakshmi the most on Diwali, the festival of lights. According to tradition people would put small oil lamps outside their homes on Diwali and hope Lakshmi will come to bless them.
The prefix Sri (also spelled as Shri, pronounced as shree) renders as 'one who takes delight in' Sri Lakshmi, meaning wealth, wealth of any kind. Any thing that need be affluent gets the auspicious prefix or suffix 'Lakshmi', or 'Sri' like Rajya Lakshmi (Wealth of Empire), Shanti Sri (Wealth of Peace), etc. In modern India, common titles standing in for the English Mr. and Mrs. are Shri (also Sri or Shree) and Shrimati (also Srimati or Shreemati), as in "Sri Gupta" or "Srimati Mangeshkar".
In Uttarakhand, after the worship of the goddess on Diwali night, the Shankha or Conch is not blown. This is because the shankha is also from the ocean like the goddess herself, so it is given a day of rest.
Karaveera Nivasini Mahalakshmi also known as Ambabai is the patron goddess of Kolhapur city, Maharashtra.
[edit] Lakshmi Puja in Bengal
In Bengal, Lakshmi is worshiped during a night in Autumn when the moon is full, the brightest night of the year. It is believed that she showers wealth on this night. She, along with her mount, the great white owl, descends to earth and takes away the darkness of poverty, stagnation, anger, and laziness from our lives. The significance of her vahana owl is that it represents the royalties and riches, which always serve at her feet; and over whom she has full control. She is also referred to as pranadayini(giver of vital life-sustaining energy) who can turn a dull thing into full of life.
She is depicted in a red costume, which represents continuous activity, or in a golden costume representing fulfillment. She wears ornaments full of gold and a golden crown with ruby studded. Her hair is long, dark and wavy. Her complexion is golden, representing boon-giver. She shows the abhaya mudra or the gyan mudra with her right hand and holds a potful of gold in her left arm and rice crop in her left hand.
In the Sri Vaishnava philosophy however, Sri (Lakshmi) is honored as the "Iswarigm sarva bhootanam" i.e. the Supreme goddess and not just the goddess of wealth.
[edit] Lakshmi Puja in Orissa
Manabasa Gurubara
With the harvest brought home the farmers feel greatly satisfied with the yield. After six months of toil in the field, they fill the granaries with the blessings of Goddess Lakshmi. So, the whole month of Margashira(December-January) is spent in worshipping the Goddess. All the rituals connected with the festival "Manabasa Gurubara" or "Lakshmi Puja" is done by housewives themselves. On each Thursday of the month the houses are plastered with cow-dung, the floors are decorated with beautiful floral designs drawn with rice-powder mixed with water. This is called Jhoti. Footmarks are painted from the doorstep to the place of worship as if Goddess Lakshmi has entered the house. The roofs are decorated with flower garlands and festoon woven out of paddy stalks. Main Ritual After purificatory bath in the morning the housewives worship the Goddess, not through an image but significantly through paddy-measures. Different varieties of rice-cakes and 'Kshiri' (rice-soup prepared with milk and sugar) are prepared in every household and are offered to the deity and then taken by all. The Legend In the evening the 'Laxmi Purana' is read or recited in which an interesting story is told. Once Shreeya, an untouchable woman worshipped Goddess Lakshmi by observing this festival. Being moved by her devotion Lakshmi left Her permanent abode, the temple which is situated inside the campus of the temple of Lord Jagannatha and visited Shreeya's house. When Lord Balabhadra, the elder brother of Lord Jagannatha came to know about this, She was declared defiled and was not allowed to come back into the temple. Lakshmi was deeply hurt and went to her father Sahara.
When Lakshmi went out of the temple all wealth in the temple started vanishing. Later the Gods Balabhadra and Jagannatha couldn't find food to sustain themselves. They came out of the temple in the attire of Brahmin beggars in search of food. Ultimately they landed at the door of the Goddess Lakshmi. Balabhadra apologised for the mistake and all of them returned to the temple.
The 'Purana' ultimately teaches all to pay extreme regard to Goddess Lakshmi and the person who disregards Her is sure to fall on evil days. This means that wealth should be well protected and properly used and misutilisation of wealth is sure to make a person suffer.
GajaLakshmi Puja
Gaja Lakshmi Puja is celebrated in the Sharad Purnima, full-moon day in the Oriya month of Aswina(September- October). This autumn festival is one of the most popular and important festival of Orissa. The goddess of wealth is worshipped for one day and in some places it is celebrated for 7 to10 days. and the festival is religiously celebrated by the business community in Orissa. In all over Orissa richly decorated and beautiful made images of Goddess Gaja Lakshmi are installed and the festival instills a spirit of holiness and sanctity into the whole community so much so that people of other faiths participate in it with abundant warmth and sincerity. In Orissa, this festival also known as Kumar Purnima falls on the fullmoon - Purnima. Girls and Boys wear new clothes and generally have a good time with family and friends.
Main Ritual In the early morning the girls after their purificatory bath wear new garments and make food-offerings to the Sun. They observe fasting for the day. In the evening when the moon rises they again make food offerings of a special variety and take it after the rituals are over.
It is a festival of rejoicing for the girls. All of them sing and dance. The songs are of special nature. They also play a kind of game known as 'Puchi'. They also indulge in other varieties of country-games
[edit] Worship
Two of the most famous prayers for worshipping Ma Lakshmi are: Sri Lakshmi Stuti By Indra and Sri Sukta. There is another famous prayer pronounced by the great sage Agastua: Agastya Lakshmi Stotra. Although Mother Lakshmi is worshipped as the Goddess of fortune, when she is worshipped with Narayana the worshipper is blessed with not only wealth but also peace and prosperity. They can be worshipped in various forms such as Lakshmi Narayana, Lakshmi Narasimha, Sita Rama, Radha Krishna, Vithal Rukmini. Another lesser known form of Lakshmi is worshipped in Karnatka as Attilakamma which is a furious form of Lakshmi and also her sisters Jalgeramma and Doddamma. Here people offer blood to these goddesses and all the desires are fulfilled.
[edit] Temples
- Padmavati Temple,Tirupati.
- Ashta Lakshmi Temple, Chennai.
- Mahalakshmi Temple,Kolhapur.
- Mahalakshmi Temple,Mumbai.
[edit] See also
| Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Lakshmi |
- Ashta Lakshmi
- Hindu goddess
- Laxminarayan
- Brahmotsavam
- Doddagaddavalli - Lakshmi temple location
- Mantra
[edit] References
- ^ Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary.
- ^ Bhagavata Purana:8.8.23-24
- ^ Encyclopaedia of Hindu gods and goddesses By Suresh Chandra http://books.google.co.in/books?id=mfTE6kpz6XEC&pg=PA199&dq=goddess+lakshmi
- ^ http://www.festivalsinindia.net/goddesses/radha.html
- ^ Radha in Hinduism, the favourite mistress of the god Krishna, and an incarnation of Lakshmi. In devotional religion she represents the longing of the human soul for God: The Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable | 2006 | ELIZABETH KNOWLES |
- ^ Sankaranarayanan, S., Glory of the Divine Mother (Devī Māhātmyam), Nesma Books, India, 2001. (ISBN 81-87936-00-2), P 148.
- ^ Pages 31 and 32 in Kinsley, David. Hindu Goddesses: Vision of the Divine Feminine in the Hindu Religious Traditions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. ISBN 978-0520063396 http://books.google.co.in/books?id=hgTOZEyrVtIC&pg=PA17&dq=Hindu+Goddesses:+Vision+of+the+Divine+Feminine+in+the+Hindu+Religious+Traditions.&client=firefox-a#PPA31,M1
- ^ Lot of information on this site. Contains her many names.http://www.vishvarupa.com/print-information-about-lakshmi.html
- ^ http://www.lakshmisgarden.com/p_aboutlaks.shtml
- ^ http://www.yogalife.net/gods-n-goddesses.html http://www.glossary.com/encyclopedia.php?q=Lakshmi
- ^ http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20090413/j&k.htm#20
[edit] Further reading
- Hindu Goddesses: Vision of the Divine Feminine in the Hindu Religious Traditions (ISBN 81-208-0379-5) by David Kinsley
- Lakshmi Puja and Thousand Names (ISBN 1-887472-84-3) by Swami Satyananda Saraswati
[edit] External links
- Other Forms of Tanjore Paintings Lakshmi
- Know about Goddess Sri Lakshmi - Know about Sri Lakshmi and Her other Forms.
- Devotional hymns and eulogies on Lakshmi
Ashtalakshmi.com
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